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ABSTRACT
The International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC) is a new permanent
international judicial tribunal which plays an important role in combating international
crimes and dispensing justice. It was established in 1998 by the international community
after much effort and compromise. It is designed to be an independent international body,
with the autonomy to determine its budget and control its funding.
This study discusses how the ICC acts as a mechanism to create a nexus between
international criminal and humanitarian law by prosecuting crimes like genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression, that fall within its jurisdiction.
The study seeks to show that the international jurisdiction of the ICC is a potential
safeguard against arbitrary national criminal procedures in respect of those who are
accused of committing serious international crimes. The ICe's jurisdiction is
complementary to that of national courts that are unable or unwilling to investigate and
prosecute these crimes. National judicial systems are still required to play a primary role
in combating international crimes and it is important that states, organisations and
individuals assist the ICC if it is to become an effective deterrent to perpetrators of
international crimes. The rationale behind the ICe's establishment is that the
international community is under a legal obligation to prosecute violations of
international law in either national or international courts.
The study also analyses the role of the ICC in balancing the rights of the victims
and the rights of the accused by applying the guarantees and safeguards for conducting
fair trials set out in the Rome Treaty. In this way, it seeks to show that prosecuting and
punishing perpetrators of international crimes is an important contributing factor in the
creation of a human rights' culture, while also serving as a deterrent to prospective





Communities around the world see the eradication of crime as a means of achieving
peace and stability within states. States that are able to protect their citizens by preventing
crime and extending protection to those who are accused of wrongdoing are likely to
have a relatively high standard of human rights.
A high standard of human rights cannot be attained unless states recognise that
certain crimes must be tried either nationally or internationally. Nation states must, in fact
co-operate to provide effective prosecution and sentencing of offenders. 1 In this age,
more than ever, crimes are committed against people that constitute an assault on
humanity in general, and these require a concerted response from as many nations as
possible.'
The twentieth century has witnessed wars that have brought about atrocities on an
unprecedented scale. The Second World War (hereinafter WWII) resulted in great
devastation: millions of men, women, and children were killed.3 An estimated one
hundred and seventy million people have died in two hundred and fifty conflicts since
WWII.4 Since then, the international community has had a growing interest in the
establishment of a permanent international criminal tribunal to serve as a deterrent to
prospective perpetrators of international crimes."
1 Stewart, N. 1999. "The Permanent International Criminal Court". Available at
www.hardwickecrime.co.uk/resources/articles/9910270I.htm (accessed on 20 May 2004).
2 Waynecourt-Steele, T. 1997. "A Universal Extradition Treaty Linked to the International Criminal Court
as a Solution to the Problems with the Existing Law of Extradition". Masters Dissertation: pI.
3 See generally Bassoiuni, M.C. 1997. "From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court", Harvard Human Rights Law Journal, 10.
4 Sadat, L.N. and Carden, R.S. 2000. "The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution",
Georgetown Law Journal, 18 (March): p384 .
5 The term 'international community' is used in this dissertation to refer to the member states of the UN.
6 Mirceva, S. 2004. "Why the International Criminal Court Is Different". Available at
www.globalpolicy.org/intjustice/icc/2004/0126different.htm (accessed on 2 February 2004).
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The international community wants to bring about a situation in which countries .
will not be allowed to give refuge to heads of states who have been accused of large-scale
crimes such as Idi Amin," Augusto Pinochet" and others". A campaign sponsored by
states, government organisations , non-government organisations (hereinafter NGOs) and
individuals to establish a permanent tribunal for the prosecution of serious international
crimes was set up in 1994 and has since gained momentum.10
In 1995, the United Nations (hereinafter UN) General Assembly established the
first Preparatory Committee (hereinafter PrepCom).ll It was tasked with the worldwide
negotiation and drafting of a treaty for the establishment of an ICC.12 From its inception,
PrepCom worked on the drafts of this treaty" On 17 June 1998, the necessity for
intensive co-operation to suppress "the most serious international crimes" led the
plenipotentiaries of member-states of the UN to adopt the Rome Treaty (hereinafter
Rome Statute) for the establishment of an ICc. 14 One hundred and twenty states voted in
favour of the Rome Statute. 15 Seven states voted against it, namely, the United States
(hereinafter US), China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar and Yemen. Twenty-one states,
including Russia, abstained from voting.16
7 Idi Amin was the Commander-in-Chiefin Uganda . In 1971 he seized control of the Ugandan government.
It is alleged that Amin was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans in 1976. He
died in 2003 in Jada in Saudi Arabia .
8 Augusto Pinochet, the former Chilean president , overthrew president Salvador Allende in 1973. On 16
October 1998 he was arrested in London. On 29 January 2001 the Chilean Supreme Court placed him
under house arrest. He faces more than two hundred accusations of crimes committed by him during his
period in power. The Chilean prosecutor alleges that Pinochet committed torture and murder and killed
prisoners.
9 Roth, K. 2003. "New Justice vs. Impunity" . Available at www.hrw.org/editorials/2003/icc061803.htm
(accessed on 11 December 2003).
10 Note 1 above.
11 UN Doc. AJRES/50/46 (1995).
12 Note 1 above.
13 Ibid.
14 Sadat, L.N. 2000. "The Evolution of the ICC : From The Hague to Rome and Back Again" . In Sewall,
S.B. and Kaysen , C. (eds). The United States and the International Criminal Court: National Security and
Int ernational Law : p41 .
15 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), UN Doe. 2187 U.N.T.S . 3 (1998).
Available at www.un.org/}aw/icc (accessed on 29 November 2003).
16 The Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
the International Criminal Court 15 June-17 July 1998, UN Doe, A/CONF.183/1O (1998). Available at
www.un .org/law/icc (accessed on 30 November 2003).
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1.2 The Importance of the International Criminal Court
Since the establishment of the UN, 17 there have been major developments in international
criminal law.18 It is submitted that the ICC has been the most important achievement in
human rights and international humanitarian law. It provides the means for the
international community to try those accused of international crimes and reduce
infringements of human rights . By dispensing justice to all categories of criminals who
breach laws the ICC makes effective the enforcement of international criminal law.
19
,
The ICC deals with 'international crimes" when those in power do not intend or
do not have the power to prosecute wrongdoers . In this regard it is submitted that the
'universal jurisdiction'f" of the ICC fills a gap where national legal procedures may
shield the perpetrators of international crimes.
The ICC is also an important instrument in the preservation of human rights, with
emphasis on the right to protection of the physical and mental integrity of human
beings.zz Regardless of whether the person in question is the accused, the witness, or the
victim, he or she, during the period of detention, has the right to freedom from arbitrary
detention, or any credible threat , be it mental, physical or sexual, as well as from murder
. h Z3or In uman treatment.
17 The Charter of the United Nations (1945) . Available at www.unhchr.cMltml/menu3/b/ch-cont.htm
(accesscd on 11 June 2004) .
18 Note 16 above.
19 Note 4 above.
20 It meant by the term 'international crimes ' , not only crimes committed between nations , but also crimes
the gravity of which is such that they deserve to be identified and condemned by the international
community. Chapter 3.1 of this dissertation will further clarify this point.
21 The universal jurisdiction of national courts means that states have jurisdiction to try the accused persons
in their custody for crimes committed abroad. The universal jurisdiction of the ICC means that the ICC has
jurisdiction over the accused persons of states which are not party to the Rome Statute when the alleged
crimes are committed in territories of a state party to the Statute. See Douglas, L. 2004. "Judgments
Unlimited", The Times Literary Supplement, 24 September: p6.
22 Mayerfeld , 1. 2003. "Who shall be Judge? The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the
Global Enforcement of Human Right", Human Rights Quarterly, 25(1) : p99.
23 Articles 6, 10, and 12 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (1966), entered into
force on 23 March 1976, UN Doc. N6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S . 171. Available at
www1.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm (accessed on 12 June 2004).
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The present study discusses the justice that will be conferred on the victims of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The ICC may compensate the victims through
the Trust Fund (a financial organ of the ICC that compensates the victims of crimes under
its jurisdictionj.i" In order to analyse the role of the ICC in balancing the rights of the
victims and the rights of the accused, the study will explore the various rights conferred
upon the accused and the victims.
It is submitted that the international jurisdiction of the ICC is a potential
safeguard against arbitrary national criminal procedures in respect of those who are
accused of committing serious international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. It is submitted that in the international
effort to deter people from committing serious international crimes, it is vital to ensure
that those who enforce the law do not violate human rights.
1.3 Research Approach and Methods
Data was gathered from the most important documents on the basis ofwhich the ICC was
established, as well as from historical documents that were prepared before the
establishment of the ICC . This study takes into consideration the Rome Statute, the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC25 (an instrument for the application of the Rome
Statute), the Elements of Crimes" (an instrument to assist the ICC in the interpretation
and application of Articles 6, 7 and 8, and which is consistent with the Rome Statute) and
PrepCom documents.r Consideration was given to ad hoc documents on the
establishment of the ICC,28 as well as other documents issued at the UN Diplomatic
24 Article 79, note 15 above.
25 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (2000), UN Doe.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add. I. Available at www.icc-cpi.int/php?id=ru1es (accessed on 30 May 2004) .
26 The Elements of Crimes (2000), UN Doe. PCNICC/2000/lIAdd.2. Available at www.icc-
cpi.int/basicdocs/elements.htm (accessed on 30 May 2004).
27 Preparatory Commission documents (1996-1997), UN Doc. AlRES/511207 (1996) and UN Doc.
AlRES/52/160 (1997). Available at www.un.org/law/icc (accessed on 20 November 2004).
28 Ad Hoc Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court documents (1995), UN Doe,
A/49/53 (1994). Available at www.un.org/law/icc (accessed on 20 November 2003).
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Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
(hereinafter the Rome Conference) ." Secondary sources were textbooks, journals, reports
and articles and critical and evaluative works on the primary data.
1.4 The Structure of the Research
The purpose of this research was to look at the normative role of the ICC as a mechanism
to prosecute international crimes. The relevant functions of the ICC were summarised in
each chapter in order to analyse how guilt or innocence and punishment should be
determined, the ways in which the ICC may enforce penalties and the role of the UN
Security Council (hereinafter UNSC) in facilitating the task of the ICC to discourage
such crimes in future.
To understand the principles underlying the formation of the ICC, a literature
review was provided in chapter two. An attempt was made in chapter three to illustrate
and investigate some criminal acts that fall under the jurisdiction ofthe ICC. This chapter
investigates the definitions of the crimes in the Rome Statute, and emphasises the
necessity for their being prosecuted. The second part of chapter three investigates crimes
that are not under the jurisdiction of the ICe.
This study investigates crimes codified in the Rome Statute in the light of the four
Geneva Conventions.i'' The study also determines the essential character of some acts
that constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, in order to analyse the
developments in international criminal law in terms of the Rome Statute.
In chapter four, the functions of the ICC were examined. Explanations was
offered as to why co-operation between states and the ICC is required in terms of the
principle of complementarity - that is, that the jurisdiction ofthe ICC is supplementary to
29 Note 16above.
30 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protectionof CivilianPersonsin Time of War (12 August 1949), 6
D.S.T 3516,75 D.N.T.S287 (1949). Available at www.icao.intlicao/enlleb/Genev.htm (accessed on 20
November 2003).
6
that of the national courts. The circumstances in which priority should be given to the
national jurisdiction of a state, rather than the lee, was explained. Finally, the role of the
ICe was critically assessed.
Further this thesis examined whether or not the role of the lee is one of effective,
deterrence to those intending to commit crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICe. Chapter
five outlines the future role of the ICC and reaches the conclusion that despite the
reluctance of nations to surrender any part of their national sovereignty, members of the
international community are beginning to realise that the ICC must have an effective
system of prosecuting international crimes. A number of recommendations were made as
to how this can be facilitated.
1.5 The Extent to which the International Criminal Court Can Dispense Justice
The Rome Statute has paved the way for international co-operation in the acquisition and
exchange of information" which, it is submitted, will enhance the ability of the
international community to combat international crimes and will therefore act as a
deterrent to these crimes. Since the ICC needs to obtain evidence, it has the right to
request crucial information at the commencement of any investigation, through
diplomatic or any other appropriate channel, and to require the states parties to co-operate
. h i 32WIt It.
It is submitted that successful, that is to say, just judgments require full co-
operation from states, organisations and individuals. The ICC may request information
from states parties without prejudice to the sovereignty and privacy of the concerned
state." The study will seek to review the duty of states parties to bring their laws into
conformity with the Rome Statute, in order that the latter may be properly applied.
31 Article 86, note 15 above.
32 Article 87(a), note 15 above.
33 Article 72(1), (2) and (3), note 15 above .
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In 2007, the first review of the Rome Statute will be held . The UN Secretary-
General will invite countries that participated in the Rome Conference as well as those
who were invited to participate, but did not attend, to a Review Conference."
Participating states have yet to agree on the definition of aggression as an international
crime, and the conditions under which the ICC will have jurisdiction over the crime of
. 35
aggression.
It is submitted that the ICC has the right to act on behalf of the international
community to combat international crimes and uphold justice. Prince Zeid Bin Raad Al
Hussein, president of the ASP and Jordanian envoy to the UN said, "The ICC is not just a
court on paper. Now we have a very final legal instrument in place .,,36 It is submitted that
a proper assessment of the functions of the ICC will determine what steps should be
taken in the future to deter crimes within its jurisdiction.
34 Annex I, Resolution F, note 16 above.
35 Clark, R. 1999. "Article 123: Review of the Statute". In Triffterer, O. (ed). Commentary on the Rome
Statute ofthe International Criminal Court: p1273.
36 Rizvi , H. 200.2. "Rights: NGOs Win Fight for Equal Representation of the ICC Judges". Available at
www.globalpohcy.org/nogs/rol/globalact/int-inst/2002/0907icc.htm (accessed on 4 March 2004).
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CHAPTER TWO
The Establishment of the International Criminal Court
2.1 Historical Attempts to Establish an International Criminal Court with
'Universal Jurisdiction'
The idea of establishing a criminal court with 'universal jurisdiction' is not new.
Centuries before the International Military Tribunals established to try alleged German
war criminals (hereinafter the Nuremberg Tribunals) were set up by the four major Allies
in WWII namely, the US, the United Kingdom (hereinafter UK), France and the former
Soviet Union, scholars, philosophers and distinguished jurists toyed with the idea of a
mechanism to prosecute international crimes.37 Their purpose was to establish an
international tribunal with unlimited jurisdiction to try offenders who committed
atrocities in times of war and peace."
In 1474, the first recorded instance of an international court, in the international
military tribunal sense, was constituted in the duchy of Burgundy by Charles the Bold,
Duke of Burgundy.j" This tribunal tried and convicted Peter von Hagenbach of murder,
rape, perjury and other crimes violating 'the laws of God and man' after hostilities had
ceased between him and the coalition rebels." However, this was 'victors' justice' set up
by those who had had triumphed, similar to the ad hoc tribunal which sat at Nuremberg
five centuries later." It would be sufficient to add that the concept of crimes violating
37 Stone, 1. and Woetzel, K. 1970. Toward a Feasible International Criminal Court: p159.
38 Ibid. .
39 Miskowiak, K. 2000. The International Criminal Court: Consent. Complementarity and Cooperation:
pll.
40 Peter von Hagenbach, the governor of Breisaeh, (a German town) under the Duke of Burgundy, Charles
(the Bold), was tried and convicted in Austria for atrocities committed during the occupation of Breisach by
a court of representatives of a coalition that had liberated it. Von Hagenbach argued that he was just
following orders, and that the court had no authority to try him. In May 1474 he was condemned and
executed by the rebels. Information about Von Hagenbach is available at World History at KMLA: History
of Warfare Swiss-BurgundianWar 1474-1477
www.zum.de/whkmla/militarv/15cenlswissburgI4741477.html (accessed on 24 June 2004).
41 Note 39 above.
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'the law of God and man' at that time was, for all intents and purposes, the same as our
current understanding of crimes against humanity.Y
Later, in 1872, after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, Gustave Moynier of
Switzerland suggested a court similar to the present-day ICC should be established to
prevent anyone from violating the 1864 Geneva Convention.Y The aim of this proposal
was to create a mechanism to prosecute crimes committed outside state borders, with or
without the consent of the state's government." Nevertheless, the proposal did not lead to
the establishment of a court, the chief reason being a lack of confidence amongst the
leading legal experts at that time, that an international court could be impartial. 45
Several international conferences subsequently addressed the necessity of
establishing such a 'universal court'. In 1889, an important attempt was made at the first
Peace Conference held at The Hague in the Netherlands." More than one hundred
delegates from twenty-six countries attended the conference.Y At the end of the session,
delegates, who included lawyers, statesmen, military personnel, technical and scientific
experts, agreed to the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration." The
conference also adopted the Convention of the Law and Customs of the War on Land and
the Convention of Maritime Warfare. 49 The idea of establishing a 'universal criminal
court' was accepted at the Second Peace Conference in 1907 after long negotiations. 50
42 Ibid.
43 Gustave Moynier was born in 1826. In 1858 he was appointed president of the Geneva Society for Public
Welfare. In 1863 Moynier and other lawyers drew up the 1864 Geneva Convention. In 1864 he organised
an international conference of 13 nations in Geneva to discuss the possibility of making warfare more
'humane' . On 22 August 1864, at the end of the conference, the representatives signed the Geneva
Convention. Information about Gustave Moynier is available at the National Archive Learning Curve
www.spartacus.schoolneLco.uk (accessed on 24 June 2004) .
44 Note 39 above, at 12.
45 Ibid.
46 Sadat, L.N. 2001. The International Criminal Court and the Transformation ofInternational Law: justice




50 Note 46 above, at 34.
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The forty-four countries that sent delegations adopted thirteen conventions relating to
. . 11 51intemationa aw.
In 1919, after the First World War (hereinafter WWI), the first Commission on
the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on the Enforcement of Penalties
(hereinafter the 1919 Commission Report) was established by the Allies52 and other
associated powers to impeach German and Turkish war criminals who were held
responsible for crimes committed against humanity .53 On 28 June 1919, at the end of this
commission, the Allied Powers and German representatives reached a compromise and a
peace treaty (hereinafter the Treaty of Versailles) was subsequently signed in
Versailles.54 Articles 227, 228 and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles provided for the
establishment of international criminal trials to prosecute more than twenty thousand
Germans before a military tribunal, either in Germany or on the Allied territory. Those
subject to prosecution included the German Kaiser Wilhelm 11 and high-ranking German
officials who had allegedly breached the laws and customs of wars.
There have been four other International Commissions, namely :
1. The 1943 United Nations War Crimes Commission (hereinafter UNWCC), which
was established by the Allied powers in London before the end of WWII, but before
the establishment of the UN. Its aim was to prosecute Nazi war criminals before an
international tribunal ;
2. The 1946 Far Eastern Commission (hereinafter FEC) , which was established to
investigate crimes committed by Japanese war criminals in countries which they had
invaded in the Far East ;
5\ Ibid.
52 The five great Allies in the First World Warwere the US, theBritishEmpire, France, Italy and Japan.
The additional states comprisingAlliedand Associated powerswereBelgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China.
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Equador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti and manyother states. .
53 Note 3 above.
54 The Treatyof Versailles(1919). Available at www.lib.bvu.edu/-rdh/wwi/versailles.html (accessed on 24
September 2004).
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3. The 1992 Yugoslavia Commission of Experts, which was established pursuant to
UNSC Resolution 780 (1992). The Commission's function was to investigate war
crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law within the former
Yugoslavia; and
4. The 1994 Independent Commission of Experts, which was established pursuant to
UNSC Resolution 935 (1994). It aimed to investigate grave violations of international
humanitarian law on Rwandan territory.55
There are many instances of international criminal trials that were conducted
more than seventy years before the establishment of the ICe. Germany prosecuted
thousands of German citizens between 1921 and 1923 in the German Supreme Court
pursuant to the Allies' requests to bring persons accused of committing acts in violation
of the laws and customs of war before military tribunals.56 These prosecutions are known
as the Leipzig Trials. 57
On 8 August 1945, the four major Allies in WWII signed the London Agreement
to establish the Nuremberg Tribunals for the prosecution of individuals who were
accused of committing crimes against peace, war crimes and ' crimes against humanity'. 58
During the course of the Nuremberg Tribunals, the four major Allies in Europe conducted
international prosecutions between 1946 and 1955.59 In Tokyo, International Military
Tribunals for the Far East (hereinafter the Tokyo Tribunals) were established by the
Allies in the Far East to prosecute the Japanese accused of war crimes in the territories
they had colonised or occupied.I" Under the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunals, military
prosecutions were conducted between 1946 and 1951.61
55 Note 3 above.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Seethe London Agreement (8 August 1945). Available at
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (accessed on 30 November 2003).




After the conclusion of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, it took more than
forty years to establish other ad hoc tribunals for prosecuting perpetrators of serious
international crimes. In terms of UNSC Resolution 827 (1993), genocide and war crimes
have been tried in an ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia" Subsequently, on 8
November 1994, a similar tribunal was established for Rwanda by Resolution 955 (1994)
of the UNSC.63 These tribunals, established as subsidiary organs to the UN, had three
major limitations:
1. They were established on the authority of the UNSC, in terms of Articles 39, 41 and
42 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.64 Their purpose was to avert perceived threats
to international peace and security, which followed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda .65
2. Further limitations were the ratione temporis (the relationship to a particular timer"
jurisdiction, and the territorial jurisdiction." The International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY) is restricted in its jurisdiction to the crimes
committed during the armed conflict, which started in 1991 on the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter
ICTR) is equally restricted to a specific time and area."
62 The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations ofIntemational Humanitarian Law Committed on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, UN Doe. S125704 at 36, annex (1993) and SI25704/Add.l (1993. Available at
www.un.org/ictv/basic/statut/statute.htm (accessed on 20 May 2004) .
63 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide , and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed on Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violations Committed on the
territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994, UN Doe. S/RES/95 5 (1994).
Available at www.ictr.orglENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (accessed on 20 May 2004) .
64 Note 17 above.
65 Note 6 above.
66 In Rwanda, for example, a retrospective time limitation applies: crimes committed before 1 January 1994
are not liable for prosecution. .
67 Note 6 above.
68 Ibid.
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3. The cnmes over which the tribunals had jurisdiction were enumerated in their
founding Statutes. No discretion was given to the judges of these tribunals to amend,
dd cri 69remove or ac cnmes.
It is submitted that the establishment of these two ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY and
the ICTR, paved the way for a clearer international vision of the ICe. Article 8 of the
ICTY Statute makes it clear that the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTY extends from 1
January 1991, but the Statute itself does not provide a limited time for temporal
jurisdiction.
2.1.1 Preparations towards the Establishment of the International Criminal Court
In the 1940s and 1950s much preparatory work was undertaken by the UN General
Assembly assisted by multinational conventions to define and establish the principle of
complementarity and establish an ICC.70 On 9 December 1948, the UN General
Assembly approved the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (hereinafter the 1948 Geneva Convention) by Resolution 260 A (I11)?1 This
Resolution invited the International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC) - a special
committee charged with preparing a Statute for the ICC - to research the desirability and
possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for trying persons charged with
genocide, 'ethnic cleansing', rape, torture and other crimes that fall under the jurisdiction
provided for by the 1948 Geneva Convention.
The ILC produced a draft in 1951 that was revised in 1953.72 The 1953 Draft was
regarded as inadequate and was ultimately abandoned because the definition of
aggression did not cover cases that some delegates believed were the main motivators for
establishing an ICC in the first instance.i" As a result, it was recommended that the 1953
69 Ibid.
70 Reeder, R. 1962. The Establishment ofan International Criminal Court: Some General Problems: p31.
71 The 1948 Geneva Convention entered into force on 17 September 1953, UN Doe, AlRES/260/III (1948).
Available at www.icao.intJicao/enlleb/Genev.htm (accessed on 20 November 2003).
72 Cassese, A. 2001. International Criminal Law: p334.
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Draft be handed over to another international body that was mandated to produce a
comprehensive re-definition.i" However, the delay in the establishment of the ICC was
not entirely due to a lack of consensus concerning the definitions and functions of the
aforesaid court. At the time, the world was divided into two opposing camps, namely, the
US and its allies and the former Soviet Union and its allies. Leaders of the opposite sides




2.1.2 Concrete Steps towards the Establishment of the International Criminal
Court
In the 1980s, the tensions of the Cold War began to ease and this culminated in the fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1989. At this point, more concrete steps could be taken towards the
establishment of an ICC. Thirty-six years after the rejection of the 1953 Draft, Trinidad
and Tobago proposed to the UN General Assembly that a specialised ICC should be
established to deal with drug trafficking.i" This was a response to the UN General
Assembly's mandate arising out of the 1989 special session to discuss the problem of
drug trafficking." In 1992, the ILC was mandated by the UN General Assembly in
Resolution 47/33 to assemble a draft statute for the establishment of an ICC.78 In 1994,
the ILC completed a draft statute which was submitted to the forty-ninth session of the
UN General Assembly." This report was not limited to drug trafficking, but included
other international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. 80
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Economides, S. 2001. "The InternationalCriminalCourt". In Smith, K.E. and Light, M. Ethics and
Foreign Policy: pU5.
77 Ibid.
78 Bassiouni,M.C. 1997. "Observations Concerningthe 1997-98 PreparatoryCommittee's Work". In
Bassiouni,M.C. The International Criminal Court: Observations and Issues before the 1997-98
Preparatory Committee, andAdministrative and Financial Implications: p7.
79 Note 78 above, at 8.
80 Politi, M. 1997."The Establishment of an International CriminalCourt at a Crossroads: Issues and
Prospects After the First Sessionof the PreparatoryCommittee". In Bassiouni, 1997:p119.
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In 1995, an ad hoc committee of the UN General Assembly was formed for the
purpose of establishing an ICC, but after two sessions it failed to convene a
plenipotentiaries' conference to approve a Statute of the ICc. 8I
On 17 December 1996, the UN General Assembly established a PrepCom by
Resolution 51/627. According to this Resolution, the PrepCom was to consist of
representatives of all member-states of the UN. It met at the UN Headquarters in New
York over a period of several weeks and embarked on the negotiations that would
culminate in the Rome Statute .82 The Resolution by which this PrepCom was established
defined the matters that PrepCom was to deal with. Its function was to deliberate on:
1. A list of definitions and the elements of crimes that were to be under the jurisdiction
of the ICC;
2. Principles of criminal law and penalties;
3. The organisation of the ICC;
4. Procedures of the ICC;
5. Complementarity and trigger mechanisms;
6. Co-operation with any concerned state if and when required;
7. The establishment of the ICC and its relationship with the UN;
8. Final clauses and financial matters; and
9. Other matters .83
This PrepCom formulated a report proposed to the UN General Assembly and
paved the way for nine weeks of meetings between 1997 and 1998.84 The 1997-1998
PrepCom was mandated to meet and finalise its work before the Rome Conference was
held.85
81 Note 78 above, at 9.
82 Note 78 above, at 11.
83 UNDoe. N51/627 (1996 ).
84 Note 72 above.
85 Ibid.
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During the Rome Conference, the delegates were separated into three working
groups, which drew up the prov isions of the Rome Statute.l" The thirteen parts of the
Statute were elaborated among the different working groups of the PrepCom, which was
eventually responsible for negotiating the Statute as a whole.
87
The first of these working groups was the so-called ' like-minded states'. 88 This
group included countries of the European Union (hereinafter EU) , the Middle East and
other parts of the world . Prominent among them were delegates from Canada and
Australia." This group favoured a fairly strong ICC with a broad' automatic jurisdiction',
the establishment of an independent prosecutor empowered to initiate proceedings and an
extensive definition of war crimes that included crimes committed in internal armed
conflicts." There was debate as to whether the ICC should have inherent (automatic)
jurisdiction, which means that there is no need for supplementary state consent in a
particular case once the state has ratified the Rome Statute." The like-minded states, who
supported the concept of 'inherent jurisdiction', aimed at ensuring the widest possible
support for the Statute without substantially weakening the ICC. 92
The second group included delegates from the US, UK, Russia and China, i.e. the
members ofUNSC, but excluding France." They wanted provisions in the Rome Statute
that would allow them certain prerogatives that would enable them either to refer matters
to the ICC or to prevent cases from being referred to the ICC as they saw fit.94 These
states opposed any attempts to define aggression, or to include it in the list of crimes
stipulated in the Rome Statute, or to include any reference to nuclear weapons." This
86 Note 72 above, at 342.
87 Arsanjani, M. 1999 . "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", American Journal of
International Law, (93)1: p22.
88 Note 39 above, at 78.
89 Ibid .
90 Note 87 above.
91 Note 72 above, at 342.
92 Note 39 above, at 78 .
93 Note 72 above, at 342.
94 Note 72 above, at 342-343.
95 Note 72 above, at 342.
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second group also felt that matters that were of ' an overriding national interest' should
not be dealt with by an international body."
The third group included members of the Non-Aligned Movement (hereinafter
NAM) .97 This group supported the inclusion of aggression, drug trafficking and the use
of nuclear weapons as crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
98
It strongly opposed the
assignment of any role to the UNSC which might influence judgements of the ICC.
99
NGOs also participated in this group. 100
Parallel to the deliberations of the working groups and formal consultations,
informal discussions were conducted among political and regional groups, such as the
NAM, the Arab group , the Latin American and Caribbean group, the EU group and
others .101
96 Ibid.
97 See generally Bassiouni, M.C. 1999. "Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court", Camel International Law Journal, 32.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 In 1995 NGOs formed the NGO Coalition for an lCC. The coalition includes over 2,000 NGOs
worldwide united in their support for a fair and effective lCC . The NGOs significantly contributed to the
process from the early stages at the UN, through the Rome Statute , the ratification campaign and beyond.
These NGOs include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch , No Peace without Justice and others. A
complete list of the NGO Coalition for an ICC is available at
www.iccnow.org/documents/statements/ngoslNGOJointStaternntEng23JuneOO.pdf (accessed on 20 October
2004).
101 The Arab states formed one of the most active informed groups; they met frequentl y and adopted a
common position. This group includes 22 states whose first language is Arabic . Egypt and Jordan were
considered to be the driving force for the completion of the Rome Statute by the participating states at the
Rome Conference. The Latin American and Caribbean Group include all the Latin American and
Caribbean states, such as Mexico and Argentina. The European Union Group includes delegations of states
members ofthe European Union such as France and Germany. See note 97 above .
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2.2 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
International criminal law is a branch of general international law and is derived from
primary sources, i.e. treaties and customary law and secondary sources, i.e. rules,
commentary and interpretation of customary law and treaty provisions.i'f The general
principles of international criminal law are recognised as a subsidiary source.i'"
International criminal law is almost entirely based on customary law.104 Comprehensive
understanding of international criminal law must include the analysis of several
interpretations of international law, codified law and custom.i'" Treaties, protocols,
conventions, charters and international agreements constitute an essential part of
international criminal law. 106
However, the criminal responsibility of individuals under international criminal
law is a relatively new issue. Classic jurisprudence recognised the state as a party in
international law, which governed the relationship between states, but it rarely recognised
the responsibility of individuals when it imposed a duty upon countries. ID? So at this early
stage, rulers or other important persons who represented the state would not bear
international individual criminal responsibility related to their acts, because states bore
responsibility for the actions of their citizens. 108
In the twentieth century, the growing concern of the international community
resulted in a demand for holding individuals criminally responsible for international
crimes.l'" For this reason law-makers, knowing that states had always endeavoured to
102 Note 72 above, at 22.
103 Ibid.
104 Chibundu, M. 1999. "Making Customary International Law through Municipal Adjudication: A
Structure Inquiry", Virginia Journal ofInternational Law, 39(4): p1076.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.




protect their citizens from criminal liability, felt that a mechanism had to be found to
impose duties upon individuals as well as giving them rights. 110
International criminal law is currently in a transitional phase. 111 Attaching old
norms concerning the sovereignty of states makes territorial independence inviolable.112
The principle of sovereignty has always been regarded as sacrosanct and an unassailable
attribute of statehood.i'r' In recent years, this concept has been assailed by the more
liberal forces at work in democratic societies, particularly in the field of human rights.v'"
A tendency towards increasing faith in international institutions can be observed.115
However, it is worth emphasising that there is no infringement on the sovereignty of
states if states consent to being bound by the jurisdiction of the ICC when ratifying the
Rome Statute, as the state's consent to the Statute is in itself an act of sovereignty.!"
The ICC was established in a world made up of sovereign governments, each with
its own national interests, but with a growing understanding of the common interests of
all states.117 National autonomy was lessened, not because of any lack of intelligibility, or
because it contained contradictions, but in cases where it appeared inconsistent with
newer norms (as in the universally recognised human rights and the rules of international
law).118 International law, the emerging norms proclaim, ought to be more 'legal' and less
'political', more protective of the individual than of the state, less relativistic and more
universal. 119 In the period from the Nuremberg Tribunals until the establishment of the
ICC, little attention has been given to the procedural and substantive aspects of
110 See generally Wedgwood, R. 1999. "The International Criminal Court: An American View", European
Journal ofInternational Law, 10.
III Note 104 above, at 1071.
112 Ibid.
113 Note 39 above, at 79.
114 Note 107 above.
115 Note 39 above, at 79.
116 1bid.
117 Chayes, A. and Slaughter, A. 2000. "The ICC and the Future of the Global Legal System". In Sewall
and Kaysen, 2000: p244.
118 Note 104 above.
119 Ibid.
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international criminal law, because there has been no body competent to deal with these
matters. 120
The international community recognises the value of protecting human rights by
means of international instruments such as the UN Charter.v" the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 122 and other conventions.V" It is submitted that the
enforcement of international criminal law helps to protect and develop these values and
to allow the ICC to evolve as an institution to enforce international criminal law and
protect human rights.
2.2.1 The Application of the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute is a set of guidelines that contains international provisions for general
definitions on the subjective elements of international crimes.r" The Rules of Procedure
and Evidence have been adopted in order to help the ICC to apply the procedure, while
the Elements of Crimes assists the ICC in the interpretation and application of Articles 6,
7 and 8 of the Statute. 125 From 1999 - 2000 the ASP held several sessions within the
PrepCom to elaborate on both the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of
Crimes.v" In 2000, the amendments were adopted by a two-thirds majority of the
members in the ASP, which is a requirement for any amendments to the Rome Statute.
The judges of the ICC will bring their own interpretation of the law to bear in
specific jurisdictions. 127 Awareness of the difficulties encountered by the ad hoc tribunals
and a critical analysis of the efficacy of the solutions proposed in that context is
120 Swart, M. 2002. "Ad Hoc Rules for the Ad Hoc Tribunals? The rule-making power of the judges of the
ICTY and ICTR", South African Journal on Human Rights, 18(4): p574.
121 Note 17 above .
122 On 10 December 1948 the UN General Assembly adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights by Resolution 217 A (Ill), UN Doe. AlRES/217 A (Ill). Available at
www.un.org/overveiw/rights (accessed on 10 August 2004).
123 Note 72 above, at 22.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Note 39 above.
127 Howland, T. and Calathes, W. 1998. "The UN's International Criminal Tribunal, Is It Justice or
Jingoism for Rwanda? A Call for Transformation", Virginia Journal ofInternational Law, 39(1): p145.
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particularly important to the future of the ICC since the interpretation of the provisions of
the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are left to the discretion of the
judges, who also define the form of conducting the proceedings.l" If the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence fail to provide for a specific situation before the ICC, a two-
thirds majority of the judges may apply provisional Rules on a temporary basis until the
ASP adopts or rejects the Rules in its next session. 129
The Rome Statute departs from the ICTY Statute procedure in that it does not
grant the judges the power to alter the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC.
130
The judges of the ICTR adapted the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR at the
first session, held from 26 to 30 June 1995.131 Article 14 of the ICTR Statute provided
that the judges of the ICTR should adopt the Rules of the ICTY, making such changes as
they might deem necessary. Specifically with regard to procedural rules, it was unusual
and therefore questionable for a judiciary to make its own rules. 132 It is submitted that the
Rome Statute, by not allowing the judges the power to alter the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the ICC, is in agreement with the principle of separation of powers and the
principle of legality.
The Rome Statute separates the provisrons of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence from the Regulations of the ICC, which are also called the Rules ofPractice. 133
Generally, the provisions of the Statute will prevail over the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, whilst the Regulations confirm the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.134
According to Article 52 of the Rome Statute, the Regulations of the ICC are
necessary for its routine functioning, including its internal organisation and
128 Ibid.
129 Article 51, note 15 above.
130 Note 120 above, at 577.
131 Ibid.
132 Note 9 above.
133 Report of the Working Group on Composition and Administration on the ICC, UN Doe.
AJAC/249/1998/L.14, and AJAC.249/1998/CRP.2/Add.5 and Add.5/Corr.1.
134 Behrens, H. 1999. "Article 52: Regulations of the Court". In Triffterer, 1999: pp696-697.
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administration. Pursuant to this Article, the Regulations are adopted by the judges by an
absolute majority, taking into consideration any consultation with the prosecutor and the
registrar taking part in the elaboration of the Regulations. States parties have the right to
strike down any Regulation within six months if objections are lodged by a majority of
them; they do not, however, have a right to impose any alternative Regulation.
l35
Article
52, paragraph 3 provides that the Regulations are to be immediately circulated to states
parties for any commentary or remark, ensuring that they are in conformity with the
Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The judges also authorise
amendments to the Regulations in the same way. 136 The Regulations of the ICC and their
amendments go into operation upon adoption, unless the judges decide otherwise. 137
Article 10 of the Rome Statute states: "[n]othing in this Part shall be interpreted as
limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for
purposes other than this Statute."
Otto Triffterer states that the provisions of the Rome Statute should be interpreted
in light of a comprehensive understanding of Article 10 of the Rome Statute, which
permits the development of international law and thus opens the door for the possibility
of revising the provisions of the Statute in the light of changes in that law. 138 According
to Triffterer, interpretations of Article 10 must take into consideration the Rome Statute
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as the Elements of Crimes. He argues
that the Statute does not prejudice international law, which will be applied when no
provision has been made in the Statute. This will ensure that the ICC takes into
consideration developments in international criminal law. 139 What has already been
codified in the Rome Statute will not thwart future developments in international criminal
law. 140 Article 10 indicates that the scope for reflecting on unwritten rules is still open. It
135 Article 52(2), note 15 above.
136 Ibid.
137 Note 134 above.




is submitted that this scope for further development indicates that reflection on and
interpretation of unwritten rules is still desirable .
The lee operates at the cutting edge of the development of international criminal
law and universal human rights considerations.l'" With this in mind, the application of
the Rome Statute can be seen to have fulfilled three major purposes, namely :
1. The criminalisation of conduct causing harm to others, like genocide, crimes against
humanity (rape, mass expulsions, ethnic cleansing), and war crimes . Although at
present uncertainty of definition does not allow the crime of aggression to be
prosecuted on the prosecutor's own initiative or by the state party's referral, it is
submitted that in future, clearer conceptualisation of this crime may be achieved;
2. The minimisation of the risk of repeating international crimes in the future; and
3. The development of rules to protect the "human values" considered important by the
entire international community, and consequently binding states and individuals.142
In this age of 'universal human rights ' and rules of international law, it is
internationally recognised that the most serious crimes that are not tried by a national
court, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, should be investigated
and prosecuted by the ICC . Hans-Peter Kaul concludes that serious crimes committed
during an internal conflict can be prosecuted if the suspect is in the custody of a state
party.143 He believes that , in general, the territory of states parties would become a risky
place for perpetrators of such crimes. It is submitted that the application of the Rome
Statute will be an increased deterrent to committing these crimes .
141 Note 72 above, at 22.
142 Ibid.
143 Kaul, P. 2001. "The Continuing Struggle on the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court". In
Fischer, H.; Kress , C. and Luder, S.R. (eds). 2001. International and National Prosecuti on ofCrimes under
International Law: p24 .
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2.2.2 The Structure of the International Criminal Court
The ICC is composed of six major divisions, namely, the Presidency, the Appeals
Division, the Trial Division, the Pre-Trial Division, the Office of the Prosecutor and the
R · 144egistry.
According to Article 35 of the Rome Statute, there are three judges in the
Presidency, one of whom has the title of president. Each serves full time from the
beginning of his or her mandate. Pursuant to Article 44 of the Statute, the president,
together with the prosecutor, decides on staffing matters.
Article 39, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute states that:
The Appeals Division shall be composed of the President and four other judges, the Trial
Division of not less than six judges and the Pre-Trial Division of not less than sixjudges.
The assignment of judges to divisions shall be based on the nature of the functions to be
performed by each division and the qualifications and experience of the judges elected to
the Court.
Members of the Appeals Division will serve their entire nine-year terms in the
Appeals Division, an arrangement which was devised because of widespread
dissatisfaction with the ICTY practice of judges moving from one chamber to another
during their terms. 145 The Appeals Division is competent to exclude the prosecutor or
judges from participating in a case when there are grounds to do that.146
The Pre-Trial Division has the power to issue warrants of arrest and summons and
to take other necessary measures for the protection of witnesses and victims. 147 It has
144 Article 34, note 15 above.
145 Schabas, W.A. 2001.An Introduction to the International Criminal Court: p154.
146 Roy, L. 1999."Creating an internationalCriminalCourt of Procedure and Compromises". In Rebel, H.;
Lemmers, J. and Schukking, J. (eds). Reflections on the International Criminal Court: p150.
147 Ambos,K. 2000. "The Legal Basis of the International CriminalCourt". In Arbour (ed). The Prosecutor
ofa Permanent International Criminal Court: Cooperation with the Office ofthe Prosecutor ofthe
International Criminal Tribunals (ICTY and ICTR): p24.
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authority to give the prosecutor permisston to institute relevant evidence-preserving
measures.i'" Judges from the Trial Division (see below) and lawyers apply for the
hearing of evidence in this division. 149
Trials are carried out in the Trial Division. 150 This division ensures that the
procedure is performed in a fair manner, taking into account the interests of victims and
the rights of the accused. 151
The prosecutor initiates the investigations and is particularly dependent on the co-
operation of states in order to perform investigations effectively.Y' He or she collects
much of the evidence and requests that other evidence be produced to prove the
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICc. 153 The context in which the
crime occurred may be controlled by the state to which the national who allegedly
committed the crime belongs.t" For instance, evidence about a military command
structure or about the information available to a suspect about the status of a military
target might be controlled by the state whose national stands accused of the crimes.155 In
this case the prosecutor may collect the information from the state involved and look for
corroboration from other states, organisations or resources. 156
Article 36, paragraph 6 of the Rome Statute defines the process by which the
prosecutor and judges should be appointed. They should be elected by an absolute
majority of the ASP by secret ballot. A state which nominates a judge or a prosecutor
must ascertain that the candidate possesses high qualifications. 157 Experience in criminal
prosecution is required, and the independence and impartial competence of the nominee
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Robertson. G. 2002. Crimes against Humanity: p354.
151 Ibid.
152 Danner, AM. 2003. "Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability ofProsecutorial Discretion at the
International Criminal Court", American Journal ofInternational Law, 97(1): p527.
153 Ibid.
154 Note 152 above, at 528.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ingadottir, T. 2003. "Nomination and Election of Judges". In Ingadottir, T. (ed). The International
Criminal Court: Recommendations on Policy and Practice: p154.
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must be generally known in his or her country.r" In order to stand for election to the
office of judge, candidates have to be qualified for the office of a high court judge (or
. 1 ). hei . 159equrva ent m t err own countries.
In February 2003, the ASP elected the prosecutor and eighteen judges by secret
ballot from a large group of highly qualified individuals nominated by the states
parties.l'" On 11 March 2003, the judges were sworn in, in the presence of the UN
Secretary-General and the Queen of the Netherlands (the ICC has its permanent seat at
The Hague).161 According to Article 36, paragraph 8 of the Rome Statute, the process of
electing judges took into consideration fair representation of both genders and the
principles of "equitable geographical representation, [and] representation of the principle
legal systems in the world".
The Registry, headed by the registrar, is responsible for the non-judicial aspects of
the ICC such as administration and servicing. 162 The registrar is the principal
administrative officer of the ICC 163 and must be consulted on the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. 164 Pursuant to Article 52, paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute, the registrar will be
consulted in the elaboration of the Regulations and their amendments.
According to Article 43 of the Rome Statute, the judges elect the registrar for a
five-year term and he or she is eligible for re-election once. If required, the judges may
also elect a deputy registrar for a five-year or shorter term. 165 The registrar and the deputy
registrar must be available to administer and be consulted on commencement of their
158 Article 36(3), note 15 above.
159 Note 157 above, at 154.
160 Note 65 above.
161 Simons, M. 2003. "Argentine Is Expected to Be Prosecutor for War Crime Court". Available at
www.genocidewatch.org/ICCProsecutorMarch24.htm (accessed on 20 December 2005)
162 .
Note 147 above, at 29.
163 Article 43(2), note 15 above.
164 Note 147 above, at 29.
165 Note 145 above, at 155.
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terms in office. 166 On the other hand, various professionals have to be hired on a full-time
h . d I' 167basis in order to help the lee w enever It nee s consu tation.
All lee core staff, namely, judges, prosecutor, deputy prosecutor, registrar and
deputy registrar, are required to serve on a full-time basis and are not allowed to engage
in any other occupation of a professional nature.l'" They are forbidden to engage in
activities likely to interfere with their judicial functions, or affect confidence in their
. d d 169III epen ence.
2.2.3 The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
The IeC exercises its jurisdiction over the most serious international crimes, namely,
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 170 The definitions of these crimes
have been accepted by the states that participated in the Rome Conference and have had
legal force since 1 June 2002. 171 The crime of aggression was also included in the
jurisdiction of the ICe, but requires further definition. In
The Assembly of States Parties (hereinafter ASP) to the Rome Statute of the ICC
is composed of the congress of states that ratified the Rome Statute. I73 ASP has limited
powers to modify the definitions of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC and to add
any act to the list of crimes .174 Such an amendment should be adopted by a two-thirds
majority of members of the ASp .I75 The ICC prosecutor, any state party, or an absolute
majority of the ICC judges may propose the addition.!"
166 Ibid.




170 Article 5, note 15 above.
171 Stampa, L. 2002. "The Time of Human Rights". Available at
~~w.globalpolicy.org/int1justice/icc/crisis0702hr.htm (accessed on 20 November 2003).
Article 5, note 15 above.
173 The roles and functions of the ASP are further explained in chapter 4.9.7.
174 Article 123, note 15 above.
175 Article 122, note 15 above.
176 Ibid.
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An ICC prosecution may be initiated in one of three ways:
1. It may be triggered by the UNSc. 177 It is possible for the ICC to exercise its
jurisdiction in states that have not ratified the Rome Statute via a referral by the
UNSC of a case to the prosecutor.i" The UNSC would in this instance be acting
under Articles 39, 41 and 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN.179 Subject to
the UNSC referral, states parties to the Rome Statute and non-ratifying states should
accept the jurisdiction of the ICC and co-operate with the ICc. 180
2. It may act on the initiative of the prosecutor proprio motu (own initiative) if he or she
determines that there is a reasonable basis to commence an investigation" under two
conditions:
(a) the approval of pre-trial judges must be sought before commencmg the
investigation. Here, there must be reasonable grounds to initiate an
investigation; 182 and
(b) the prosecutor should inform the ASP of his or her decision to commence the
investigation.l'" The state concerned has the right to notify the prosecutor within
one month of receipt of the notification that it is investigating or has investigated
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, which the prosecutor intended to
investigate.l'" In that case, the prosecutor has a duty to defer the investigation
subject to the principle of complementarity.lf
The principle of complementarity is examined in this dissertation in conjunction
with ICC endeavours not to allow perpetrators of international crimes to evade
177 Article 13(b), note 15 above.
178 Ibid. '
179 Ibid.
180 Article 39, note 17 above.
181 Article 15, note 15 above.
182 Ibid.
183 Article 18(1), note 15 above.
184 Article 18(2), note 15 above.
185 Ibid.
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punishment. The ICC generally accepts a case where there has been a collapse in
the national courts of a state, making the state unable to prosecute crimes, or
making it difficult for its judicial system to maintain justice in trials.186
3. It may be triggered by a state party's referral ofa case to the prosecutor. 187 In January
2004, the first case was brought to the ICC when the Ugandan president Yoweri
Museveni referred the file of the Ugandan rebels' crimes to the ICc.
188
This landmark
case demanded great effort from the prosecutor to fulfil the requirements of impartial
justice because of tribal and other conflicts within Uganda, which had given rise to
many years of conflict. 189
It is submitted that the ICC must avoid becoming partisan in the politics of
nations. The prosecutor is obliged to investigate whether the referring parties had
political goals prior to the commencement of the investigation .!" The Rome Statute
provides for the principle of 'no immunity', 191 which implies that in the course of the
investigation no individual or group is exempt from ICC prosecution. 192
2.2.4 Obstacles to the International Criminal Court
Substantial obstacles had to be overcome before the final draft of the Rome Statute was
submitted to the states that participated in PrepCom sessions.i'" These obstacles related
to definitions of crimes, especially the crime of aggression, the principle of
complementarity and the rules governing the granting or refusal of immunity for
186 Article 17(1), note 15 above.
187 Article 13(a), note 15 above .
188 Jams, L.; Odinkalu, G. and Smith. 1. 2004. "A Crucial Case for the International Criminal Court" .
Available at www.globalpolicy.org/intIjustice/icc/2004/0226crucial.htm (accessed on 4 March 2004).
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 The principle of no immunity means that there is no immunity for any individual who is accused of
having committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC irrespective of his or her capacity. This
principle is analysed in chapter 4.2.
192 Article 98, note 15 above .
193 Black, 1. 2003 . "International Criminal Court Comes to Life" . Available at
www.globalpolicy.org/intIjustice/icc/2003/0311judjes.htm (accessed on 20 November 2003).
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individuals, in particular heads of states and those who work in the name of peace-
keeping.194 All these obstacles will be examined.
The ICC has the power to try the nationals of non-ratifying states if they have
committed international crimes in the territories of states parties. 195 Article 12 of the
Rome Statute articulates the grounds upon which nationals of non-ratifying states may be
tried without the need for further treaties or agreements to legitimize the prosecution,
namely, when the alleged crimes occurred on the territories of states parties.
This study also considers the problems related to obtaining evidence from
countries that are in a state of civil turmoil, war or invasion. Some crimes under the
jurisdiction of the ICC, such as murder, rape, sexual slavery and deportation, require a
quick response if reliable evidence is to be gathered, especially when perpetrators of the
crimes obscure or destroy evidence relating to crimes that have been committed or
intimidate witnesses of crimes. 196
The research will take into consideration the problems related to obtaining
information from non-ratifying states that refuse the prosecutor's request for information,
justifying their refusal in terms of 'the principle of national sovereignty' - that is, the
protection of national security information and interests of the state.197 This study will
examine the way in which states and organisations may, in the absence of compulsory
obligations, co-operate with the ICC in order to surrender those suspected of having
committed international crimes .
Obstacles related to the principle of national sovereignty create an environment of
uncertainty as to whether the ICC will be capable of fulfilling its task. 198 This climate of
uncertainty formed part of the focus of the present research, and an attempt will be made
194 Ibid.
195 Article 12, note 15above.
196 See chapter 4.7.
197 The principleof national sovereignty is examined in chapter4.5.1.
198 Engelbrecht, G.A. 2002. "Going It Alone? An Evaluation of AmericanConcerns about the International
Criminal Court". MastersDissertation: p62.
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to determine whether or not the ICC functions as a successful court for the prosecution of
serious international crimes.
2.3 Financing of the International Criminal Court
The ICC has an independent financing system to which the states parties and other
organisations contribute (see below). It is separate from the framework of any states or
organisations. Article 114 of the Rome Statute provides that the expense of the major
organs of the ICC and the ASP, including its bureau and subsidiary bodies, shall be paid
from the funds of the ICC.
2.3.1 The Budget of the International Criminal Court
The ASP adopted the euro as the currency of the statutory headquarters of the ICC and its
Finance Regulations, therefore the ICC's budget is presented in euros.199 According to
Article 118 of the Rome Statute, an independent auditor audits the budget annually. This
auditor audits the records and accounts of the ICC, including its financial statements.
Thordis Ingadottir and Cesare Romano state that the budget reflects ICC policy-making
because its budget determines its resources.r'" In other words, budgetary considerations
will limit some activities whilst prioritising others. They conclude that two important
elements shape the budget of the ICC, namely, the jurisdiction of the ICC and the nature
of the ICC as an international criminal prosecution mechanism.
The Office of the Prosecutor bears the costs of investigating cases and gathering
evidence, wholly or in part, as well as the costs of defending persons who are accused,
199 The Financial Regulations of the International Criminal Court (2002), Statutory Instrnment 2002 no.
822. Available at www.icc-i .int/officialjournal.html (accessed on 30 June 2004) .
200 Note 167 above, at 83.
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their maintenance while in detention and witness protection .201 The Office of the
Prosecutor also covers any costs incurred in protecting victims and witnesses. 202
According to Ingadottir and Romano, the budget is to some extent dependent on
the prosecutor's planning and the number of investigations and indictments which he or
she decides on.203 They state that when the prosecutor initiates investigations proprio
motu, rather than at the request of a state, it is likely that the evidence he or she requires
will be more difficult to obtain and analyse. When a situation is referred to the ICC,
either by a state or the UNSC, the Office of the Prosecutor will be required to respond
quickly in order to handle the initial phase and it will also require funding for the
prosecutor's work.
Since the presidency bears the final responsibility for the administration of the
ICC, it also has the right to make the final decision regarding the budget proposals of the
Registry.i'" The budget of the registrar is largely dependant on the planning of ICC
divisions.i'"
Ingadottir and Romano state that the budget for the judges will be made up of the
expenses of the divisions, the prosecution and the registry, while the budget of the ASP
will entail costs associated with its meetings and the expenses of its bureau and
subsidiary bodies.i'" They point out that the budget should also consider instances where
the ICC might not have any cases for years or alternatively, several cases might be
referred to it at the same time.
According to Article 115 of the Rome Statute, the expenses of the ICC shall be
provided by the following sources :
201 Ibid.
202 Note 167 above, at 87 .
203 Ibid .
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1. Assessed contributions of all states parties .
2. Funds provided by the UN, subject to the approval of the ASP, in particular, III
relation to expenses incurred by UNSC referrals.
2.3.1.1 Assessed Contributions from the States Parties
The Financial Regulations are mandated to assess the amounts of states parties '
contributicns.i'" According to Regulation 5 (7) of the Financial Regulations, the assessed
contributions from the states parties shall be paid either in euros or in other currencies; it
is stipulated that states parties will bear the exchange cost of the euros.
Article 117 of the Rome Statute provides that the contributions of states parties
shall be assessed in accordance with an agreed scale of assessment, based on the scale
adopted by the UN for its regular budget and adjusted in accordance with the principles
on which that scale is based.
The assessment scale of the UN is based on the so-called ' capacity to pay' , which
will depend on the national income of a state adjusted by factors such as external debt
and size of population.208 This is adjusted and expressed as a share of the total income of
UN members. The maximum share must not reach 25% and the minimum should not be
less than 0.001% of the budget.i'" Developing countries' contributions should not exceed
0.01%?1O Since scales of assessment of most international organisations are subject to
arbitrary floors and ceilings, Ingadottir and Romano have suggested that the floor and
ceiling could also be applied to the ICC scale." : It is submitted that such limits could
alleviate problems concerning contributions for developing countries.
207 Note 167 above, at 57 .





The power to decide the ICe scale of assessments is vested in the ASP, which
made its decisions when the budget was submitted to it in 2003 .2 12 Pursuant to Article
112, paragraph 7 of the Rome Statute, efforts should be made to adopt the scale by
consensus. Failing that , the decision would need to be taken by a two-thirds majority, as
the adoption of the scale of assessment is a decision on matters of substance and not
procedure.
According to Ingadottir and Romano, the contributions of states parties are
expressed in terms of a percentage of the total budget; adjustments will be required upon
the accession or withdrawal of a state?13 They point out that decisions relating to
amendments of the scale also constitute a substantive decision-making process. Such
decisions place the obligation on each state to bear the expenses allocated to it. Payment
of contributions is a fundamental obligation of membership. Joining the ICe means the
acceptance of the burdens and obligations of contributing to its funding . Pursuant to
Article 112, paragraph 8 of the Rome Statute, issues of non-payment or delayed payment
will be decided by the ASP.
On 9 September 2002, a committee on budget and finance of the ICe was
established by the ASp .2 14 Its task was to draw up the first formal budget for the lee.
The committee held ten meetings in New York from 4-8 August 2003.215 The draft
budget for 2004 was adopted by the ASP in September 2003.z16
212 Washbum. J. 2003 . "Committee Considered 2004 ICC Budget", The International Criminal Court
Monitor. 25 September: plO .
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2.3.1.2 Funds Provided by the United Nations
Ingadottir and Romano point out that because the UN convened the Rome Conference,
the expenses of the ICC during the preparatory phase from 1998 to 2003 were borne by
the UN.217 Under Article 112, paragraph 6 of the Rome Statute, the ASP can meet either
at the seat of the ICC or at the headquarters of the UN. According to Ingadottir and
Romano, the UN will reduce ICC costs by providing free space and secretarial and
conference services to the ICe. They suggest that the UN contributions should be used to
pay for the extra costs derived from new investigations and eventual trials and not to help
states parties defray costs which they would have incurred in any event. Details on how
to organise transfers and how to use possible surpluses deriving from the UN
contributions are addressed in a special agreement between the ICC and the UN and the
Financial Regulations.218
Article 115 of the Rome Statute considers the funds of the UN as an assessed
contribution. It stipulates that the approval of the ASP is required for the UN payments.
Such approval must be given in proper time and form. This provision seeks to impose an
obligation on the UN to finance part of the expenses of the ICC, since creating an
obligation on a third party will not succeed without the approval of that party.219 When
the UNSC refers a case to the ICC, the UNSC should bear the expense incurred.i'" It is
submitted that referrals by the UNSC are likely to have much effect on the expenses of
the ICC, and this must be taken into account in the amount of the ICC's costs covered by
the UNSe.
2.3.1.3 Voluntary Funds
Article 116 of the Rome Statute authorises the ICC to receive and utilise voluntary
contributions from states, inter-government organisations, NGOs, individuals, eo-
operations and other entities as additional funds.
217 Note 167 above , at 70.
218 Note 167 above , at 72.
~~~ Halff, M. and To1bert, D. 1999. "Article 116: Voluntary Contributions". In Triffterer, 1999: p1228 .
Note 219 above, at 1229.
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Voluntary contributions will be accepted if they meet the appropriate criteria
adopted by the ASp. 221 According to Maarten Halff and David Tolbert, these criteria
ensure that the donor is not suspected of human rights abuses and does not intend to give
a donation with ulterior motivates, which might compromise the ICC.
222
They believe
that the ICC must investigate issues related to its financing, such as dubious or politically
awkward sources, for example, states with a history of gross violation of human rights. It
is submitted that they likely to be right in this matter and the discretion of the prosecutor
or registrar must be exercised in accepting donations.
The 'appropriate criteria' referred to earlier should be incorporated into the
Financial Regulations and should not be subject to conditions which might defeat the
aims of the ICC.223 For instance, if contributions are used to provide support and
compensation to victims, they should not benefit or discriminate against any particular
ethnic, religious or political group.224 The criteria and the Financial Regulations define
ways in which funds or resources are to be transferred, how they are going to be used and
how they are going to be accounted for.225
Gifts from states or private persons, such as administrative support, equipment,
office space and surfaces may be beneficial to the ICe.226 These costs should not be
defrayed if the ASP accepts them as donations from third parties .227
Voluntary contributions will not be included in the budget , nor can they affect the
budget on either side of the balance sheet.228 Cash contributions earmarked for a
particular investigation or work of the prosecutor should not be allowed.229 Such
contributions will not fully cover the expenses of the ICC, nor can they be considered to
221 Article 116, note 15 above.
222 Note 219 above, at 1229.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 Note 167 above , at 78.
226 Note 167 above , at 79-80.
227 Ibid.
228 Note 219 above , at 1231.
229 Ibid.
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be a stable source of funding . Voluntary funds will not relieve the obligation on states
parties to contribute, because such donations are unpredictable.230
2.3.2 The Trust Fund
Halff and Tolbert believe that the significance of the financial situation of the ICC is
described in Article 112 of the Rome Statute, which defines the financial matters to be
governed by the Statute as well as Financial Regulations devised by the ICC judges in
2002?31 They point out that the Statute provides for financial matters such as the Trust
Fund, which was established under Article 79 of the Rome Statute to compensate victims.
The Trust Fund (see chapter 1.2) does not have any direct links with the divisions
of the ICC and the Rome Statute does not make provision for the ICC to control or utilise
the Trust Fund.232 According to Halff and Tolbert, the Statute merely describes how the
ICC can make contributions to the Trust Fund by way of reparations , fines and
forfeitures .233 The Trust Fund is excluded from the basic budgetary considerations of the
ICC.
Ingadottir and Romano state that the nature of the Trust Fund is also very
different from that of the ICe. 234 They point out that the Trust Fund cannot be used for
any of the judicial processes of the ICC, but only for purposes of victim compensations .
Being a Trust Fund, it cannot incur obligations unless the necessary cash has been
received.r" By contrast , the ICC must operate, and thereby incur expenses .i" The ICC is
able to contribute funds to the Trust Fund and order that any award for reparations be
made through the Trust Fund.237 According to Article 79, paragraph 3 of the Rome
Statute, the ASP determines the management criteria of the Trust Fund.
230 Note 167 above, at 79-80.
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Article 79 of the Rome Statute touches on the Trust Fund 's financing only insofar
as it originates from the ICe. Reparations are transferred to the ICC first; the ICC is free
to decide whether to transfer them directly to the victims or to use the Trust Fund.238 The
beneficiaries of the Trust Fund are victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICe.239
Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence defines victims as natural persons who
have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of
the ICC. The family of the victim may also benefit from the Trust Fund.240 Educational
institutions and religious or charity organisations that have sustained direct harm to their
prosperity might be compensated through the Trust Fund.24 1
Fines will be collected from states parties in accordance with the procedures of
national law and confiscated property and funds will be transferred to the ICe. 242 The
ICC may ultimately order money and any other property collected through fines or
forfeiture to be transferred to the Trust Fund.243 In determining fines in accordance with
the criteria provided in Rule 89 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the ICC shall
take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances
of convicted persons , for instance, age, socio-economic conditions, the motivation for the
crime and whether it was ordered by a superior.244
238 Note 176 above , at 116.
239 Article 79(1), note 15 above.
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Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court and Fair Trials
3.1 Crimes under the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
The forth paragraph of the preamble of the Rome Statute limits the jurisdiction of the
ICC to "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" . It
makes it clear that the ICC should target genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes as defined in the Rome Statute for prosecution.r" When these crimes were
defined in the Elements of Crimes, the international community had to consider what sort
of perpetrators it wanted to punish or deter,z46 Deciding these matters was critical to the
description of the 'mental element' of the crimes.i'" If the aim is to deter only those at the
highest levels of the planning and direction of the crimes, then the definition might
include a ' mental element' encompassing purposeful participation in the planning of the
crimes. 248
3.1.1 Genocide
The definition of genocide as stated in Article 6 of the Rome Statute reproduces almost
word for word the text of Article 11 of the 1948 Geneva Convention.r'" The definition in
Article 6 restricts the judicial interpretation of the crime by clearl y laying out the acts that
constitute criminal behaviour.250 This has led to a consideration of the context in which
the definition was arrived at, starting from its origin in the 1948 Geneva Convention and
ending in its use in the reports of the PrepCom between 1997 and 1998.251
245 Note 179 above , at 353.
246 McAuliffe de Guzman, M. 2000. "The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes against
Humanity", Human Rights Quarterly , 22(2): p341.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
249 Note 100 above.
250 Schabas , WA. 1999. "Article 6: Genocide". In Triffterer, 1999: pl08.
251 Ibid.
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The forms of genocide outlined in the Rome Statute relate to ' physical
genocide, .252 There are five acts that define genocide as a crime within the jurisdiction of
the ICC .253 According to Article 6 of the Rome Statute, genocide occurs whenever an act
is committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group. The Rome Statute enumerates the following genocidal acts :
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group?54
3.1.1.1 The Importance of Intention in Genocide
The five acts of genocide specified in Article 6 stipulate that for a crime to be classified
as genocide the intention must be to destroy the group in whole or in part.255 In other
words, the perpetrator of a wilful killing must have the intent to cause the death or
destruction of a specific protected group of persons as defined in the Article?56 If the
special intent or dolus specialis of destroying a group and the context of a manifest
pattern of similar conduct are present, the perpetrator will be committing genocide.257
Any harm which is sufficient to threaten and destroy the group, in part or wholly,
irrespective of this harm being mental or physical, meets the criteria spelt out in genocide
and therefore constitutes genocide. F" The term ' mental' in thi s instance refers to
permanent mental impairment.F " The PrepCom working groups decided that a reference
252 Ibid.
253 Article 6, note 15 above .
254 Ibid.
255 Note 250 above, at 109.
256 Article 6, note 15 above.
257 Ruckert , W. and Witschel, G. 2001. "Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in the Elements of
Crimes". In Fischer, Kress and Luder, 2001: p67.
258 Note 250 above, at 109.
259 Ibid.
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to 'mental harm' should be understood to mean more than just a minor or temporary
,. f I ~ It' 260Impairment 0 menta racu ies .
Wiebke Ruckert and Georg Witschel state that the language used to describe
intent was similar to the descriptions of crimes against humanity, the war crime of wilful
killing and other war crimes in Article 8 paragraph 2 (b) of the Rome Statute.i" They
point to the fact that the common character of the intent in these crimes lies in the point
that even a single murder would be sufficient to constitute the crime of genocide.262 If the
perpetrator merely intended to cause bodily harm to an individual or individuals and
expected the possibility of death to arise from his or her action , he or she would be
committing the genocidal act of wilful killing.263
As has been indicated, the accused would be tried for genocide irrespective of the
number of victims. It would not matter whether the intention of offenders was the
complete destruction of the whole group or not. A specific intent to destroy any portion
of it would be sufficient. 264 The focal point of this crime is that if an offender commits
mass murder without a clear intention to exterminate a specific group of persons, his or
her act does not constitute genocide. i'" In these circumstances, the judges must examine
the intention to destroy and decide whether it meets the stringent definition in Article 6 or
not.266
According to William Schabas, sexual assault also constitutes genocide. i'" He
points out that sexual assault with intent to change the ethnic fabric of a community may
be constituted genocide. According to the case law of ICTY, rape may be used to change
the ethnic character of the population, but genocidal intention must be proved.i'"
260 Ibid .
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Sometimes rape is used to systematically prevent women from procreating in future,
when fear of having children as a consequence of rape may lead women to voluntary
"I' . 269sten isation.
3.1.2 Crimes against Humanity
The list of crimes against humanity falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC was drawn
up with the purpose of criminalising the conduct of those who committed certain acts as
part of a systematic and/or widespread attack on a civilian population.i" Such crimes do
not require an armed conflict or a general element of destroying groups in part or whole
to be present.i" This clear statement of a test of crimes against humanity is
counterbalanced by the definition of ' attack' in Article 7, paragraph 2 (a) of the Rome
Statute.272
According to Ruckert and Witschel, this definition establishes that an 'attack'
implies multiple commissions of inhuman acts, pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or
organisational policy .273 They believe that the policy element introduces a lower
threshold and a more flexible check than the term 'systematic' <" According to the
Elements of Crimes, the definitions of such crimes extend by stating that in the case of
torture, no specific purpose must be proven for the crimes to be prosecutable. i"
It is submitted that proof of a widespread and/or systematic attack on the civilian
population is essential for the decision that persons committed crimes against humanity.
It is the central element that will elevate what might have been termed 'not serious'
violence to one of the most serious crimes known to the human race. Furthermore, if a
person was convicted of crimes against humanity, yet was truly unaware of the
widespread and/or systematic nature of the acts, this would violate the principle of actus
269 Ibid .
270 Article 7, note 15 above.
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nonfacit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make the person doing it guilty unless it
is accompanied by a guilty mind).276
It is difficult to imagine a situation where a person could commit a murder as part
of a systematic attack while credibly claiming to have been completely unaware of that
attack.277 It is submitted that this might happen if the perpetrators of murder were under
superior orders to kill certain people and were not aware that their actions formed part of
a superior intent of a systematic attack against a population. In such a case, the accused
would have the intention for murder, but not for the far more serious charge of
committing crimes against humanity.278
Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute enumerates the acts that constitute




(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture ;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political , racial, national,
ethnic, cultural , religious , gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with
any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
276 Robinson, D. 1999. "Defining "Crimes against Humanity" at the Rome Conference", American Journal




Article 7, paragraph 1 (e) makes reference to "other severe deprivation of physical
liberty" in order to preclude an inappropriately restrictive interpretation of the term
'imprisonment' .279 Pam Spees and Vahida Nainar believe that this would probably
include the policy of any apartheid regime of banning political activists to, or restricting
the movement of people in one country.i'" Consequently, it is submitted that the Rome
Statute recognises new forms of crimes against humanity.
The reference to rape was expanded and clarified in paragraph 1 (g), to include a
wide range of sexual crimes.i'" This provision confirms that these acts, which have been
persistent throughout history, warrant special attention and should be included within the
definition of crimes against humanity.282 The precise determination of the preconditions
of rape as a crime against humanity, especially when it occurs in war, differs
considerably in national legal systems. 283 Thus these preconditions were left to the
di . f h . d 284iscretion 0 t e JU ges.
3.1.2.1 Examples of Acts Defined in the Rome Statute as Crimes against Humanity
1. Murder
The material element of murder is described in the Rome Statute as the killing of one or
more persons.
285
However, according to the Elements of Crime, the term 'killed' can be
interchangeable with the term 'caused the death of civilian' in respect of genocide.i'"
This reference to the 'causation of death' does not provide for any particular test with
regard to cases of indirect causation.i'" The term 'murder' was considered sufficiently
clear in terms of the applicable sources of law and thus did not to require additional
clarification. 288
279 Note 276 above, at 52-53.
280 Spees, P. and Nainar, V. 2000. The International Criminal Court: The Beijing Platform in Action: p18.
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2. Extermination
Extermination was included under the cnmes against humanity in international
instruments preceding the Rome Statute such as the ICTY Statute, but was not defined in
any of them. 289 The question therefore arises as to how the crime of extermination differs
from that of murder. The ILC, in its commentary on the Draft Code of Crimes against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, pointed out that extermination differs from murder,
because in extermination, the criminal conduct is directed against a group of individuals
and contains an element of mass destruction.i" Also, extermination can be distinguished
from genocide in that the group affected does not necessarily share common
characteristics and the killing is not necessarily directed against the whole group.29l
Ruckert and Witschel believe that the material elements of extermination are in
line with the ILC's reasoning.292 The first material element specifies that extermination
requires that the perpetrator killed one or more persons.i'" Nevertheless, in contrast to
murder, for extermination to be deemed to have taken place the killing must have taken
place as part of a mass killing of members of a civilian population.i" This second
material element constitutes the element of mass destruction that distinguishes
extermination from murder.295
3. Deportation or Forcible Transfer ofa Population
The Rome Statute includes not only deportation, but also the forcible transfer of a
population.f" The definition of ' forcible transfer' seeks to include the relocation of a
population within or outside of the borders of a state .297 There may be grounds that
permit the deportation or forcible transfer of a population under international law in
289 Article 5, note 62 above.
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certain special circumstances, for example, in national disasters and in cases of genuine
. I .. 298nationa CrISIS.
3.1.3 War Crimes
The ICC also has jurisdiction over war crimes, which are adequately defined in the four
Geneva Conventionsi'" and Additional Protocols 1300 and 11.301 William Fenrick argues
that both customary international law and the four Geneva Conventions are needed for a
comprehensive understanding of the fundamental aspects of war crimes as defined in the
Rome Statute?02 War crimes constitute a grave breach of the four Geneva Conventions if
the acts mentioned in Article 8, paragraph 2 (c) of the Rome Statute were committed
against persons or property protected under the provisions of the Conventions.i'"
According to Fenrick, the four Geneva Conventions apply under the following
conditions:
1. In all armed conflicts between two or more parties to the Conventions, even if one or
more parties do not recognise a state of war;
2. In all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a party to the Conventions,
even if the occupation meets with no armed resistance; and
3. If a party subscribing to the Conventions is at war with a power that is not a
subscriber, the Conventions shall be applied if the latter power accepts and applies the
provisions of the Conventions.304
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The fact that the definition of war cnmes admits the possibility of lawful
incidental injury or collateral damage does not in any way justify violations of the law as
applicable in armed conflicts.i'" However, Article 8 of the Rome Statute does not address
the justifications for war or other rules related to war.
306
It merely reflects on the
proportionality requirement inherent in determining the legality of any military activity
undertaken in the context of an armed conflict. 307
Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute enumerates the acts that constitute war
crimes. These are :
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention:
i. Wilful killing;
ii. Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
iii. Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
iv. Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
v. Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces
of a hostile Power;
vi. Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of
fair and regular trial;
vii. Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
viii. Taking of hostages.
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed
conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the
following acts:
i. Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
ii. Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which
are not military objectives;
iii. Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units
or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in
305 Note 302 above, at 184.
306 Note 302 above, at 183.
307 Note 302 above, at 184.
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accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are
entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the
international law of armed conflict;
iv. Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated;
v. Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives;
vi. Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having
no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
vii. Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the military insignia
and uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the
distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or serious
personal injury;
viii. The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its
own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or
transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or
outside this territory;
ix. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals
and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not
military objectives;
x. Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical
mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are
neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person
concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or
seriously endanger the health of such person or persons;
xi. Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation
or army;
xii. Declaring that no quarter will be given;
xiii. Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure
be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
xiv. Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights
and actions of the nationals of the hostile party;
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xv. Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of
war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's
service before the commencement of the war;
xvi. Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
xvii. Employing poison or poisoned weapons;
xviii. Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids,
materials or devices;
xix. Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as
bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is
pierced with incisions;
xx. Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which
are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which
are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed
conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of
warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an
annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant
provisions set forth in Articles 121 and 123;
xxi. Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
xxii. Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as
defined in Article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions;
xxiii. Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain
points, areas or military forces immune from military operations;
xxiv. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions in conformity with international law;
xxv. Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by
depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully
impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions;
xxvi. Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the
national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations
of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely,
any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the
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hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:
i. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
H. Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
iii. Taking of hostages;
iv. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial
guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable .
(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus
does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of
an international character, within the established framework of international law,
namely, any of the following acts:
i. Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
ii. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and
transport , and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions in conformity with international law;
iii. Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units
or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are
entitIed to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the
international law of armed conflict;
iv. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals
and places where tile sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not
military objectives;
v. Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
vi. Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as
defined in Article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other
form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of Article 3
common to tile four Geneva Conventions;
vii. Conscripting or enlisting children under tile age of fifteen years into armed
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities;
51
viii. Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the
conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military
reasons so demand;
ix. Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;
x. Declaring that no quarter will be given;
xi. Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to
physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which
are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person
concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or
seriously endanger the health of such person or persons;
xii. Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict.
(f) Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus
does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to
armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups.
Some war crimes that have been included in Article 8 of the Rome Statute, for
example outrages upon personal dignity , have not been mentioned in the four Geneva
Conventions.i'" It is submitted that the inclusion of new war crimes in the Statute is a
significant development in international criminal law which will raise the standards of
human rights. Knut Dormann states that the inclusion of new war crimes is largely based
on the case law of the ICTY, which recognises that serious attacks on human dignity may
constitute inhuman treatment.l'" Ultimately, the PrepCom decided that the crime of
"outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment"
would cover such conduct as constitutes an attack on human dignityl'"
Article 8, paragraph 2 (c) does not apply to international conflicts, nor does it
apply to internal tensions such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence.
Paragraph 2 (c) allows for the necessary distinction between international armed conflicts




and internal armed conflicts. Article 1, paragraph 4 of Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions defines armed conflicts as situations where people are fighting
against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination?l1 Article 1, paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol II to the
Geneva Conventions states that Additional Protocol II applies to all armed conflicts not
covered by Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. However, armed conflicts
taking place between two or more states are international armed conflicts.312 Fighting
between governmental forces and organised, armed national groups is defined as an
internal armed conflict.313 Such conflict only becomes an international armed conflict if
another state intervenes in favour of one or more organised national groups.'!"
3.1.4 Innovations in the Definitions of Crimes under the Rome Statute
As international law developed in the last half century, it is submitted that many
innovations were incorporated into definitions of crimes in the Rome Statute. Notably,
forced pregnancy (that is pregnancy resulting from rape) is included as both a crime
against humanity and a war crime. This dual inclusion reflects outrage at the experiences
of the case law of the ICTy 315
In a similar reflection of concern with earlier armed conflicts.I" apartheid has
also been included as a crime against humanity after South Africa insisted, at the Rome
Conference, that the crimes of former high-ranking members of the South African
311 See generally Cottier, M. 1999. "Article 8: War Crimes paragraph 2 (b) (xiv) and (xv)". In Triffterer,
1999.
312 Ibid.
313 Note 308 above.
314 Ibid.
315 David, M. 1999. "Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the International Criminal Court and
the Commitment to International Law", Michigan Journal ofInternational Law, 20(2): p362.
316 There was long debate about whether the South African Conflict was internal or international, given that
there were major conflicts between the African National Congress (hereinafter ANC) and the Former South
African regime . The ANC was banned by the former apartheid regime in South Africa from 1960 until
1990 and much of the conflict between it and former government forces was 'external' in that ANC forces
were based outside of South Africa. It is nevertheless the case that the ANC undertook a campaign of
sabotage and other acts of destabilisation within the country. See Saunders, C. (ed). 1995. Illustrated
History ofSouth Africa: the Real Story : p530 .
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apartheid regime be criminalised internationally.l'" In a somewhat controversial measure,
the definition of war crimes was extended to include transfer of population and a state's
transfer of members of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.l"
According to Geoffrey Robertson, Israel settled over 200,000 Jews on the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip after the 1967 Six-day War.319 He points out that Israel voted against the
Rome Statute, since it feared that its leaders might be put on trial.
3.1.5 Opt-out Declaration
According to Article 12 of the Rome Statute, once a state becomes a party to the Statute,
it immediately accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC over genocide and crimes against
humanity. At the request of France at the Rome Conference, in respect of war crimes, a
state may accept the jurisdiction of the ICC immediately or declare that it will not accept
this jurisdiction for a period of time after it ratifies the Rome Statute, if these crimes are
alleged to have been committed by its citizens or on its territory.32o Such a declaration
may be withdrawn at any time .321 Article 124 of the Rome Statute provides that this
transition period of time shall be reviewed at the Review Conference.
Andreas Zimmermann gives two interpretations of Article 124:
- Either any such opting-out completely bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court in
regard of alleged crimes committed either by nationals or on the territory ~f the state
which has made the declaration.
Alternatively, opting-out could also have the sole effect that the state which has
made the declaration has simply not accepted the jurisdiction of the court for its
nationals under Article 12 para 2 of the Statute. Notwithstanding the exercise of
jurisdiction by the court could then be still based it on the alternative jurisdiction link
that the state on the territory of which the alleged crimes has been committed is a
317 Note 276 above.
318 Note 315 above, at 361.
319 Note 179 above, at 351.
~~~ Zi~ermann, A. 1999. "Article: 124 Transitional Provision". In Triffterer, 1999: ppI279-1280.
ibId.
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contracting party or has otherwise consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
322
court.
The opt-out declaration excludes not only the jurisdiction of the ICC over war
crimes during the opt-out period for that state party, but also the duty of the state party to
co-operate with the ICC.323 It is limited to a non-renewable period of seven years from 1
June 2002.324 The opt-out declaration is only effective when the case is triggered either
by the prosecutor proprio motu, or referred by a state party under Article 14 of the Rome
Statute.325
It is submitted that Article 124 is an opting out clause that enables states to shield
persons responsible for war crimes from prosecution. It may seem strange that a non-
ratifying state can be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC for war crimes whereas states
parties can choose to be excluded from ICC jurisdiction for a limited period of time.326
Kristina Miskowiak observes that states parties can accordingly be less bound by this
jurisdiction than non-ratifying states.327 She points out that the US is a non-ratifying state
and France is a state party that has decided to opt out ofICC jurisdiction over war crimes
for a period of seven years.328 In the same peace-keeping operation, the actions of a US
serviceman could fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, since the alleged crimes are
committed in territories of a state party. However, the actions of a French soldier could
not be prosecuted since France, as has been indicated above, has chosen not to be under
the jurisdiction of the ICC as regards war crimes.329
Miskowiak argues that the opt-out declaration creates a theoretical possibility that
Article 124 might be used to deter citizens of non-ratifying states from committing
322 Note 320 above .
323 Note 264 above , at 128.
324 Article 124, note 15 above .
325 Note 320 above.
326 Note 39 above, at 16.
327 Ibid .
328 Ibid .
329 Note 39 above, at 29.
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crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC in the territory of a states party.330 In terms of
this Article, the likelihood of citizens of non-ratifying states being prosecuted, whilst
citizens of states parties are immune from prosecution, is reduced through the principle of
complementarity, which gives states the option of prosecuting offenders nationally.331
3.1.6 Instances where Perpetrators Will be Held Responsible
The Rome Statute specifies in what circumstances perpetrators would be held
individually responsible for crimes committed under orders from their superiors.I" It is
submitted that Article 28 (a) of the Rome Statute makes a distinction between the
deliberate intentions of military superiors and their culpable negligence. Military
superiors will be held responsible for crimes committed by forces under their effective
command when:
1. They know or, due to the circumstances at the time when the crimes are committed,
have the obligation to have knowledge or information that their forces were
committing or were about to perform such crimes;
2. The crime is committed consequent to the superior's failure to exercise effective
control over the forces and his or her failure to take all necessary and reasonable
measures to avoid or suppress their commission; and
3. The superior fails to submit the case to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.I"
In the past, international criminal law instruments dismissed the defence of
'superior orders', but treated them as a mitigating factor in imposing sentence.I" The
Nuremberg Tribunals recognised a wide range of mitigating factors, including superior
330 Note 39 above, at 27.
331 Ibid.
332 Article 28, note 15 above.
333 Ibid.
334 Note 145 above, at 143.
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orders, age, position in the military hierarchy, suffering of the victims, efforts of the
criminal to reduce suffering, and duress.r" Even when the defence is unsuccessful, the
fact that the defendant was obeying the orders of a superior will encourage a degree of
.. . 336
mmganon.
According to Ruckert and Witschel, the Rome Statute takes a pragmatic view. 337
They conclude that it leaves the prosecutor and judges to develop criteria for determining
whether there are grounds for excluding criminal responsibility or not. Consequently,
paragraph 5 of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes provides that "grounds
for excluding criminal responsibility or the absence thereof are generally not specified in
the elements of crimes listed under each crime".
Article 30 of the Rome Statute states:
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material
elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this Article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
3. For the purposes of this Article, 'knowledge' means awareness that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. 'Know' and
'knowingly' shall be construed accordingly.
Ruckert and Witschel believe that Article 30 proved to be the benchmark in
stipulating that a person be held criminally responsible whenever the material elements of
the criminalised acts are in similarity with intent and knowledge.338 Therefore, paragraph
2 of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes confirms the requirement of
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid.
337 Note 257 above, at 63.
338 Ibid.
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Article 30.339 This Article envisages that persons may be considered guilty when the
intentions to commit crimes together with the knowledge that the envisaged acts
constitute crimes are present, unless the provisions of the Rome Statute state otherwise.340
Although the Rome Statute makes it clear that intention, knowledge and the nexus
must be present , it is submitted that the judges have considerable power of decision in the
use of the categories 'genocide', ' crimes against humanity' and 'war crimes ' . Paragraph
2, therefore, only provides a basis on which judges are required to use their discretioni'"
It is submitted that the legal understanding of genocide has in recent years
become increasingly complex. Article 6 (c) of the Rome Statute recognises that the
infliction of conditions calculated to bring about a group 's physical destruction is a
genocidal act. However, Article 6 (d) extends the definition of genocide to include the
imposition of measures intended to prevent births within the groupS.342 Ruckert and
Witschel believe that the question of whether knowledge of the possibility of the
destruction of a group is required for the commission of genocide is particularly
contentious.I" The common last element in the Elements of the Crimes provides that it is
required for the commission of crimes against humanity that "the perpetrator knew that
the conduct was part of, or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against a civilian population".344
Dormann believes that the above provision gives some guidance in determining
the requisite degree of knowledge.l" He argues that there are indications in the Elements
of Crimes that the prosecutor must prove a higher degree of knowledge than in the case
339 Paragraph 2 of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes states that "As stated in Article 30
unless othenvise provided , a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge .
Where no reference is made in the Elements of Crimes to a mental element for any particular conduct,
consequence or circumstance listed , it is understood that the relevant mental element, Le. intent, knowledge
0Jo both, set out in Article 30 applies. Exceptions to the Article 30 standard, based on the Statute".
3 Note 257 above, at 62.
341 Ibid.
342 Note 257 above, at 66.
343 Ibid.
344 Article 7, note 26 above .
345 Note 308 above, at 106.
58
of other crimes.346 Furthermore, it appears that generally proving the existence of
intention and knowledge objectively will be sufficient.347 In such circumstances, an
accused cannot argue that he or she did not understand the nexus?48
It will be up to the judges of the ICC to determine how to bring case law in line
with Article 30 of the Rome Statute?49 The judges might face a similar problem with the
term 'wilful', which is used in some of the crimes under Article 8 of the Rome Statute,
and which has not been repeated in the Elements of Crimes."? Furthermore, the judges
will have to determine whether the standard contained in Article 30 and the definition of
'wilfulness' in the case law of the ICTY and ICTR coincide.351
With respect to war crimes, the words 'in association with ' in Article 8 of the
Rome Statute were meant to reflect the case law of the ICTY and ICTR that required a
sufficient connection to be established between the offences and the armed conflictsi"
Acts such as murder for purely personal reasons, for example, are unrelated to an armed
conflict, i.e. if a jealous soldier kills a civilian or a war prisoner because the latter had a
relationship with the soldier's wife, this is not considered to be a war crime.353
It is submitted that the Elements of Crimes merits much more detailed discussion,
and may profitably become the subject of other studies. It is further submitted that since
the main focus in this dissertation is the general structure and process of the ICC, a
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3.1.7 Investigations, Trials and Sentencing
Article 15 of the Rome Statute specifies on what basis prosecutions or investigations may
be initiated by the prosecutor. According to this Article, the prosecutor must analyse the
information concerning the circumstances, the persons involved and the alleged crimes in
order to arrive at a fair conclusion that a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC has been
committed. He or she will then initiate an investigation whenever it is in the interests of
the victims and in the interests of justice to do SO.354 According to Article 15, paragraph
4, the prosecutor must request authorisation from the Pre-Trial Division before initiating
an investigation. Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute mentions that the obligation
of the prosecutor to consider the interests of justice, as required by Article 53, paragraph
1 of the Rome Statute, is still effective after obtaining the authorisation to initiate an
investigation from the Pre-Trial Division.l'"
3.1.7.1 Elements to be Considered by the Prosecutor
Article 58, paragraph 7 of the Rome Statute authorises the prosecutor to summon a
person directly if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the
crime. In particular, if a warrant of arrest is issued, this Article determines its binding
force, and that it is not to be questioned by national authorities.V" Once the person has
been arrested the custodial state has to apply the provisions of the Rome Statute rather
than its national law.357
According to Allison Danner, Article 58 also deals with the extent to which the
prosecutor should be expected to function as a political agent who can be held
accountable and the extent to which he or she will be able to claim Iegitimacy.F"
The Rome Statute is almost silent with respect to the larger policy problems
which relate to the question of whether the prosecutor should pursue any suspects.I" The
:54 Bergsmo,M. and Kruger, P. 1999."Article 53: Initiationof an Investigation". In Triffterer, 1999: p706.
55 Note 354 above, at 707.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
358 Note 152above, at 511.
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prosecutor has an important policy-making role in determining what kind of crimes
should come under the jurisdiction of the ICe.360
According to Danner, the prosecutor will have to determine which charges to
bring against individuals he or she has decided to prosecute and decide how many
charges to bring and for what kind of crimes.i'" These decisions will significantly affect
the complexity and character of the individual case?62 He believes that the significance of
the prosecutor's decisions takes on importance in the light of the Rome Statute's rejection
of plea-bargaining. It is submitted that crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC must be
fully prosecuted and the rejection of plea-bargaining will not lead to immunity for
perpetrators of these crimes.
The practical form of liability created by the Rome Statute will enhance the long-
term viability of the ICC without making the prosecutor dependent on the directives of
any particular state.363 Pragmatic forms of liability help both to protect against the
prosecutor's exceeding his or her power and ensure that other agents - including non-
ratifying states whose nationals may face prosecution before the ICC - have the ability to
influence the prosecutor's use of his or her powers to investigate cases.364If an individual
is being targeted in a way that a state feels is illegal or unjust, that state may try to
influence the prosecutor's investigation or prosecution.J'" It is submitted that allowing
victims to make representations to the Pre-Trial Division during the early stage of
investigations according to Article 15, paragraph 3 of the Rome Statute, and also
allowing them to submit observations to the ICC according to Article 19, paragraph 3 of
the Rome Statute, may prevent states from trying to influence the prosecutor's
investigation.
359 Note 152 above, at 521.
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid.
362 Note 152 above, at 522.




Because states have the power to remove a case from the purview of the
prosecutor and challenges to the jurisdiction of the ICC or the admissibility of case,
according to Article 19 of the Rome Statute, they wield the ultimate power over the
prosecutor's discretion.Y" The Pre-Trial Division scrutinises the prosecutor's plans or
proceedings with special care.367 This Division has the right to review the prosecutor's
decision if it so wishes and can request the prosecutor to reconsider his or her decision.P"
The Pre-Trial Division is given the right to review the prosecutor's decisions, not solely
in the interests of justice, but also in the interests of victims.r'" On the other hand, the
prosecutor has discretionary power to resurrect an investigation or prosecution if new
facts or information become available, though in these circumstances the Pre-Trial
D' " I h h f revi 370rvision a so as t e power 0 review.
In some cases, it may be difficult for the prosecutor to prosecute particular crimes,
for example gender-based crimes, effectively.Y' It is submitted that this is because the
prosecution of such crimes requires certain expert evidence (such as forensic evidence)
which may no longer be available, before proof can be offered . However the prosecutor
will take into consideration the following elements when he or she initiates prosecution:
1. The gravity of the crime will be considered. Crimes on the lower scale of gravity, and
therefore not under the jurisdiction of the ICC, will be left to national jurisdiction;
2. After the prosecutor has completed the formal investigation and gathered the
necessary information, he or she must balance the evidence available in order to
determine whether to proceed with prosecution or not.372
366 Note 152 above, at 527.
367 For further information about the Pre-Trial Division see chapter 2.22368 . , • •
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3. Other elements will be considered , such as the interests of the victim, the age of the
alleged perpetrator (the ICC requires that the perpetrator be over eighteen years) and
his or her role in the alleged crimes.373
The prosecutor may decide to stop a prosecution for two reasons:
1. No sufficient legal or focal basis to seek a warrant or summons under Article 58 of
the Rome Statute; and
2. The inadmissibility of particular cases under Article 17 of the Rome Statute.374
3.1.7.2 Requirements Imposed upon the Prosecutor
The Pre-Trial Division must approve the prosecutor's requests for orders or warrants that
are necessary for the purpose of an investigation.V' The Pre-Trial Division is free to
reject a prosecutor's request for these orders or warrants and is unwilling to issue orders
or warrants too frequently, or in relation to minor offences.376
The prosecutor must notify the UNSC if the case was referred by the UNSc.377
As shown in chapter lA, referrals made by the UNSC to the ICC are merely one way in
which cases can be brought before the ICC. This indicates that the overall role of the
UNSC in the working of the ICC, even though significant, is not great.378
The prosecutor must notify a state party when a case is referred by it, or notify
states parties when he or she initiates an investigation proprio motu. 379
373 Note 354 above, at 709.
374 See chapter 4.4.1.
375 See chapter 2.2.2.
376 Guariglia, F. and Harris, K. 1999 . "Article 57: Functions and Powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber". In
Triffterer, 1999: p748.
377 O 'Shea, A. 1999. "The Statute of the International Criminal Court" , SouthAfrican LawJournal. 116:
p248.
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3.1.7.3 Sentencing Policy
The ICC may impose penalties not exceeding thirty years imprisonment, or a term of life
imprisonment depending on the circumstances of cases.
380
Unlike the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals, the ICC cannot impose the death penalty. l'" Sentences may be served
in states that have indicated their willingness to accept sentenced persons.
382
However,
the ICC may order fines that may not be prejudicial to third parties. i '" The accused and
the prosecutor may appeal to the Appeals Division on procedural errors or error in facts
and law.384
In effect, the Rome Statute leaves the criteria to be applied in the imposition of
multiple sentences to the judges.385 It imposes a ceiling and, from a practical standpoint
in the cases of the most serious crimes, there will be little discretion to exercise because
individual offences will deserve the maximum available scntence. l'" It is submitted that
since the ICC deals only with serious crimes , no minor penalties of imprisonment are
appropriate. It is further submitted that even in a case which does not constitute genocide ,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression, such as that of an
official of the ICC who has been corrupted in connection with his or her official duties
(see chapter 3.1.7.5), a major sentence such as ten years of imprisonment should be a
minimum. Given the nature of the crimes with which the ICC deals, it is unlikely that a
sentence of less than ten years would be passed . Proof of the lack of the victim 's consent
is required in order to convict, and a reasonable doubt about this consent entitles an
acquittal. 387
380 Article 77, note 15 above.
381 Ibid.
382 Article 103(1), note 15 above.
383 Article 77(2), note 15 above.
384 Rakate , P. 1998. "An International Criminal Court for a new millennium - The Rome Conference"
South African Yearbook, 23: p220. '
385 See generally Bergsmo, M.; Cisse, C. and Staker, C. 2000. "The Prosecutors ofInternational Tribunals" .
In Sewall and Kaysen, 2000 .
386 Note 145 above, at 144.
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When sentence is pronounced for more than one offence, the Rome Statute does
not specify the sentence for each offence as well as the total period of imprisonmentf"
The total period cannot be less than the highest individual sentence pronounced, nor may
it exceed the total length of sentence mentioned above.389
3.1.7.4 Agreements of the International Criminal Court on the Prison Policy
Once judgments have been given, there is a general obligation on states parties to
recognise and aid in their fulfilment, although that obligation does not extend to
providing prison facilities. 390 The ICe makes arrangements and/or agreements with states
parties that are able to provide prison facilities.I" If no other arrangement is made for
prison facilities, the sentence of imprisonment will be served in the host state ? 92 In this
case, the Ice shall bear the cost of imprisonment.393
In choosing a state of detention, the ICe does not take into account the views of
the sentenced person or his or her nationality.l" The ICe chooses the state of detention,
which must comply with widely accepted international standards governing the treatment
of prisoners.I'" There can obviously be no question of sending a prisoner to a state with
prison conditions that do not meet international standards.I" Furthermore, conditions of
detention must be neither more nor less favourable than those available to prisoners
convicted of similar offences in the state where the sentence is being enforced.i'"
A sentence of imprisonment must be served under the supervision of the ICe,
which will ensure that the full sentence is served .398 However, the sentenced person can
388 Article 77 , note 15 above .
389 Article 78(3), note 15 above.
390 Crawford, 1. 1994. "The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal", American Journal
of International Law, 88: p152.
391 Article 103(1), note 15 above.
392 Article 103(4), note 15 above.
393 Ibid .
394 Article 103(3), note 15 above.
395 Note 145 above, at 145.
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petition the ICC for pardon, parole or commutation of sentence.f" Nevertheless, when
the sentenced person has served two-thirds of the sentence, or twenty-five years in the
case of life imprisonment, the ICC shall review it proprio motu to determine whether the
sentence should be reduced or not.400 It is submitted that such petition of sentenced
persons must be entertained, according to the health of the sentenced persons and that,
given the length of sentences likely to be imposed by the ICC, the question of parole
must at least be considered after two-thirds of a sentence has been served.
3.1.7.5 Sanctions for Offences against the Administration of Justice or Misconduct
The ICC is empowered to rule on crimes that constitute an offence against the
administration of justice, such as corruption or destruction of its procedures.?" It may
impose a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years, or a fine in accordance with the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, or both.402 Deliberate misconduct before the ICC or a
refusal to comply with its directions or ruling is also punishable.403
Article 70, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute states:
The Court shall have jurisdiction over the following offences against its administration of
justice when committed intentionally:
(a) Giving false testimony when under an obligation pursuant to Article 69, paragraph I,
to tell the truth;
(b) Presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged;
(c) Corruptly influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with the attendance or
testimony of a witness, retaliating against a witness for giving testimony or
destroying, tampering with or interfering with the collection of evidence;
(d) Impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing an official of the Court for the
purpose of forcing or persuading the official not to perform, or to perform
improperly, his or her duties;
(e) Retaliating against an official of the Court on account of duties performed by that or
another official;
399 Note 390 above, at 152.
400 Article 110(3), note 15 above.
401 Articles 70 and 71, note 15 above.
402 Article 70(3), note 15 above.
403 Article 71, note 15 above.
66
(f) Soliciting or accepting a bribe as an official of the Court in connection with his or
her official duties .
Misconduct is defined as any behaviour violating the dignity of the ICe or
interfering with the procedures necessary to guarantee its independence, objectivity or
effectiveness.r'" Misconduct is possible at any stage of prosecution.405 The ICe does not
punish misconduct before the trial is held.406 The disruption of proceedings may occur
through physical attacks on a judge, prosecutor, witness or legal expert, or by making a
disturbance that negatively affects the function of the Iee.407 Neglecting to heed advice
or warnings from the ICe or deliberately refusing to comply with its orders and other
serious misconduct may lead the ICe to impose sanctions such as a fine or removal from
the ICe courtroom.f"
According to Triffterer, misconduct by the defendants, witnesses, experts or
victims is punishable in a public or closed session. 409 He states that misconduct is defined
within two limitations:
1. Place limits : misconduct must take place in the ICe courtroom, or in places where the
ICe is held, which includes the public gallery but excludes other rooms in the
building; and
2. Time limits : misconduct must occur when court is in session. No sanction will be
given before the judges appear or after they leave the place of trial.
404 Triffterer, O. 1999. "Article: 71 Sanctions for Misconduct before the Court" In Triffterer 1999' p930
405 Ibid. . , . .
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3.2 The Challenges of Defining the Crime of Aggression and Crimes not under the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
3.2.1 The Crime of Aggression
Customary international law appears to consider the cnme of aggression as an
international crime.4 1O The crime of aggression has always been defined as planning,
organising, preparing, or participating in the first use of armed force by a state against the
territorial and political independence of another state, in contravention of the UN Charter,
and provided that the acts of the crime of aggression have large scale and serious
consequences.":'
Unlike the cnme of aggression, genocide, cnmes against humanity and war
crimes are defined in the Rome Statute. These definitions draw heavily on definitions of
these crimes as established in prior specific conventions, other international agreements
and ad hoc tribunals.Y'
The first major outstanding issue at the fifth PrepCom session was whether or not
to adopt a broad definition or a list of specific acts on Resolution 3314 (1974) of the UN
General Assembly, which defines the crime of aggression.i" Some support seemed to be
emerging for the creation of a comprehensive definition with illustrative examples.l'"
This debate led to a decision on what procedure would enable the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction.t'? According to Christopher Hall, permanent members in the UNSC argued
that the UNSC must be allowed to determine where aggression occurred.?" Like-Minded
states suggested that the International Court of Justice, the UN General Assembly, or
410 Note 72 above .
411 Ibid.
412 Note 315 above, at 361.
413 Hall , C.K. 2000. "The First Five Sessions of the UN Preparatory Commission for the International
Criminal Court" , American Journal ofInternational Law, 94: p788.
414 Ibid.
415 Nanda , V. 1998. "The Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court: Challenges Ahead",
Human Rights Quarterly, 20: p419.
416 Note 413 ab;ve.
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another organ could start proceedings in cases of suspected aggression.l'" States were
divided on whether co-operation between the ICC, the International Court of Justice or
the UN General Assembly was necessary, though general agreement would be required in
order to decide that aggression had occurred.l"
The US and some other states were concerned that the inclusion of aggression as a
cnme was highly political, and might result in politically motivated charges being
brought by rival states.l'" These states also strongly resisted the inclusion of nuclear
weapons and land mines in the list of prohibited weapons in terms of the definition of the
crime of aggression, on the grounds that the threat of using such weapons was not
actually prohibited under existing international law.P"
According to the UN General Assembly, aggression as an international cnme
must occur under the following conditions:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State,
or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or
attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part
thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or
the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armedforces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and
air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State
with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory
beyond the termination of the agreement;
417 Ibid.
418 Ibid.
419 Note 415 above, at 419.
420 Krisch, P. and Holmes, IT. 1999. "The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The
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(1) The action of a State in allowing its territory , which it has placed at the disposal of
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression
against a third State ;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups , irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
tI
. 421ierem.
It is submitted that in order to analyse the definition of the crime of aggression in
the future, the specific acts enumerated in the 1974 definition as constituting this crime
should be retained as the basis for defining it under the Rome Statute. The 1974
definition gives the UNSC the power to decide whether the crime of aggression has
occurred in each case and recommends that it should, where possible, use this definition
as guidance when determining, in accordance with the UN Charter, the existence of an
act of aggression. 422 The particular acts listed in the definition can inform the UNSC and
still serve as an official definition of what constitutes the initiation and/or waging of an
aggressive war.423 It is submitted that the ends of international justice will be better
served if the 1974 definition of the crime of aggression is used by the judicial chamber of
the ICC to determine the existence of an act of aggression and no reference is made to the
UNSC.
Leila Sadat and Richard Carden argue that the debate on how to allocate
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is complicated by the fact that Article 39 of the
UN Charter declares that the determining of situations of aggression is a prerogative of
the UNSc.
424
If the UNSC is the arbiter of situations of aggression, it means that the ICC
can only prosecute aggression once the UNSC has declared a particular act or acts as
constituting aggression.l" Such a view seems contrary to the independence of the ICC,
and could mean that permanent members of the UNSC are unlikely to face prosecution
421 UN Doc. AlRES/ 3314 (XXIX) (1974) .
422 Note 4 above, at 444.
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid.
425 Note 4 above, at 445.
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for the crime of aggression, since each permanent member has the power of veto.
426
The
ICC needs to have the power to undertake prosecutions in cases of aggression without
such cases being referred by the UNSC. 427
The Rome Statute does not state explicitly that an affirmative determination by
the UNSC is required prior to a complaint of aggression being brought before the ICC.
428
Sadat and Carden suggest that the ICC should not leave the determination of such a
central factual issue to a political body like the UNSC.
429 In the words of former
Nuremberg war crimes prosecutor, Benjamin B. Ferencz, the international community
must ultimately decide "whether it prefers the law of force or the force of law,,430 and to
this, it is submitted that determining where the acts of the crime of aggression occur is a
non-procedural matter, and it is not appropriate that a judicial issue be decided by a
political body such as the UNSC.
Before it exercises its jurisdiction, the ICC should define and set conditions under
which its jurisdiction can be exercised so as to take into consideration the UN Charter.Y'
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter provides that states "shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state". This Article should be read together with Article 51
of the UN Charter, which grants an inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN.432 This Article is unclear as to
what constitutes aggression and this has led to long-standing disagreement among states
and international scholars on the criteria for determining acts that constitute
aggression.F" It remains, therefore, for the UN to convene an international conference to
426 Ibid .
427 Note 145 above, at 27.
428 Note 4 above , at 449 .
429 Ibid.
430
Note 4 above, at 444.




define what constitutes an aggressive act sufficiently serious to come within the terms of
the UN Charter.Y"
The journey toward a generally accepted definition of aggression has been long
and difficult.435 It is submitted that a list of definitions, such as those in Resolution 3314,
tends to be clearer and less controversial than an illustrative list of examples of
aggression, and would therefore be more acceptable for inclusion in the Rome Statute at
the Review Conference.
Participating states at the Review Conference will need to apply a three-part test
in assessing aggressive acts : the first part defines an aggressor; the second decides who
initially committed the act of violence, and the third determines subjectively the existence
. f . . 436or non-existence 0 aggressive intent.
It is submitted that the next step would be to scrutinise and possibly amend the
1974 definition of aggression. According to Sadat and Carden, the ICC understanding of
the crime of aggression required the use of a list of definitions, combined with a more
general preamble. 437 This list would address many of the concerns about ICC powers and
avoid claims that individuals have no knowledge of whether given acts are criminal. 438 It
is submitted that, if this list could be agreed upon, it would reconcile earlier objections,
either by incorporating or refuting the arguments which they advanced.
Indeed, the best way to create a statutory crime is to list the specific actions that
constitute the perpetration of the crime.439 However, an illustrative list of examples of
aggression may lead to an individual 's simply choosing to commit acts not mentioned in
the list in order to escape liability.T'" On the other hand, a list of the definitions may
434 Ibid.
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follow existing international law more closely, while at the same time allowing for the
f hi I 441development 0 t IS aw.
3.2.2 International Crimes outside the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court
During the deliberations for the establishment of the ICC at the Rome Conference in
1998, some delegates suggested including other international crimes under the
jurisdiction of the ICe. 442 Algeria, India, Sri Lanka and Turkey attempted to include the
act of terrorism in the Rome Statute.443 However, the wording of Article 5 of the Rome
Statute excludes acts of terrorism and other international crimes such as drug trafficking
from the jurisdiction of the ICe.444 The content of Article 5 of the Rome Statute draws
attention to the limitation of the jurisdiction of the ICC with regard to the international
. d b 445cnmes state a ove.
3.2.3 The Crime of Terrorism
Up to the present time, there is no satisfactory definition of terrorism. It is submitted that
the crime of terrorism should be distinguished from the crime of aggression. As indicated
above, aggression occurs as an international crime when states commit such acts against
another state. It is further submitted that terrorism may be undertaken mainly by
organised group or individuals outside the framework of states. Terrorism may manifest
itself as murder, extermination, torture, rape and persecution, all of which are mentioned
in the Rome Statute.446 Acts of terrorism may amount to crimes against humanity when
they meet the special requirements of these crimes, i.e., when they are part of a
widespread or systematic attack on civilians; and when perpetrators are aware or
cognisant of the fact that their criminal acts are part of a general or systematic pattern of
441 Ibid.
442 Note 97 above .
443 UN Doe. A /CONF. 18311L71 (1998) .
444 Note 72 above.
445 Article 5, note 15 above.
446 Note 72 above.
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conduct.l" Terrorism may constitute genocide if perpetrators target a specific national,
ethnical, racial or religious group.l" There is much debate as to whether terrorism should
be defined as a war crime and whether terrorist acts can be interpreted as war crimes.449
As long as there is no specific definition of the crime of terrorism, and the ICC has no
official jurisdiction over terrorism, the ICC cannot prosecute alleged terrorists.V''
The exclusion of this crime from the jurisdiction of the ICC allows certain
terrorists to escape justice even though their acts constitute serious international
crimes.Y' It is submitted that non-judicial measures may be used to deal with persons
accused of terrorism, and these measures might be in contravention of human rights. To
leave the crime of terrorism outside the jurisdiction of the ICC might deprive those
accused of terrorism of their rights, or bring them into a situation where human rights
standards are not applied . It is further submitted that there are many cases where strongly
partisan feelings within a state make it difficult for a person accused of terrorism to
receive a fair trial nationally.
The ICC IS an international institution that is able to deal jointly with the
prosecution and deterrence of international acts of terrorism.F'' The international
community could send a clear message that terrorist acts are internationally condemned
and will incur prosecution on the international level by the ICC.453
According to Mira Banchik, the future definition of terrorism should include the
financing of terrorist acts .454 Banchik points out that without adequate finance, terrorist
attacks could not be carried out. However, it is submitted that despite the absence of a
satisfactory or comprehensive definition, there is general agreement that terrorism
447 Ibid.
448 See chapter 3.1.
449 Banchik, M. [n.d.] 1999. "The International Criminal Court and Terrorism": p14 . Available at
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consists of unprovoked attack on civilians, and that there is a strong link between all such
acts. For examples, kidnapping of hostages , attacks on large buildings and random
shootings have as their common elements violence against innocent individuals and may
come within the category of terrorism.
It is submitted that a proper definition of what constitutes an act of terrorism
should be made so that the ICC as a judicial system decides who is a terrorist. Terrorism
should be a separate category and, as such, deserves separate contemplation and
prosecution.l'" This would mean that the ICC would not have to charge alleged terrorists
with already existing crimes like crimes against humanity or war crimes.
3.3 The Human Rights of the Accused and the Victims
"We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the
record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned
chalice is to put it to our lips as well" .456 These are the words ofRobert Jackson, the chief
prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunals. It is submitted that this reflects on the necessity
for ICC officials to show awareness of human rights .
The human rights obligations imposed by the Rome Statute extend to all laws
applied and interpreted by the ICC.457 These include the operations of the ICC, the
prosecutor, the judges, the ASP and acts of states parties, organisations, individuals and
others who co-operate with the ICC.458 These obligations are included in the Rome
Statute, the Elements of Crimes, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and other
principles and rules ofintemationallaw referred to in Article 210fthe Rome Statute.459
455 Note 449 above , at 18.
456 Scharf, M.P. 1995. "A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal". In Bassiouni, 1997: p259.
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3.3.1 Rights and Guarantees Aimed at Ensuring Fair Trials
The Rome Statute defines the rights of the accused throughout the different stages. The
rights of the individual provided for in Article 55 of the Statute during an investigation in
the pre-trial stage include a number of important internationally recognised safeguards.
Article 55 states:
1. In respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person:
(a) Shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt;
(b) Shall not be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to
any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(c) Shall, if questioned in a language other than a language the person fully
understands and speaks, have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent
interpreter and such translations as are necessary to meet the requirements of
fairness; and
(d) Shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, and shall not be deprived
of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedures as are established in this Statute.
2. Where there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court and that person is about to be questioned either by the
Prosecutor, or by national authorities pursuant to a request made under Part 9, that
person shall also have the following rights of which he or she shall be informed prior
to being questioned:
(a) To be informed, prior to being questioned, that there are grounds to believe that
he or she has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(b) To remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination
of guilt or innocence;
(c) To have legal assistance of the person's choosing, or, if the person does not have
legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case
where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by the person in
any such case if the person does not have sufficient means to pay for it; and
(d) To be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person has voluntarily
waived his or her right to counsel.
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Hall believes that the impact of Article 55 on the law and practice of states parties
may well prove to be one of the more significant aspects of the Rome Statute/'" All these
states will need to ensure that the rights of persons questioned by their authorities at the
request of the prosecutor are assured.f" This will probably influence national law and
practices in other cases involving crimes of lesser magnitude .462 States parties will also
need to respect these rights in cases where they are conducting national investigations of
persons suspected of crimes within the jurisdiction of the lee if they wish to avoid the
lee exercising its concurrent jurisdiction under the principle of complementarity.T"
Despite the fact that Article 55, paragraph 2 (a) grants the accused the right to be
informed that he or she is a suspect prior to being questioned, the Rome Statute does not
state that the accused person must be informed prior to the initiation of the
investigation.l'" A further right of accused persons is granted to them under Article 60,
paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute which states that the accused has the right to apply for
bail.465
Article 56, paragraph 1 (b) of the Rome Statute entitles the Pre-Trial Division,
upon request of the prosecutor, to take the necessary measures to ensure the efficiency
and integrity of the proceedings and to protect the rights of the defence. This Article
attempts to balance the situations of the accused persons and the prosecutor at the pre-
trial stage by providing some degree of equality of rights during this phase of the
procedure, rather than obliging the defence to rely solely on his or her right of cross-
examination at trial.466
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3.3.1.1 The Presumption of Innocence
The presumption of innocence should apply from the investigation stage and continue
until the conviction or acquittal of the accused.l'" The Rome Statute proscribes the person
from the presumption of innocence after guilt is proven.
468
Therefore, the prosecutor
carries the burden of proof and the accused is convicted when the judges find that his or
her guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
469
The presumption of innocence applies in the Pre-Trial Division even when a
prima facie case has not been confirmed.Y" It follows, among other things , that the
investigating authorities must also investigate all circumstances which appear to favour
the suspect in order to exclude any reasonable doubt. 471
If the accused refuses to plead, the Trial Division enters a ' not guilty ' plea.472
Furthermore, the accused may elect to remain silent and not to speak in his or her
defence .?" As has been noted , the presumption of innocence aims to protect the right of
the accused to refuse to answer questions, because he or she is presumed innocent and
hence has no obligation to contribute to the proceedings.l" It would seem that another
consequence is that the accused is under no obligation to give evidence before the ICC
and, in addition, no adverse inference may be drawn from his or her decision not to
testify on his or her own behalf. 475 It is submitted that these safeguards for accused
persons are adequate.
3.3.1.2 The Rights of the Defence
On 3 February 2003, at its sixth meeting, the ASP was informed that its President, in
consultation with his bureau, had appointed a legal expert to act as a focal point for the
467 Article 66, note 15 above .
468 Schabas, W.A. 1999. "Article 66: Presumption ofInnocence". In Triffterer 1999 ' p838
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establishment of an international criminal bar, in order to assist the ASP in future
discussions on the matter.476 On 22 April 2003, the ASP decided to include an item in the
agenda for the second session concerning the establishment of an international criminal
bar.477 According to Hans Bevers and Chantal Joubert, the ICC encourages a strong
defence system that pledges a warning against arbitrary proceedings; the ' defences' pillar
is the main pillar of the ICC.478
It is submitted that the need for such a group of lawyers, sufficiently conversant
with the area of jurisdiction and codes of the ICC, arose partly because the accused must
be questioned in presence of counsel. Claus Kreb argues that if the defence counsel is
required to testify as a witness, it becomes difficult to reconcile Rule 140, paragraph 3 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which provides that "a witness who has not yet
testified shall not be present when the testimony of another witness is given", with the
requirement that the accused be continuously assisted by defence counsel. 479
It is submitted that the problem is that the possibility seems to exist that the
defence counsel may also be required to testify as a witness. In adversarial systems the
accused is generally allowed to testify as a witness in his or her defence and/or in the
defence of a co-accused.i'" This raises questions under the existing ICC code, however,
where the accused is not competent as a prosecution witness even against a co-accused.l"
According to Jacob Cogan, possible reluctance of states parties to co-operate with
the ICC might limit the ability of the accused to gain access to materials which might be
476 See generally United Nations. 2003 . Assembly of States Parties to the Rom e Statute ofthe International
Criminal Court: first session (first and second resumptions) .
477 Ibid.
478 B
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Light of Comparative Criminal Procedure" . In Fischer Kress and Luder 2001 : p322
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necessary for his or her defence.482 He believes that these limitations do not weigh
equally on the prosecution since no case could have been brought against the accused if
there was insufficient evidence against him or her. Equally, without the co-operation of
the relevant state witness, testimony may be unavailable.l'" On the other hand, it is
submitted that the prosecutor, who serves in all the cases before the ICC and is well-
known to the international community, has far greater prestige than the defence counsel,
who serves in a single case, and this is also potentially problematic.
The defence counsel is also disadvantaged in the case of state manipulation of
defence witnesses.i'" In these situations, the ICC will probably avoid issuing an order
that presents a high risk of non-compliance, so that it can retain the appearance of
authority.485 The ICC is therefore open to the criticism that the defendant's defence
counsel is at a disadvantage regarding the prosccution.l" Indeed, these apparent
imbalances may create difficulties, which are a matter for the judges to decide on a case-
by-case basis.487 These sorts of determinations are made all the time in national courts .
The defence is entitled to seek orders that are requests for assistance. Even when
these orders originate from the defence, they would emanate from the Pre-Trial Division,
which is an organ of the ICC, and so the requisite states would be required to give them
the same treatment accorded to other requests for co-operation with the ICC.488
The ICC and not, as in most legal systems, the accused or his or her
representatives, chooses the defence counsel and tries to select lawyers from different
geographical areas.489 The Registrar plays a major role in ensuring a geographical
distribution of counsel and states when selecting the counsel.490 This is similar to the
482 Cogan, J.K. 2002. "International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects", Yale
Journal ofInternational Law, 27 (Winter): p128.
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procedure at the Nuremberg Tribunals when the accused were not entitled to name their
own counsel pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles.l" It is submitted that giving the
accused the right to choose his or her counsel would be an improvement of human rights
standards in international criminal procedures.
3.3.1.3 The Norm of a Public Hearing
Article 64, paragraph 7 and Article 67 of the Rome Statute list the norms of a public
hearing. Exceptions may occur when there is a need to protect the victims, the witnesses,
or the accused. 492 Article 68, paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute provides another exception
- to protect confidential or sensitive information. Where this is the case, it may be
decided that parts of the proceedings be conducted in camera or the presentation of
evidence by electronic or other special means be allowed, especially in the case of sexual
crimes or when a victim or witness is a child. The hearing must be conducted fairly,
which means that all persons must be treated with equal civility. 493
3.3.2 The Rights of the Accused and the Relationship to the Principles of
International Criminal Law
Antonio Cassese believes that the stipulations of the Rome Statute in terms of the
procedural guarantees are simply a blend of the common law judicial systems in the US
and UK and civil law judicial systems such as those of France and GermanyI" The
Statute grants the accused the rights which exist in international criminal law.495
3.3.2.1 Ne Bis in Idem
The Rome Statute provides that a person cannot be tried in two different courts for the
same offence, for instance, the accused cannot be tried at the ICC and then in a national
491 Article 228, note 54 above.
492 Article 67, note 15 above.
493 Cattin, D. 1999. "Article 67: Rights of the Accused". In Triffterer, 1999: p851.
494 Cas~ese,,,A. 1999. "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary
Reflections , European Journal ofInternational Law, 10(1): p169.
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court.496 After the Nuremburg Tribunals, national courts retried those who were acquitted
by the Tribunals. 497 They were charged a second time and in some cases convicted.l'"
In addition to this principle, the resources and court facilities of the judicial
system must be conserved.Y'' Article 20 of the Rome Statute prohibits a second trial for
anyone who has been convicted or acquitted in respect of the same conduct. In the pre-
trial proceedings, where no final decision, such as that to amend or withdraw charges, is
arrived at, then the ne his in idem does not apply. 500 This Article excludes some
conditions from the principle of prohibition on double jeopardy when national courts
decide to prosecute the accused in order to shield him or her from the ICC prosecution.
3.3.2.2 Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
Under Article 22 of the Rome Statute, the ICC will try persons for their conduct, if the
conduct that gives rise to crimes is defined in the Rome Statute. The definition of crimes
outside the Statute does not criminalise conduct, regardless of the national law of any
state party.SDI According to Article 121, paragraph 4 of the Rome Statute, new crimes are
brought under the jurisdiction of the ICC by the ASP.
3.3.2.3 Nulla Poena Sine Lege
The sentencing provision of Article 77 of the Statute specifies the term of imprisonment
in addition to the possibility of fines or confiscation of property.i'" The ICC has no
authority to impose punishment that is not set out in the Statute .503
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498 Ibid.
499 Tallgren, I. 1999. "Article 21: Applicable Law". In Triffterer 1999 ' p421
~o . ' . .
IbId.
501 Broomhall, B. 1999. "Article 22: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege". In Triffterer, 1999: p452.
502 Schabas, W.A. 1999. "Article 23: Nulla Poena Sine Lege". In Triffterer 1999: p466.
~~ ,
82
3.3.3 The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy
An accused cannot be forced by the ICC to divulge the size or extent of his or her
property, nor can any state be forced to disclose this on behalf of the accused.Y" If
accused persons are exempt from search and seizure of their property, the human rights,
even of those suspected of having committed serious crimes, will be protected .505 George
Edwards believes that though the ICC will probably find this exemption implicit within
the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the scope of coverage is
uncertain.i'" It is likely that the ICC will take into account various factors, and may make
a distinction between the rights of an accused (presumed innocent) individual, and those
of a convicted person.?" At present, all law applied is interpreted by the ICC and must be
consistent with the search and seizure right to privacy.508
The mere existence of the search and the seizure right to privacy is insufficient to
ensure realisation.i'" The ICC must enforce the right, as it is required to enforce all
internationally recognised human rights.51O Furthermore, the ICC is obligated to consider
Article 69, paragraph 7 of the Rome Statute, which underlines that evidence shall not be
obtained by means which violate the Rome Statute or internationally recognised human
rights.51I
3.3.4 Protection from Sexual Crimes in the Rome Statute
The enumeration of rape and other gender-based offences as grave breaches of the four
Geneva Conventions and as crimes against humanity signifies a formidable development
in international law.
512
It aims to deter people from these crimes in future and suggests a
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profound shift in attitude within the international community towards crimes of particular
gender concern. 513
As has been shown in part one of this chapter, these crimes include acts of sexual
mutilation and sexual exploitation. Listing sexual crimes separately rather than under the
other categories of crimes against humanity means the harm implicit in these serious
violations is explicitly recognised. i'" This category of crimes is also underlined in the
Elements of Crimes, which stipulates that any particular conduct constituting one of the
sexual crimes could still constitute one or more of the other crimes, if their conditions
were fulfilled. 515
Sexual violence can also occur when the victim is imprisoned in an oppressive
environment in which he or she has no choice but to succumb to unwanted advances.i"
Subjugation by fear , psychological oppression, imprisonment or detention, excessively
hard labour, generalised terror, abuse of power, duress , or deprivation of psychological or
physical support and comfort can also be used to coerce a victim to engage in sexual
conduct. 517
One of the PrepCom tasks is to avoid retrograde decision-making and fulfil the
mandate of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action'" by integrating gender
sensitive attitudes throughout the Rome Statute.i'" The idea is to protect women from all
forms of violence and traditional practices involving intolerance and extremism,
513 See generally Erb , N. 1998. "Gender-Based Crimes under the Draft Statute for the Permanent
International Criminal Court", Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 29 (Spring).
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particularly religious extremism, which affect their rights and freedoms.r" The protection
of children against abuse is also a priority.521
Due to the particular circumstances in which crimes of sexual violence generally
occur (and such crimes come under the jurisdiction of the lee when they also constitute
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) , the relationship between elements of
crime, defences and proof can become complex. 522 Issues of consent that may be
pertinent in a case of sexual violence within the context of a national prosecution may not
be equally valid in the context of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.523
It is submitted that the human rights principles which lie behind the prosecution
of crimes involving sexual and gender violence have important ramifications for national
law reform in states parties. These principles open the door, for example, to the
establishment of policies ofgender equality .F" Ratification of the Rome Statute paves the
way for recognition of gender inequalities in national criminal laws as well as in
immigration policies, laws and regulations. 525
The efforts of the international community have been geared towards ensuring
that the lee participates in the protection of women from sexual crimes such a rape.526
This is a challenge because resistance to furthering the agenda has become progressively
more overt on the part of some delegations with particularly bad gender records.r"
520 Su~livan, D. 1994. "Women's Human Rights and the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights", The
American Journal ofInternational Law, 88: p153.
52\ Note 513 above .
522 Note 387 above, at 394.
523 Ibid.
524 Note 280 above, at 18.
525 Ibid .
526 Note 280 above, at 26.
527 Ibid .
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3.3.5 The Protection of Children's Rights in the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute does not have a position on whether children below the age of eighteen
should be held responsible for the commission of offences; rather it provides that the ICC
will not assume jurisdiction for such cases.528 On the other hand, the Statute confirms that
adult commanders of child soldiers can be prosecuted for offences committed by their
forces.529
John Holmes believes that there are two main reasons why the Rome Statute has
not granted jurisdiction over children under the age of eighteen to the ICC.
53o
First, it
would have been difficult to develop a separate system of criminal juvenile justice for the
ICC.531 International human rights instruments set clear standards for states concerning
juvenile justice and if the ICC were to assume jurisdiction it would have to establish a
separate juvenile justice system, including a distinct penal institution.Y' Creating such a
system would mean lengthy negotiations, assuming that states would accept its
establishment. 533
The second reason is that if child soldiers could be prosecuted under the Rome
Statute, the ICC would victimise children twice.534 According to Holmes, the use of
children in armed forces is already a violation of their rights and punishment for being
conscripted or enlisting into the armed forces would be unjust. 535 Similarly, in crimes
under the jurisdiction of the ICC, it is submitted that if children are accused of
involvement, it can be assumed that the influences upon them have been corrupting. The
ICC should thus concern itself only with prosecuting leaders.
528 Holmes, J.T. 2000 . "The Protection of the Children's Rights in the Statute of the International Criminal
Court". In Nesi, G.; Politi, M. and Ashgate, A. (eds) . The Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal
Court: a challenge to impunity: p122.
529 Ibid.
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Prohibitions on conscripting or enlisting children are included in two sections of
the list of war crimes in Article 8 of the Rome Statute. It is included as a crime in
international armed conflicts and also in the section related to non-international armed
conflicts, which is essentially the same as for international armed conflicts, except that
the former includes conscripting or enlisting children into armed groups as well as into
armed forces.536 The Rome Statute does not cover a hypothetical situation where children
I '1" h c: 537vo untan y jom sue rorces.
This implies a prohibition on 'conscripting' or compulsorily enlisting children
into military service. The Rome Statute uses the term 'conscripting or enlisting' rather
than the four Geneva Conventions' term 'recruiting'; the term was changed in order to
clarify that the crime is intended to cover active efforts by members of the armed forces
to draw children into their ranks.538 Article 8, paragraph 2 (xxvi) of the Rome Statute
prohibits the enlisting of children under the age of fifteen into national armed forces
under any conditions. According to this Article, no defence is possible in a case
concerning the conscripting or enlisting of children. The word 'national' was added to
'armed forces' after some Arab states tried to protect stone-throwing children who had
not been subjected to any military training from prosecution.r"
The provisions in Article 8 relating to the recruitment of children into armed
forces closely resemble the Additional Protocols.l" Article 77 of Protocol I and Article 4
of Protocol 11 obligate states parties to refrain from recruiting children into their armed
forces, but do not specify the age of the children. Therefore, the inclusion of conscripting
or enlisting children under the age of fifteen into armed forces under war crimes in the
Rome Statute represents a significant advance in international humanitarian law.541
536 Note 528 above, at 119.
537 Ibid.
538 Note 528 above, at 120.
539 Note 311 above, at 261.
540 Note 528 above, at 120.
541 Ibid.
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The Rome Statute uses the term 'participating actively' in both national and
international armed conflicts. 542 It can be argued that the language of the Rome Statute is
broader and it therefore remains for the ICC itself to determine where active participation
has occurred.t'" This may be a departure from Additional Protocol 11, which places no
qualification other than the word 'direct' on the prohibition against participation in
hostilities. 544 According to Holmes, this change was made for two reasons: First, it was
believed that it was necessary to retain some symmetry between the provision for
international and internal armed conflicts. 545 Second, the provisions in Protocol 11 are not
defined as a grave breach of the Conventions whereas 'active participation' by children is
defined as a war crime in the Rome Statute; thus, a clearer standard was necessary.546
The major obstacle in applying the relevant international rules to internal armed
conflicts is the insurgent party's status under international law; the restrictions on
conflicts between two states do not necessarily apply here.547 However, the insurgent
party can be held responsible for violating the rules of internal armed conflicts. Adriaan
Bos believes that the ICC may consider Common Article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions as an additional indication of the applicability of fundamental human rights
in internal armed conflicts.r" He suggests that violations of these rules by the parties,
including the insurgents, in internal armed conflicts may be dealt with as crimes under
international law. As regards the protection of human rights, there are of course other
paragraphs in the Rome Statute that are clearly an improvement over earlier texts on the
same subject.549
The other contentious issue involving the protection of children's rights was the
forced removal of children from their families. The question ofwhether the children must
542 Ibid.
543 Ibid.
544 Note 528 above, at 121.
545 Note 528 above, at 120.
546 Note 528 above, at 119.
547 See generally Bos, A. 1998. "Dedicated to the Adoption of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court 1948-1998: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Statute of the International




have had a 'lawful residence' before being forcibly transferred was resolved after a
majority of delegations at the Rome Conference indicated that the Rome Statute required
only transfer from one to another group, not lawful residence.P" On the other hand, many
delegations wanted to include all persons below the age of twenty-one in the scope of
Article 6 (e), which criminalises the forcible transfer of children.Y' After some
discussion, a clear majority of delegations emerged in support of the age limit of eighteen
, h b . 552years, and consensus was founded on t at aS1S.
3.3.6 The Rights of Victims and Witnesses
The Rome Statute recognises that without the participation of victims, there can be no
effective justice worth protecting.Y" It explicitly recognises the right of survivors to
participate in the judicial process, directly or through legal representatives at different
stages.f"
In terms of Article 68 of the Rome Statute, victims may participate in the
activities of the ICC in a number of ways. First, they may participate in the procedure
before the Pre-Trial Division when the prosecutor is requesting authorisation to proceed
with an investigation on his or her own initiative.555 It is likely that victims will tend to
support the prosecutor.t" Victims may also participate in the course of challenges to
jurisdiction or admissibility, even in cases that have been initiated by states parties or by
the UNSC.557
550 Note 257 above, at 70.
551 Note 145 above.
552 Ibid.
553 Note 280 above, at 19.
554 Ibid.
555 Article 54(3)b, note 15 above.
556 Note 145 above, at 147.
557 Article 19(3), note 15 above.
89
3.3.7 The Victims and Witnesses Unit
There is an increasing trend in criminal justice towards what is called 'restorative justice',
a victim-oriented approach. This is addressed in Article 75 of the Rome Statute.i" To
further emphasise this matter, Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides
for the establishment of a Victims and Witnesses Unit. Pursuant to this approach the ICC
established the Victims and Witnesses Unit to ensure that victims and witnesses enjoy
their rights and are able to participate effectively in the procedure of the ICe.
Victims regularly appear as witnesses in criminal proceedings.I" They and their
families may be vulnerable to intimidation or retaliation as a result of the trial.560
Moreover, victims may suffer more than other witnesses when testifying.F" Reliving the
traumatic experience during the investigation and prosecution of a case may lead to
severe stress; the Rules of Procedure and Evidence contain provisions that seek to avoid
secondary traumatisation. 562
According to Article 43, paragraph 6 of the Rome Statute, the Victims and
Witnesses Unit will provide protection, therapy and other appropriate assistance for
witnesses and victims who are deemed to be at risk because of giving testimony.
Furthermore, the Unit must include staff with expertise in trauma, including sexual
trauma.
563
The Rome Statute emphasises the gravity of gender violence by refusing to
include such violence under the general heading of outrages upon personal dignity or
humiliating treatment. 564
According to Birte Timm, the group of victims to be notified is broad because
proprio motu investigations will be typically triggered by information provided by
558 Note 145 above, at 147.
559 Timm, B. 2001. "The Legal Position of Victims in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence". In Fischer,
Kress and Luder, 2001: p294.
560 Ibid.
561 Ibid.
562 IRu e 16(2), note 25 above.
563 Note 280 above, at 19.
564 See generally, Aafjes, A. 1998. Gender Violence: the Hidden War Crime.
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victims.i'" Timm states that notification must therefore be given to all victims that are
known to the prosecutor or the Victims and Witnesses Unit. Moreover, the prosecutor
may give notice by general means i.e through a public announcement. Timm believes that
all notifications at this particularly sensitive stage of the proceedings are, however,
subject to the integrity and effective conduct of the investigations and the security, and
well-being of victims and witnesses. If these are endangered, no notification will be given
by the prosecutor.566
According to Article 15, paragraph 3 of the Rome Statute, if victims come
forward in response to the notification, they are required to submit written representations
within a set time. In the case of the proprio motu investigation, the submissions will
typically relate to the question of whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation, and in the case of a doubt as to the jurisdiction of The ICC, whether the
case is of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the ICe. 567
According to Article 19, paragraph 3 victims may submit observations to the ICC
when a ruling of the ICC is sought on a matter of admissibility and jurisdiction. As a
general rule, Article 68, paragraph 3 mentions that where the personal interests of victims
are affected, the ICC shall permit their views and concerns to be considered by the ICC
and in a manner consistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. 568
565 Note 559 above, at 296.
566 Ibid.




The Roles and Functions of the International Criminal Court
and its Interaction with National Courts
4.1 Introduction
Most countries throughout the world have similar interests in as far as their national laws
are expected to enforce international standards and the rule of international law.569 Most
of the participating states at the Rome Conference understood that it was in their interests
that individual nations should remain accountable for prosecuting violations of
. . 11 570internationa aw.
However, it was also necessary for the international community to prosecute
certain types of offenders. Where the national courts are inadequate to the task and the
crime is both serious and on a large scale or may negatively affect the fabric of a nation
or nations, or may threaten the well-being of humanity, then the crime should be
prosecuted by the ICe. 571 The forth preamble of the Rome Statute confirms that the
perpetrators of serious international crimes (listed in chapter 3.1) must not go unpunished
and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national
level and by enhancing international cooperation. The benefits of the ICC processes will
not only advance the objectives of the international community with respect to major
human rights violations, but will also directly advance the related causes of international
criminal law and administration ofjustice.572
569 Note 87 above, at 25.
570 Ibid.
57! Ibid.
572 Concannon, B. 2000. "Beyond Complementarity: The ICCand NationalProsecution. A viewfrom
Haiti", Colombia Human Rights Law Review, 32: p227.
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4.2 The Importance of the International Criminal Court
As stated above the rationale for the creation of the ICC is to be found in the belief that,
crimes that are deeply shocking to humanity, threaten world peace, or at least affect
people's well-being where they are vulnerable to atrocities, should be prosecuted.r" It is
submitted that despite the reluctance of nations to surrender any part of national
sovereignty, members of the international community realise that the ICC still needs to
have an effective system for punishing criminals whose positions of power allow them to
evade punishment nationally. Robert Mounts, Douglass Cassel and Jeffrey Bleich
enumerate some of the reasons that justify the existence of the ICC below:
1. To vindicate the rights ofvictims;
2. To express outrage;
3. To act as a deterrent to crimes ofa similar sort;
4. To protect victims and future victims from these criminals while they are imprisoned;
and
5. To rehabilitate individuals who have lost all moral sense.574
Miskowiak concludes that the importance of establishing the ICC is clear when
we look at the pitfalls countries face when they endeavour to prosecute leaders who have
fallen from power.575 She points out that a country in the process of political
transformation will tend to place great value on internal unity. According to her, there is a
presumption that prosecuting these political leaders in the ICC would prevent fresh
disturbances from surfacing in a conflict-ridden country. Thus it could, in some cases, be
an advantage if the ICC, with the impartiality it could ideally be trusted to have, dealt
with cases concerning leaders who might still be popular with some sectors of the
1 · 576popu anon.
573 Hafner et al. 1999. "A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood", European
Journal ofInternational Law, 10: p1l6.
~74 Mounts, R.T.; Cassel, D.W. and Bleich, 1. 1995. "Panel II: War Crimes and Other Human Rights Abuse
m the Former Yugoslavia", Whittier Law Review 16: p425 .
575 'Note 39 above, at 43 .
5761bid.
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According to Robertson, individuals who occupy a position of current political or
military power in any state are unlikely to be put on trial unless they invade another state
and commit war crimes on its territory.577 He concludes that an established court is
necessary, since a single ad hoc tribunal will accomplish little, especially if its
fundamental purpose is to discourage people's belief in their immunity from prosecution
or if it neglects the importance of national judicial systems.
The ICC will achieve greater success than any ad hoc process if the raison d'etre
for its existence resides in the criminal records of national courts around the world.578
According to Charney, one role of the ICC should be to serve as a mechanism ofjudicial
processes, then as a monitoring and supporting institution for the prosecution of suspects
under its jurisdiction in national courts where possible.r" He concludes that this last is
perhaps the best outcome, because the purpose of establishing the ICC is to eliminate
immunity for crimes of international concern.
Charney argues that success will be achieved when national legal systems cease to
allow immunity to any category of criminal.580 He points out that the test of that success
will not be large case dockets before the ICC, but persistent and comprehensive national
criminal proceedings worldwide, facilitated by progress towards discouraging
perpetrators of international crimes.
A category of offenders likely to be arraigned in the ICC, with their state's
consent, consists of persons who commit international crimes in a cause that has utterly
failed, and in a country which decides to refer a case to the ICC because it lacks the
facilities or resources to try the matter itself 581 In such cases justice will not only be
served but will also appear to be served, which might make the result more readily
577 Note 179above, at 350.
578 Note 4 above, at 384.
579 Charney, 1.1. 2001. "International Criminal Law and the Role of DomesticCourts",American Journal of
International Law, 95(1): p124.
580 Ibid.
581 Note 179above, at 350.
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acceptable.i'? On the other hand, the risk of a show trial or too mild a sentence would be
higher in a national court, with all the attendant politicking that might still be present, and
. h hi f h . 583referring the case to the Ice rrug t prevent t IS rom appenmg.
The ICe will be useful in high profile cases because its prestige as a court is
great, it has large logistical capability, well-paid international staff and the capacity for
complex litigation.Y" However, these advantages also give rise to certain disadvantages
and it may become too cumbersome and expensive for the ICe to pursue minor incidents,
low-level soldiers and paramilitaries.if
4.3 The Importance of National Prosecutions
National prosecutions are as important as international prosecutions because ad hoc
tribunals and the ICe can only prosecute a small fraction of the large-scale international
crimes that OCCUr.586 In fact , it is advisable that it should prosecute only high profile
individuals who do not constitute the bulk of 'hands-on' perpetrators.i'" National courts
are also important from the perspective of the prosecuting country because victims
generally prefer a good local prosecution to the best international one.588 It is submitted
that national prosecutions offer a valuable opportunity for the local justice system to
perform better and for the public to learn to trust it.
Tiffany Steele states that when national courts are able to try high-ranking
defendants who have previously served as public officials, this restores confidence and
legitimacy in the judicial system ofthe state, and in so doing, contributes to reconciliation
582 Note 39 above , at 42.
583 Note 179 above , at 350.
584 Note 572 above, at 226.
585 Ibid .
586 Note 572 above, at 225.
587 Ibid.
588 Note 572 above, at 227.
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and good governance in a conflict-torn region.589 In other words, national trials prove to
the international community and nationals that local judicial institutions are capable of
rendering effective justice and are committed to the rule of law.590
According to Miskowiak, investigation and prosecution in a national court would
also be less complicated, because it would be based on familiar procedure and rules.59!
She points out that documents, other physical evidence and witnesses are likely to be
more easily available and language problems would also be minimised. A national trial
could also be less traumatising for the accused, who may be innocent, although
unfortunately, this is not always the case.592
Steele argues that victims prefer a local prosecution if their system can provide an
acceptable fair trial, because they do not feel confident in the procedures of a trial to be
held outside the country .F" He points out that in a local trial, the victims would better
understand the proceedings and could exercise some advantage over government
prosecutors and law enforcement agencies. These trials may therefore result III more
positive outcomes for victims than international trials .594
It is submitted that national prosecutions are more effective than international
prosecutions because of the abovementioned reasons, but they must be capable of, and
interested in, ensuring a fair trial and the rights of the accused and victims .
589 Steele, T. 2002. "The Contribution of the Statute of the ICC to the Enforcement ofIntemational Law in
~e L~ght of the Experience of the ICTY', South Afr ican Yearbook of International Law, 27: p23.
IbId.
59\ Note 39 above, at 42.
592 Ibid.
593 Note 589 above, at 22. /
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4.4 The Principle of Complementarity
The provisions of Article 17 of the Rome Statute are as follows:
1. (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the
State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability ofthe State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of
the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under Article 20,
paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider,
having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law,
whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in Article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice .
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether,
due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system,
the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
The provisions above deal mainly with the principle of complementarity. They
state that the ICC will only initiate an investigation where a state is unwilling or
genuinely unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution of the crime under its
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jurisdiction. It is submitted that the ICC encourages states to prosecute international
crimes and does not seek to replace the national judicial authority.
Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the Rome Statute has not provided for the ICC to
exercise primary jurisdiction over the investigation and prosecution of international
crimes within its jurisdiction.r" Consensus was reached at the Rome Conference that
penal law and law enforcement by police are prerogatives of states.596 The jurisdiction of
the ICC should be viewed as an exception to such a state prerogative.I" The use of
complementary jurisdiction is related to the definition of the situation in such
'exceptions' to the state's prerogative would apply .598However, only specific extenuating
conditions will trigger complementarity jurisdiction.599
One of the 'exceptions ' that would justify an ICC investigation is the
unwillingness or inability of a government to undertake an investigation and prosecution
on its own initiative.F" However, according to Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the ICC
still has to determine unwillingness in particular cases, and can determine this only if
certain conditions are fulfilled.
4.4.1 Determining whether a Case is Inadmissible
The first condition is that the ICC should determine if the case is in the process of being
investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over the place where the said
offences occurred.f'" According to Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute, the ICC
might accept the case as ' admissible ' if the state was unwilling or genuinely unable to
fulfil its judicial obligations. Sharon Williams believes that it appears that the issue of
595 Note 6 above.
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inability, at least in principle, is acceptable, but unwillingness is more problematic
because the ICC would be, in effect, passing judgment on a national judicial system .602
The second condition is that the presumption of ,inadmissibility' may be rebutted
where the ICC determines that its decision to prosecute a crime has resulted from the
unwillingness or inability to prosecute the crime nationally.t'"
The third condition is that the case will be deemed ' inadmissible' if it is not of
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the ICC or if an intervention by ICC officials
is likely to be ineffective.604
4.4.2 The Admissibility of a Case
The principle of complementarity has a concise definition that delineates the different
functions and powers of national courts and the ICC.605 The ICC is not mandated to admit
a case when the state in question fulfils the minimum standard requirements for the trial
of persons a under the jurisdiction of the ICe.606 Under the principle of complementarity,
priority is given to the national courts to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of
international crimes, even when they are within the jurisdiction of the ICe.607
According to Ved Nanda, the PrepCom discussions showed that states had
different views regarding the criteria that the ICC should use in determining the
admissibility of a case before basing it on the principle of complementarity.f'" Some
states preferred a more general criterion, such as lack of good faith or manifest
unwillingness in a state to bring the persons accused to justice in the national courts .
Other states suggested that these criteria could not be applied to states that are unable
602 Ibid.
603 Note 600 above, at 393.
604 Ibid.
605 Mc Dowell, M. 2003. "International Criminal Court Bill" . Available at
www.justice.ie/S02569B20047F907/vWeb/pcRXHR5QCBUF (accessed on 20 May 2004) .
606 Note 600 above, at 392.
607 Ibid.
608 Note 415 above, at 421.
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conduct trials , because they could still investigate pertinent cases. They stated a
preference for criteria that could be specifically enumerated and defined , such as
unconscionable delay in the proceedings or lack of impartiality.609 This study investigates
the lack of impartiality and inability of states because it is submitted that the prosecutor
plays an important role in deciding whether states are impartial or able to prosecute cases.
4.4.2.1 Lack of Impartiality
It may happen that a state cannot provide a fair trial for an accused. However, during the
PrepCom discussions it appeared that the proceedings could still be defective even
though the state might have acted in good faith.6 1O
It might be difficult to prove a lack of impartiality on the part of the state because
the prosecutor must prove that the state, contrary to its apparent actions, is in fact
devious, and that this is inconsistent with the intent of bringing the persons concerned to
justice.t!' On the other hand, the advantages of an independent prosecutor, like the one
who monitors the ICC investigations and prosecutions, far outweigh the disadvantages.t'"
4.4.2.2 Inability of States
In terms of the principle of complementarity enshrined in Article 17 of the Rome Statute,
the ICC may only act in specific circumstances, which are triggered by the inability of a
state to investigate or prosecute a case. Thus, the jurisdiction of the ICC is exceptional. 613
If there is a lack of central government, as when a state finds itself in chaos due to a civil
war or national disaster or if any other event that leads to public disorder occurs and the
government is unable to initiate proceedings, then the ICC has primacy over the national
court .6 14
609 Ibid .
610 Note 600 above, at 394 .
611 Note 600 above, at 393 .
612 See generally United Nations. 1998. The UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court:
{Jfw should they relate ? Report ofthe 29th United Nations Issues Conference 1998, official record.
Note 589 above, at 9. .
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4.4.3 The Possible Impact of the Principle of Complementarity on International
Criminal Jurisdiction
Steele believes that the principle of complementarity is a powerful force in international
criminal jurisdiction.t" He argues that without a strong principle of complementarity in
which the ICC determines admissibility and prosecutions, states would be left to their
own devices to prosecute even the most serious international crimes. It is submitted that
this would not facilitate the enforcement of individual criminal responsibility against the
perpetrators of these crimes. When the threat of international prosecution induces states
to institute national investigations and prosecutions against perpetrators of these crimes,
the Rome Statute's mandate to put an end to immunity is realised.r'" When a threat of
prosecution does not yield this result, the case becomes admissible before the ICe.617
Jelena Pejic states that it must be stressed that the principle of complementarity is
the most important reason why states agreed to discuss and eventually to establish the
ICe.
618
According to Pejic, without complementarity, the very idea of the ICC would
probably not have overcome the hurdle of the states' concerns with sovereignty.
Therefore, the practical application of the principle of complementarity needs to be
closely monitored, given its potential impact on the effectiveness of the ICC, its prestige
and its reputation as a trustworthy institution worldwide.619
The adoption of the principle of complementarity was imperative although the
compromises entailed during the PrepCom discussion affected the selection of crimes
regarded as admissible, as well as the determination of the level of gravity crimes must
have to come under the jurisdiction of the ICe. 620 Williams argues that the principle of
complementarity would promote broad acceptance of the ICC by states and consequently
615 Note 589 above, at 27.
616 Ibid.
617 Ibid.
618 Pejic, 1. 1998. "Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and
~~ec~iveness", Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 29 (Spring): p31O.
IbId.
620
Note 600 above, at 393.
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enhance its credibility, authority and effectiveness.621 He adds that it would avoid
overloading the ICC with cases that could be better dealt with by national courts. He
concludes that this lowers the financial burden of running the ICC .
Its inherent jurisdiction gives the ICC the authority to prosecute crimes within its
jurisdiction without the consent of the particular state party concerned or the ASP.622
According to Bartram Brown, this will allow the ICC to assert jurisdiction over cases
involving international crimes without deferring to the jurisdiction of any interested
state.623 He states that such an approach will promote universal and uniform individual
criminal responsibility for these crimes. This is because the ICC, and not the different
national courts with their different procedures and standards, will investigate crimes and
try the accused.r"
Bartram Brown argues that the concept of 'universal jurisdiction' would probably
be unacceptable to many states and that it would, in any case, be outside the bounds of
current international law.625 He believes that the ICC does not, in fact, have 'universal
jurisdiction' to investigate or prosecute these crimes at will. If there were to be a
complete ' universal jurisdiction', the ICC would be able to investigate any occurrence of
a crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC anywhere in the world .626
The principle of 'universal jurisdiction' over crimes generally recognised as being
of international concern affords jurisdiction to any state, regardless of the status of the
offence or the nationalities of the offender and the offended. 627 Offences criminalised
under international criminal law and obligations that have become part of customary
international law, including crimen contra omnes, can be prosecuted in any state on
621 Ibid.
622 Note 415 above, at 423 .
623 Brown, B.S. 1998. "Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and
~~te~ational Criminal Tribunals", Yale Journal ofInternational Law, 23 (Summer): p409.
IbId.
625 Ibid .
626 Note 39 above, at 19.
627
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behalf of the international community .v" The international crimes defined as being under
the jurisdiction of the lee clearly qualify as violations erga omnes within the meaning of
the doctrine of 'universal jurisdiction' .629
4.5 The Interface between the International Criminal Court and National Courts
It is submitted that states parties always have a choice as to whether or not to prosecute
nationally a person suspected of having committed crimes that fall under the jurisdiction
of the lee. If a state has jurisdiction over these crimes, then that state can choose to
prosecute the suspected person under its own laws or refer the case to the lee and assist
the lee by providing it with the necessary information and evidence.f'"
Charney argues that in most situations, states find it more desirable to resolve a
matter domestically than to give up their responsibility to an international body.631 He
believes that, as a rule, states wish to manage issues themselves and voluntarily refer
matters to the lee only when a collapse of national judicial authority has occurred or
when an lee verdict might enable resolution of international disputes arising from
domestic difficulties which the state is unable to resolve.632
When states agreed to grant the ICe inherent, but neither exclusive nor primary
jurisdiction over cnmes, they established concurrent national and international
jurisdiction over the same crimes.r" The lee could decline to exercise its inherent
authority in cases in which deferral to national jurisdiction was, for some reason, a better
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Bartram Brown states that in some circumstances, a state may find that it is in its
interests to allow a prosecution to be conducted by the ICC.636 He believes that in some
cases a prosecution might be too dangerous to be handled domestically and therefore the
state might prefer the trial to be conducted by an international tribunal. In other
situations, the state may not be capable of properly prosecuting a complex international
. . I 637cnmma matter.
However, Jonathan Charney points out that in other circumstances, the state might
wish to retain control over such prosecutions.f" He argues that for a state to allow its
own nationals to be prosecuted for international crimes on its territory by the ICC would
deprive the state of control and suggest that its national legal system is inadequate.
Furthermore, the state may not wish to have the ICC find that its procedures in dealing
with accused persons are inadequate. 639
Pejic believes that the principle of complementarity strikes a balance between
state sovereignty and the jurisdiction of the ICC.64o Article 17 of the Rome Statute
indicates that inherent jurisdiction may be mistakenly viewed as an encroachment on
state sovereignty. Miskowiak states that it is necessary to have a balance between the
obligation of states to investigate and prosecute offenders and the right of the ICC to
assume jurisdiction in special cases if justice is served.t" The system of checks and
balances ensures that the circumstances in which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction are
well-defined.Y It is submitted that no conceivable formulation of the relationship
between international jurisdictions will be absolutely water-tight, and diverse
interpretations are likely to be offered.
636 Ibid.
637 Ibid.
638 Note 579 above , at 122.
639 Ibid.
640 Note 618 above , at 291.
641 Note 39 above, at 50.
642 Ibid.
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4.5.1 Primacy and Sovereignty
It is important to note that the Rome Statute does not take any jurisdiction away from the
state on whose territory international crimes are committed.F" Thus, the primacy of its
territorial jurisdiction is recognised.F'" This implies that national jurisdiction is
recognised as taking precedence over that of the ICe. However, according to Article 17
of the Rome Statute, the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state is subject to the single
qualification, that the state be willing and able genuinely to carry out the investigations.
Bleich believes that the rationale for the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state lies
not only in the practical considerations cited by the prosecutor in requests for deferral,
but also in the following legal considerations.F" He states that the first consideration is
that one purpose for establishing the ICC is to protect humanitarian interests in the
context of a situation identified as a threat to international peace, security and the well-
being of the world. He concludes that it therefore follows that extraordinary measures
were justified to deal with such grievous situations. These measures might necessitate an
investigation or prosecution before the ICC.646
The conditions on which national primacy depends are that minimum standards of
justice and impartial adjudication shall be met in cases of great international concern.r'"
However, crimes that come under the jurisdiction of the ICC include all cases within the
jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals because of their link to international criminal law,
which is recognised by the UNSC. 648 Looking at the history of ICTY and ICTR, the
conclusion emerges that states may raise issues of sovereignty when they are reluctant to
turn over an accused for trial before the ICe.649
643 Leigh, M. 2001. "The United States and the Statute of Rome", American Journal ofInternational Law,
25(1): pl25.
644 Ibid.
645 Bleich, J.L. 1997. "The International Criminal Court: Report of the ILA Working Group on
Complementarity", DenverJournal ofInternational Law and Policy, 25: p399.
646 Ibid.




When the Rome Statute was adopted, the support for granting a conditional
primacy to states, which falls away only in cases where suspects are not prosecuted by
h h c. d' . I . 650national authorities, was much greater t an t at ror uncon itiona pnmacy.
Governments in times of peace and especially in times of armed conflicts, should be
aware that they have a responsibility to bring to justice those accused of international
. 651cnmes.
States are free to become parties to the Rome Statute and will be guided by their
own determinations in making that decision, which does not imply that the ICC will have
a better claim to exercise jurisdiction than national courtS.652 Whether they become
parties to the Statute or not, all countries will retain their fundamental rights, including
the right to try those accused of having committed crimes on their territory and to try
their own nationals accused of committing crimes elsewhere. If a foreign national is
accused of committing a crime on territories of non-ratifying states, either this country or
the home country of the accused could legitimately try the case .653
According to Bleich, sovereignty considerations become less of an issue when
one considers the system of international criminal law that is now in place .654 He believes
that doubts about the scope of a state's primacy arose from the moment the ICTY Statute
was adopted. He points out that a new system has been created, which need not be bound
by existing consensual systems for inter-state co-operation and judicial assistance.
Miskowiak suggests that the model of national sovereignty and reciprocity characteristic
of extradition law need not dominate the relationship between states and the ICe. 655 It is
submitted that the old roles of national sovereignty which prevented the prosecution of
international crimes in the past are in the process of development because the majority of
states has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICe.
650 Note 39 above, at 42 .
651 Ibid.
652 Note 618 above, at 310.
653 Brown, B.S . 1999 . "U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief
Response", New York University Journal ofInternational Law and Politics 3 1' p869
654 • • .
Note 645 above, at 399.
655 Note 39 above, at 71.
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4.6 The International Criminal Court as a Deterrent to Serious International
Crimes
The deterrent value of nat ional prosecutions directed at individuals of varying levels of
responsibility is often greater than the deterrent value of international prosecutions
directed at a select few individuals, though they may be high profile.
656
According to
Steele, public knowledge and local media coverage are likely to be more intensive in the
case of a national prosecution.V ' He argues that if the same case was to be tried
internationally, it would be likely to be less known nationally and, therefore, might have
a weaker deterrent effect.
Therefore, national prosecutions stand a fair chance of demonstrating that
immunity where a state refuses to prosecute a particular category of crime does not
always succeed in intimidating national institutions or the rule of law.658 This has
important collective impl ications for quashing local support for someone who has
exercised popular authority and boosting the victims ' sense of justice.659 National and
international prosecutions may ultimately help to build reconciliation and peace between
conflicting segments in society. 66o
The lee may help to deter some of those who might otherwise commit crimes
within its jurisdiction.f" If so, this will reduce the need to send"peace-keeping troops to
countries throughout the world in the aftermath of such atrocities.662 Before the
establishment of the lee when no tribunal existed, ad hoc tribunals were often deprived
of key evidence; hence perpetrators of international crimes remained immune from
prosecution.f" The continuation of the lee could render ad hoc tribunals unnecessary. r'"
656 Note 589 above, at 22 .
657 Ibid.
658 Note 645 above, at 399 .
659 Note 39 above, at 71.
660 Note 589 above, at 22 .
661 Note 574 above, at 412.
662 Note 653 above, at 891.
663 Note 574 above, at 412 .
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According to Robertson, in some cases neither ad hoc tribunals nor national
I d . . I' 665 Hcourts prosecute people who have former y perpetrate mternationa cnmes. estates
that any former perpetrator of (core international crimes' who retains a power base in his
country will remain safe from prosecution, since in retirement he or she is unlikely to
constitute a threat to international peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and
besides, the home state may lack the will to try them. It is nevertheless that Article 23 of
the Rome Statute confirms the principle that a law may not be applied retroactively to
crimes committed before it was enacted. On the other hand, according to Article 27 of the
Rome Statute, the ICC has no status of limitations, meaning that former perpetrators of
international crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC will not be safe whatever their age.
Nonetheless, any deterrent effect the ICC may have not apply to individual
citizens of non-ratifying states; hence, accused persons in such states need not fear
prosecution by the ICC.666 Furthermore, perpetrators of the crime of aggression can enjoy
immunity while the crime of aggression is still being defined by the ASP, in light of the
fact that individuals might, or might not, be punished by the UNSC under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter.i'" It is submitted that the ICC acts as a deterrent to serious international
crimes in two ways: directly, when its divisions investigate and prosecute these crimes
and indirectly when the existence of the ICC motivates states to prosecute those accused
of these crimes themselves.
Despite the fact that the ICC has not yet come up with a definition of the crime of
aggression, it can prosecute the perpetrators of that crime if they commit other
international crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICe. Individual state leaders who are
guilty of waging aggressive war are also likely to be guilty of committing other crimes
defined in the Rome Statute.668
665 Note 179above, at 350.




4.7 International Co-operation with the International Criminal Court
Before the Rome Conference, a disagreement arose in the PrepCom's working group
concerning states' obligation to co-operate with the ICC. 669 Some states felt that this
obligation should be absolute while others felt that a degree of discretion should remain
with the state. 670 Despite the fact that the ICC depends on the international community to
perform some of its tasks, the Rome Statute does not provide a definition of the principle
of co-operation with national judicial systems. Miskowiak believes that a state should not
be able to justify, internally or externally, its lack of co-operation by referring to the
absence of clear provisions in the Rome Statute if the ICC requests compliance.F"
However, the general principle of national co-operation with the ICC appears sound and
should be encouraged, with appropriate refinements.672
It is submitted that the motivation for setting up the ICC was and is moral and
effective. It is up to states to provide the necessary aid to enable it to function effectively,
including national co-operation and voluntary assistance.F" The ICC depends on either
co-operation on a case-by-case basis or a more general acceptance of its jurisdiction and a
national willingness to facilitate its investigations.V"
4.7.1 The Need for International Co-operation
All international institutions depend to some degree on states' co-operation in order to
effect their mandates.
675
However, according to the forth paragraph of the Preamble of
the Rome Statute, the Ice depends on international co-operation to perform its primary
functions.
669 Note 39 above, at 71.
670 Ibid .
671 Ibid.
672 Note 623 above, at 434 .
673 Scharf, M.P. 1994. "Getting Serious about an International Criminal Court", Pace International Law
Review, 6: p1l8.
674 Ibid .
675 Note 152 above, at 527.
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According to Miskowiak, the ICC, like any criminal court, has the capability to
request co-operation, implying that its requests must be taken seriously.Y" She points out
that national judicial systems rely on the coercive powers granted to them under local law
in order to function effectively, while the willingness of states to co-operate with the ICC
seems to be related to the political will of each state. It is submitted that if it were not so,
the credibility of the ICC would be undermined and its deterrent effect would be
minimised.
4.7.2 Co-operation with the Request for Information
Article 18, paragraph 5 of the Rome Statute authorises the prosecutor to request a state to
report on the progress of investigations in the state. This Article is mainly concerned with
rulings on jurisdiction and admissibility. States parties are obliged to provide the ICC
with updated reports indicating the progress of their investigations and cannot unduly
delay their submissions.?" Article 19, paragraph 11 of the Rome Statute provides similar
authority for the prosecutor to request information from a non-ratifying state but in this
case the state is not obliged to co-operate with the ICC .678 Therefore, such a request for
information is not binding upon it.679
According to Steele, even though the prosecutor may periodically be able to
request information from a state regarding its investigations, this information may not
necessarily be sufficient to gauge the willingness or unwillingness of a state to investigate
crimes.68o He concludes that this can happen when a state intentionally misleads the ICC
in order to prevent it from ruling that a case is admissible. It may, in such cases, be
possible for the prosecutor to show that a state is unwilling to investigate or prosecute, in
accordance with the Rome Statute, at a time after a prosecution is actually launched.t'"
676 Note 39 above, at 73.
677 Note 589 above , at 26.
678 Ibid.
679 Ibid.
680 Note 589 above, at 15.
681 Ibid.
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However, this means that a mala fide state seeking to secure its nationals from
prosecution by the ICC might use the time between the initiation of an investigation and
f . d id 682the commencement 0 a prosecution to estroy evt ence.
Fairness is achieved when the prosecutor notifies states parties of his or her
intention to initiate an investigation.F" Non-ratifying states that are affected by the
decision are entitled to receive notification under Article 18, paragraph 1 that a situation
has been referred to the ICe, or that the prosecutor, acting propria motu, is conducting an
investigation. This puts the relevant states on notice and allows them to challenge the
jurisdiction or admissibility of a case before the ICC.684 Under this Article, paragraph 2
these states have the right to challenge the admissibility of a case at an early stage of the
proceedings and at various intervals thereafter.
These policies are based on the need to prevent a situation in which the ICC and a
national state are simultaneously conducting two investigations of the same case.685 The
policies take into account the fact that it is sometimes necessary to take interim measures
to secure evidence or to prevent a person from absconding while the ICC determines the
admissibility of a case.?"
According to Article 93 of the Rome Statute, states are required as far as possible
to comply with requests for information which may serve as evidence and, more
importantly, using national law as an excuse not to comply with these requests is
discouraged. Article 72, paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Rome Statute provides that if a state
believes that disclosure of information or documents that the accused may have would
prejudice its national security interests , the state shall have the right to ask the ICC to
obtain information or evidence from different sources. Citing national security interests
as a ground for non-disclosure of information tends to be used too widely to be taken
682 Ibid .
683 Note 589 above, at 23.
684 Ibid .
685 Note 589 above, at 26.
686 Ibid.
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seriously; as such, interests could be fully protected through procedural provisions .f" It is
submitted that the ICC may offer to refrain from disclosure of sensitive material or
information and this may have a negative effective on the ICC 's determination to put an
end to immunity. It is further submitted that such offers should occur as rarely as
possible .
4.7.3 States' Obligation to Co-operate with the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute has drawn up different formulae in terms of which states are obliged to
co-operate with the ICC.688 It affirms that serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must be punished and that states have an obligation to take steps at
the national level to enhance international co-operation and ensure that the ICC remains
effective.689
Miskowiak states that the general obligation of states to co-operate, as stated in
Article 86 of the Rome Statute, was worded relatively strongly.690 She believes that the
duty of states to co-operate fully will be the guiding principle in future cases that come
before the ICC. This duty creates a strong presumption in favour of the competence of the
ICC in relation to co-operation requests, which states must take seriously.f'"
Article 93, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute specifies where states are obliged to
co-operate with the ICC as follows :
States Parties shall , in accordance with the provisions of this Part and under procedures
of national law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following assistance in
relation to investigations or prosecutions:
(a) The identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items;
687 Note 39 above, at 72.
68&
The Preamble(4), note 15 above.
6&9 Ibid.
690 Note 39 above, at 73.
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(b) The taking of evidence, including testimony under oath, and the production of
evidence, including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Court;
(c) The questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted;
(d) The service of documents, including judicial documents;
(e) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts before the
Court;
(f) The temporary transfer of persons as provided in paragraph 7;
(g) The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and examination of
grave sites;
(h) The execution of searches and seizures;
(i) The provision of records and documents, including official records and documents;
(j) The protection of victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence;
(k) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets
and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without
prejudice to the rights of bonajide third parties; and
(1) Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested
State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court.
Hall states that states parties should refrain from acts that would defeat the object
and purpose of the Rome Statute.692 He states that they also have an obligation to carry
out their responsibilities to the UN. The ICe ought to have equal authority with any ad
hoc tribunal established by the UNse before the Rome Statute was adopted.693 However,
unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICe was not established directly by the UNSe, so at
present, it appears that its influence may be less than theirs.694 It is submitted that the ICe
may exercise power equal to that of the national courts although its power does not derive
directly from a national electorate, but from the ratification of the Rome Statute by the
state.
According to Steele, if the Pre-Trial Division determines that a state party is
unable to co-operate with the ICe, it may authorise the prosecutor to investigate crimes
692 Hall, C.K. 1998. "The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an




on the territory of that state party.695 It is submitted that the circumstances under which
this authorisation might be given could, for example, be those of a country with no
effective government.
According to Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Rome Statute, the ICe may
only exercise its jurisdiction either in territories of states parties or when the suspect is a
citizen of a state party, or if his or her country has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICe in
the particular case. Non-ratifying states may declare their agreement that the jurisdiction
of the ICe may be exercised with respect to the crimes in question.F" Such declaration
requires full co-operation from the state to which the request is put without delay.697
It is submitted that where the ICe requires co-operation from a non-ratifying
state, it will put a formal request to that state. If that state refuses, the ICe may ask the
UNSe to make the request on its behalf, which it is empowered to do under chapter VII
of the UN eharter.698 Miskowiak points out that some state may assist the ICe without
being under a legal obligation to co-operate in terms of the Rome Statute.699 In other
cases, states may wish to co-operate with the ICe without being requested to do so, for
example, when a state wishes to clear the name of a person suspected of international
crimes.I'" It should be noted that, in most cases, co-operation will not be voluntary and
states, almost certainly, will seek to shield citizens from prosecution, or will try to retain
them for prosecution by the national courtS.701
For the ICe to be able to carry out its functions, it is essential that the Rome
Statute clearly declare that, whilst states may challenge the admissibility of particular
cases, they must comply with the decisions of the ICe, even those not to their liking.702
695 Note 589 above, at 27.
696 Ibid .
697 Ibid.
698 Kreb, C. and Prost, K. 1999 . "Article 87 : Requests for Cooperation: General Provisions" . In Triffterer,
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No state is allowed to make a unilateral decision not to co-operate with the ICC In
particular cases based on inadmissibility.703
4.7.4 Examples of Co-operation and Non-eo-operation with the International
Criminal Court
It is submitted that the ICC is a judicial institution that deserves proper support and co-
operation from states parties and as much support as possible from non-ratifying states. It
incorporates the essential guarantees of the international criminal justice system and
recognises the importance of ensuring a fair trial to defendants and complainants alike .
704
This dissertation examines the actions of various states regarding the implementation of
the ICC .
4.7.4.1 South Africa
It is submitted that South Africa is a good example of state co-operation with the ICC.
During PrepCom sessions South Africa was considered a valued member of the
consortium of like-minded states?05 It was represented in the Ding Committee of the
Rome Conference by Medard Rwelmira from the University of Western Cape, who was
the head of the South African delegation at the Rome Conference and a co-ordinator of
the working group on the Composition and Administration of the ICC. 706
Appropriately, the South African delegation took the lead in having the crime of
apartheid included in the definition of crimes against humanity. i'" During the PrepCom
discussions, South Africa submitted a report on the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, which appealed to the international community to recognise
the processes of the Cornmission. i'"
703 Ibid.
704 Ibid.
705 Note 264 above, at 129.
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708 Dugard, 1. 2002. "Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions" . In Cassese, Geata and
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On 17 July 1998, South Africa signed the Rome Statute.
709
On 27 November
2000, it ratified the Statute, becoming the twenty-third state party. 71O The South African
parliament adopted legislation, which includes provisions on co-operation with the ICC
and recognition of its ' universal jurisdiction' .711 By adopting this legislation, which came
into effect on 16 August 2002, South Africa has consolidated all ICC-related matters into
a statute, thus avoiding disparate amendments and provisions.
712
It appends the Statute as
a schedule to the South African Constitution, thus making it part of the law and adopting
. . d f .. 713Its vanous e imtions.
Section 232 of the South African Constitution"!" states : " [c]ustomary international
law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of
Parliament" . According to this section, crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC are
recognized as crimes in South Africa. South Africa will co-operate with the ICC even
though its courts are not involved in direct co-operation with international tribunals, and
the South African diplomatic practice will determine the best way to do this.
715
4.7.4.2 The United States
The US has reservations about the ICe. Since 1998, the negotiating envoys of the US
have made extraordinary efforts to secure modifications in the text of the Rome Statute
that would enable the US to join the ICC.716 The US has pressed for restrictive definitions
of certain international crimes, especially war crimes and the crime of aggression, the
right of veto for permanent UNSC members on any investigation or prosecution, a limit
on the power of the prosecutor to initiate investigations, and high thresholds for the
709 The International Criminal Court Now website, Country information, South Africa. Available at
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jurisdiction of the ICC over genocide and crimes against humanity.717 The participating
states in the Rome Conference rejected these suggestions.?"
The US intends to protect its nationals against prosecution in the ICC, particularly
those who work in the name of peace-keeping in states parties, and has therefore
submitted objections to some articles of the Rome Statute?19 Shortly before the fourth
session of the PrepCom (13-31 March 2000), the US submitted two lists of suggestions to
the other states.720 It consisted of a two-part proposal dealing with co-operation and
jurisdictioni" This became the focus of intensive discussion and consultation at the
PrepCom.722
The first proposal was tantamount to giving the right of veto to the state of which
the accused is a citizen.723 This proposal was rejected at the PrepCom meetings, since it
was inconsistent with the principle of complementarity.724
The second proposal would prevent the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction over a
citizen of a particular state who was accused of a crime on the territory of a state party,
unless his or her state authorised the jurisdiction of the ICe. 725 This proposal was also
rejected since it was contrary to Article 15 of the Rome Statute, which authorises the
prosecutor to investigate crimes regardless of the nationality of the accused or whether
the state ofwhich the accused is a citizen grants permission.726
On the first day of the fifth session of the PrepCom (12-30 June 2000), the US
delegation introduced an amended version of the first part of the above-mentioned two-
717 Note 692 above, at 556.
718 Note 264 above, at 109.
719 Koh, H.H. 2003. "Yale Law School Professor Harold Hongju Koh Defends the ICC Before the US
Congress". Available at www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2003/0714koh.htm (accessed on 25 October
2004).
720 Note 143 above, at 31.
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part proposal intended to prevent the surrender of US citizens to the ICC?27 The US
appeared willing to sweep aside all of its objections in exchange for the inclusion of a
provision requiring the approval of UNSC as a prerequisite for the jurisdiction of the
ICC.728
On 31 December 2000, one of the final acts of the former US government (the
Clinton administration) was to sign the Rome Statute on behalf of the US. 729 In May
2002, the current US government (the Bush administration) again attempted to put into
effect the conditions that exempt US citizens from prosecution under the ICe. 730 When
the states parties refused to do this, the US withdrew its approval. 731
With this implicit rejection of 'universal jurisdiction', the US began urging states
parties to sign bilateral agreements with it.732 Under these bilateral agreements, US
citizens or people employed by the US who were accused of crimes and whose crimes
were within the jurisdiction of the ICC, would be extradited to the US, pursuant to Article
98 of the Rome Statute, and thereby avoid prosecution in the ICC. It is submitted that
limiting the scope of the jurisdiction of the ICC in this way threatens the achievement of
justice under the authority of the ICC if the non-ratifying state seeks (through its request
for extradition) to shield its citizens from international prosecution.
In 2002, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1422, which was proposed by the US?33
This Resolution exempts personnel in the UN peace-keeping, diplomatic and
philanthropic operations from prosecution in the ICC for one year, such exemption being
renewable annually. It is submitted that the aim of the Resolution is to shield the citizens
of non-ratifying states. On the other hand, countries that are considered to be strong ICC
727 UN Doe. PCNICC/2000/WGRPE (9)/D.
728 Note 198 above.
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730 Corell, H. 2004 . "A Question of Credibility". Available at
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supporters, namely Canada, Jordan, New Zealand, Liechtenstein and Switzerland,
requested an 'open meeting' to discuss the Resolution in order to give non-UNSC
members an opportunity to 'voice' their opposition to it.
734
Human rights observers have condemned the US attitude towards the ICC.
735
Many individuals, states and legal consultants have urged the US to adopt the Rome
Statute and to stop negotiating the aforementioned bilateral agreements.r'" It is submitted
that the US is an influential country that possesses strong enforcement measures of its
own and it is able to play a part in the implementation of ICC judgments. Also, the US is
capable of paying a large percentage of the budget of the ICC, especially since the annual
contribution of the US to the UN is approximately 25% of its budget.737
Bartram Brown concludes that the US has a sinister motive for its objections and
its refusal to submit to any higher authority.738 Even if there is credible information that a
crime has been committed, only the US and the other four permanent numbers of the
UNSC will be permitted to judge that conduct.739
Thus, despite the fact that the US is a non-ratifying state, the jurisdiction of the
ICC over a US citizen accused of crimes in a state party is generally unavoidable when
the state party involved does not have a bilateral agreement with the US that allows for
the extradition of the accused of international crimes.740 ID van der Vyver believes that
the basic problem that confronts the US is that all crimes within the jurisdiction of the
734 Dicker, R. 2003. "U.N: Defend ICC in opening meeting" . Available at
www.hnv.org/press/2003/06/icc061103.htm (accessed on 22 December 2003).
735 Kenneth Roth, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, wrote letters urging for continued
resistance against "the US Immunity Agreements". Available at www.hrw.orglpress/2002/l0/eu-
icc10211tr.htm (accessed on 1 December 2003). On 21 October 2002, he sent these letters to the foreign
ministers of states parties and signatory states to the Rome Statute . On 1 December 2003, he sent a letter to
the Secretary of State, US Department of State, Colin Powel, "on US Bully Tactics against the International
Criminal Court" , urging him to bring an end to the "vendetta" against the ICC. Available at
www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/usa0630031tr.htm (accessed on 1 December 2003).
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ICC are subject to 'universal jurisdiction'.741 He concludes that the US cannot shield its
citizens in the ICC by refusing to ratify the Rome Statute.742 It is submitted that although
the US cannot prevent the ICC from carrying out its functions, the ICC would be stronger
with US support.
4.7.5 Co-operation of Individuals and Organisations
One feature that distinguishes the efforts to establish the ICC from most other endeavours
to establish international organisations has been the close though sometimes uneasy
partnership maintained by governments, inter-governmental organisations and NGOs in
the Ad Hoc Committee, PrepCom sessions and the Rome Conference.I" This sometimes
adversarial relationship has continued to characterise the work of the PrepCom, which
has received numerous documents from NGOs. These include a series of papers on war
crimes by the International Committee of the Red CrosS.744
Many organisations that promote human rights, women's rights and humanitarian
aid are in favour of the creation of the ICC.745 Furthermore, many dedicated groups such
as the Coalition for the ICC have promoted the ICC.746 It is unlikely that the state of
human rights in the world, whatever its shortcomings, could have progressed as much as
it has since WWII without the work of individuals and organisations such as these.747
One of the most problematic aspects of organised cnme IS its international
mobility.i'" This places serious obstacles in the way of national investigations and the
detection of criminal conduct. 749 It is therefore understandable that guidelines of the
Rome Statute should solicit effective co-operation arrangements on the exchange of
741 Note 264 above, at 113.
742 Note 264 above, at 114.
743 Note 413 above.
744 Ibid.
745 Note 113 above, at 246.
746 N bote 738 a ove, at 62.
747 Steiner, H.I. and Alston, P. 2000. International Human Rights in Context: p939.
748 Strydom, H.; Pretorius, I. and Klinck, M. 1997. International Human Rights Standard: p32.
749 Ibid.
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information between individuals and organisations as part of the effort to support the
ICC.750
Also, assistance from NGOs is important, SInce they operate on differing
mandates that focus on their own priorities and methods of action, bringing a range of
viewpoints to the human rights movement.751 In fact, the Rome Statute stipulates in
Article 15, paragraph 2 that the prosecutor may gather information from NGOs when
evaluating the seriousness of information relating to cases being investigated by the
ICe.752
In this way the participation of individuals and organisations may help to shape
the agenda in the direction that would be most beneficial for formulating the ICe. 753 This
would further the cause of human rights by punishing perpetrators of international crimes
and thus enhance the enforcement of international criminal law.754
4.8 The Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court
Diplomatic relations are useful to the ICC both in terms of recognising the principle of
complementarity and of enforcing judgements. These relations are based on interactions
at national and international levels. Sascha Luder argues that the ICC justice system can
only operate smoothly when the international community recognises the legitimacy of the
ICC.
755
It is submitted that it is very important for combating international crimes to
recognise the legitimacy of the ICC.
750 Ibid.
751 Note 747 above, at 939.
752 Note 113 above, at 241.
753 SeegenerallyVagts, D. 1998. "Restrictionfor Historical Wrong: The AmericanCourtsand International
Law",American Journal ofInternational Law, 92.
754 Note 39 above, at 69.
755 Luder, S.R. 2001. "Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Legal Natureof the International Criminal
Court". In Fischer,Kress and Luder, 2001 : p50.
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The ICC has the capacity to enter into contracts and commitments necessary for
its own proceedings.f" It may, for example, establish units to investigate particular
human rights violations.I'" For that purpose, it is endowed with international legal
expertise to draw up its agreements and contracts.f" It may exercise its statutory
functions and powers by special agreements on the territory of any state; for example, it
has agreements with its present host, the Netherlands.
On 19 November 2002, the ICC and the Netherlands finalised the Privilege and
Immunity Agreement. 759 This agreement defines the privileges and immunities of the
ICC's staff and enables the ICC to carry out its investigative and other tasks on the
territory of host states?60 In May 2003, the agreement was extended for twelve months.f"
However, the ICC will conclude Privilege and Immunity Agreements with other states
parties.762 In June 2003, the interim results of the working-level consultations between
the ICC and the host state regarding draft articles for a Headquarters Agreement were
presented to the ICe.763
In September 2002, the UN Secretary-General and the president of the ICC
finalised a Draft Relationship Agreement prepared by the PrepCom and adopted by the
ASP.
764
In December 2003, the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution allowing the
ICC to invite the UN Secretary-General to "take steps to conclude a Relationship
Agreement between the UN and the ICC and to present the negotiated draft agreement to
756 Note 179 above, at 354.
757 Ibid.
758 Ibid .
759 The International Criminal Court Now website, Country information, the host state. Available at





764 Relationship Agr~ement betwee.n the International Criminal Court and the United Nations (2004), ICC
ASP/I/3: p243. AVailable at www.lccnow.org/pressroom/ciccmediastatements.html (accessed on 5
November 2004).
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the UN General Assembly for approval".765 On 4 October 2004, the president of the ICC
and the UN Secretary-General signed the Relationship Agreement.i'"
The ICC also has the power to make agreements with non-ratifying states, which
compel them to provide assistance in investigations. Such agreements will also help to
resolve questions of extradition, as they will establish that states may accept the
obligation to assist the ICC in matters where it has jurisdiction, even though they are non-
ratifying states?67 Actually, states parties are unlikely to harbour persons who have
committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Such persons will generally live in
non-ratifying states. Such states are unlikely to allow the ICC and its prosecutor to
operate by special agreement on their territory unless the political system in that state
recognises the importance of an ICC investigation.768
4.9 Challenges Facing the International Criminal Court
There are many problems facing the ICC, especially those relating to the co-operation of
state with its judgments in spite of its competence to issue binding orders. This could be
envisaged from the problems experienced by the ICTY and ICTR769The Rome Statute is
not a perfect instrument; no internationally negotiated instrument can be that.77o Philippe
Krisch and Holmes argue that the Statute includes uneasy technical solutions, awkward
formulations and difficult compromises that partly satisfy states.?" However, they
conclude that the Statute is a balanced instrument, with enough strength to ensure the
effective functioning of the ICC and sufficient safeguards to foster broad support among
states.772
765 UN Doe. AlRES/58179 (2003).
766 Ibid.
767 Ibid.
768 Note 179above, at 354.
769 Note4 above, at 415.




4.9.1 Enforcement of the Judgment of the International Criminal Court
'Enforcement' the term used to describe the rules governing the implementation of
judgments by a state through its courts, executive agencies and police action .773 In
contrast to national courts, the ICC does not have entire systems in place to carry out its
orders, or assist in the investigation and prosecution of cases, and it has no associated
police .774 It also has no enforcement jurisdiction over citizens of non-ratifying states,
although they may enter into ad hoc arrangements for co-operation with the ICC. 775
Cases within the jurisdiction of international tribunals involve fundamental
humanitarian interests of concern to the international community as a whole, but the
weakest link in international law is the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms.i"
Sadat and Carden argue that enforcement problems make the jurisdiction of the ICC
feeble and have the potential to undermine its efficacy in prosecuting cases. 777 They
conclude that these problems affect the ICC just as they affect other bodies charged with
implementing international law in fields such as human rights and the international
environment. It is submitted that Sadat and Carden is over standing the case when they
uses the term 'feeble', since the ICC has right to make use of the law enforcement
mechanisms of states parties.
Furthermore, agreeing to ICC judgements may in some cases create enforcement
problems by placing national authorities in the awkward position of either violating their
national law or violating international treaty obligations to provide judicial assistance.T"
Bartram Brown points out that the present structure of the Rome Statute gives no
guidance in identifying valid bases for challenging requests by the ICC or prosecutor and
.. hei d 779 hresistmg t eir or ers. He suggests t at the Statute needs to enumerate the specific bases
773 Note 4 above, at 415.
774 Note 589 above, at 27.
775 1bid.
776 Note 623 above, at 408.
777 Note 4 above, at 415.
778 Note 623 above, at 434.
779 1bid.
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on which a state may refuse to comply with a request for judicial assistance.I" It is
submitted that enumerating the specific bases for refusing the request of judicial
assistance must be minimised to cases where the requested states violate international
obligations.
The ICC accepts assistance from the International Criminal Police Organisation
where it is consistent with the Rome Statute?81 In some circumstances, the ICC can also
use regional organisations, with which the state party co-operates to carry out its
function.782 The state keeps the ICC request for enforcement judgements confidential.i'"
According to Article 87, paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute authority to make requests and
ways of transmitting information are designated by each state party at the time of
ratification.
Daniel Brown believes that the more time that passes, the less likely it is that a
successful prosecution will take place.784 He states that delays during investigations or
trials are costly and result in a reduction in the effectiveness of witness testimony, which
deteriorates because of memory loss and death. Moreover, time delays provide greater
opportunities for loss and destruction of evidence and may lead to the fabrication of
evidence.i'" It is submitted that the ICC should avoid delaying investigations because
avoiding unjustified delays will enhance the ability of successful prosecutions.
4.9.2 Surrendering the Accused
The requested state shall surrender the person if the ICC has taken decision on
admissibility.I'" If it is necessary to transport the accused through another state, the
requested state could advise the ICC of whether the accused may be delayed or risk
780 Note 623 above, at 434.
781 Article 87(l)(b), note 15 above.
782 Note 698 above, at 1060.
783 Ibid.
784 Brown, D.J. 1999. "The International Criminal Court and Trial in Absentia", Brooklyn Journal of
International Law, 24: p783.
785 Ibid.
786 Kress, C. and Prost, K. 1999. "Article 89: Surrender of Persons to the Court". In Triffterer, 1999: pIOn.
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imprisonment.787 It is submitted that it is vital that information should be exchanged
between the ICC and states required to co-operate before accused persons are surrendered
to the ICe. It further submitted that states should refrain from delaying for security
reasons compliance with the ICC requests.
Miskowiak believes that because the ICC acts on behalf of the international
community, its functions should not be subjected to exacting security in terms of national
constitutions, as if the ICC were equivalent to national courtS.788 On the other hand, Sadat
and Carden argue that the national security exception in Article 72 of the Rome Statute
may be utilised to respond to legitimate concerns of states.789 They believe that
disagreement with the provisions of the Rome Statute may make states unwilling to co-
operate with the ICe. It is submitted that this problem might have a negative effect on the
future ofICC implementation.
Bartram Brown suggests that the PrepCom may consider amendments to the
Rome Statute which would exclude non-constitutional, non-fundamental, and
discretionary bases for refusing an ICC request to surrender the accused."? Granting the
ICC inherent jurisdiction over all cases involving a defined list of international crimes
without granting it mandatory power to enforce the surrendering of the accused might be
problematic in future?91 Ultimately, there would have to be a mechanism for the
enforcement of that jurisdiction if a state with custody of an accused refused to surrender
that individual. 792
Daniel Brown states that in a case where the accused has not been surrendered,
this might halt an investigation or a trial. 793 He argues against trial in absentia by stating
that it is both unnecessary and unwise to apply rigid constitutional principles to the ICe.
On the other hand, trial in absentia may serve to thwart the objectives of the ICC and
787 Ibid.
788 Note 39 above, at 68.
789 Note 4 above, at 447.
790 Note 623 above, at 434.
791 Note 623 above, at 409.
792 Ibid.
793 Note 784 above, at 783.
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permit an accused to evade justice by choosing not to appear before the ICe.794 Indeed, in
absentia authority seems aimed at targeting the accused who deliberately avoid
prosecution either by taking refuge in or receiving aid from a friendly state.795 It is
submitted that trial in absentia may, in some cases, serve the goal ofjustice and motivate
accused persons to appear voluntarily before the ICC, since such an appearance would
allow them to defend themselves.
Miskowiak argues that, disappointingly, states parties are not always obliged to
surrender a person to the ICC when there is an extradition obligation to another state.796
She points out that a state party that sympathises with the person in custody could decide
to extradite him or her to a country that would ensure that person a sympathetic trial. She
suggests that states, on becoming parties to the Rome Statute, need to revise their existing
extradition agreements with non-ratifying states, so that they may avoid violating such
agreements.
The Rome Statute seeks to specify the grounds on which the requested state party
must make its decision if it is under another extradition obligation. Claus Kress and Kim
Prost argue that the Rome Statute should ensure that the state in which the accused is
surrendered obeys the laws that permit such deliveries.F" Under the Statute, the
obligation is vague and seems to presume that a state party would not surrender the
accused if it had another extradition obligation to a non-ratifying state?98 It is submitted
that justice might be better served if states, by becoming parties to the Rome Statute, are
under a clear obligation to give priority to the requests of the ICe.
794 Ibid.
795 Ibid.
796 Note 39 above, at 65.




Article 98 of the Rome Statute states:
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third
State for tile waiver of the immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require tile
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender
a person of that State to the Court, unless tI1e Court can first obtain the cooperation
of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
It is submitted that Article 98 raises problems involving international agreements
between states, which under certain conditions prevent the ICC from proceeding with a
request for surrender for an accused . According to Robinson Everett, before the
establishment of the ICC, no such general agreements were known to exist.799 He states
that not even the Status of Force Agreement (as opposed to agreements between two
states) makes general provision for the extradition of accused persons to member-states
or to an international tribunal. He concludes that the bilateral agreements that exist
arguably only preclude the surrender of an accused person when a state has exclusive or
primary concurrent jurisdiction over an offence.
Article 98, paragraph 1 could, in these circumstances, result in a former head of
state being granted immunity for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICe. 800 A national
who is not a citizen of the custodial state, who is suspected of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC, might go free if the custodial state perceives the immunity of the
person to be consistent with international law.80 1 This could happen even if the custodial
:: Everett, R.O. 2000. "American Servicemembers and the ICC". In Sewall and Kaysen, 2000: pp138-139.
Note 589 above, at 13.
801 Article 98, note 15 above.
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state, the state of official permanent residence and the state of nationality of the suspect
were all states parties and were thus bound by the jurisdiction of the ICC.802
Article 98 directs the ICC not to take action that would result in states violating
their international obligations to accord immunity to foreign officials.f'" Miskowiak
states that bilateral agreements may be used to prevent other states parties from arresting
those accused of crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC; therefore, such agreements
may impede the ability of the ICC to gain custody of state officials.f'" She adds that
Article 27 of the Rome Statute removes the immunity of state officials but the ICC does
not have independent powers to arrest them and must rely on states to arrest and
surrender them.
According to Dapo Akndde, although it is not easy to dismiss the argument that
Article 98 preserves the immunity of officials of states parties, under international law,
the conferral of power on states to arrest a visiting serving head of state or a serving
ambassador would have far-reaching effects.805He states that it is probably the only way
that such persons could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the ICe. The ICC, however,
would be stronger if the Statute entitled it to prosecute persons accused of committing
crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, no matter where they were residing as soon as
his or her country is a party to the Statute or the crime has been committed in a state
party.806 It is submitted that participating states in the Review Conference should amend
Article 98 and confirm the ICC's rule of 'universal jurisdiction' and the principle of 'no
immunity' .
802 Note 39 above, at 64.
803 Akande, D. 2004. "International Law Immunities and the International Court", American Journal of
International Law, 98(3): p420.
804 N bote 39 a ove, at 65.
805
Note 803 above, at 421.
806 Ibid.
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4.9.4 Theoretical Potential of the Rome Statute to Violate Customary
International Law
It is theoretically possible that the Rome Statute could violate international customary
law because, in some cases, it could allow the ICe to try individuals for international
crimes without the consent of their states.807 The theory is that if the ICe tries an
individual for a crime, then in some extended sense, that individual 's national state is
subject to obligations under the Rome Statute.
808
A fundamental tenet of the principle of international customary law of treaties is
that no state can be burdened with obligations from any treaty to which it is not a
signatory.809 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties810 states: "[a]
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent".
This Article seems to be in contradiction to Article 12 of the Rome Statute, which gives
the ICe jurisdiction in the territory within which the crime in question occurred, even if
the accused is a citizen of a non-ratifying state.811 On the other hand, the Statute should,
as far as possible, respect customary international law because of the fact that the ICe is
an international instrument which is subject to international law.812
Michael Scharf concludes that the ICe gains jurisdiction over citizens of non-
ratifying states , but does not put any obligation on these states .8I3 Models of the
obligations that the Rome Statute places on states parties include the following : they
should provide funding; they should assist in the transfer of indicted persons ; and they
80 7 Note 198 above, at 1.
808 Note 653 above, at 896.
809 Scharf, M.P. 2000. "The ICe's Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-Party States" . In Sewall and Kaysen,
2000 : p220.
810 On 22 May 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted. On 23 May 1969 it was
opened for signature by the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties. The Conference was convened
pursuant to the General Assembl y Resolutions 2166 (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and 2287 (XXII) of 6
December 1967. The Conference held two sessions, both at the Neue Hofburg in Vienna, the first session
from 26 March to 24 May 1968, and the second session from 9 April to 22 May 1969. On 27 January 1980,
this Convention entered into force. Available at www.un.orglIaw/ilc/teA1s/treaties.htm (accessed on 31
August 2004).
81 I Note 784 above, at 796.
812 Note 87 above, at 25.
813 Note 809 above.
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should co-operate with the ICC by providing evidence that may be crucial in aiding the
prosecution of criminals.t'" Non-ratifying states, which have not joined the ICC, are
therefore not obliged to do the above things.
815
Scharf gives a few examples where international treaties have gained 'universal
jurisdiction' over the citizens of states that have not ratified and are not signatories to a
particular treaty.816 He points to the four Geneva Conventions , the 1958 Law of the Sea
Convention, the 1970 Hijacking Conventions , the 1971 Aircraft Sabotage Convention,
the 1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention, the 1979 Hostage Taking
Convention, the 1984 Torture Convention, the 1988 Airport Security Protocol and the
1988 Maritime Terrorism Convention.
There are also a few examples of occasions when one state exercised jurisdiction
over individuals of another state without their country 's consent. In 1990, in the case of
United States v. Yunis,817 the US exercised 'universal jurisdiction' over a citizen of a
non-state party to the Hijacking Convention, in spite of the fact that the crime itself was
not previously recognised as being subject to 'universal jurisdiction' in terms of
international customary law.818 In this case, the US prosecuted a Lebanese man who
hijacked a Jordanian Airliner with two Americans on a board at the Beirut Airport,
although Lebanon was not a party to the Hijacking Convention and did not consent to its
citizen being tried in the US.819 In 1998, in the case of United States v. Ali Rezaq,820 the
accused, a Palestinian, was found guilty of the hijacking an Egyptian airliner, even
though Palestine was not party to the Hijacking Convention.821
814 Note 809 above, at 220.
815 Note 113 above, at 238.
816 Note 809 above, at 220.
817 See the Appeal from the US District Court for the District of Columbia (Criminal no. 87-(0377) 1991.
Decided on 29 January 1991. Available at www.terrorismcentraI.comlLibrary/TeasersNnisAppealT.html
(accessed on 13 September 2004).
818 Note 809 above, at 221.
819 Ibid.
820 See the Decision of the Supreme Court of the US (Criminal no. 97-6203) 1998. Available at
~~.usdoj.gov/osglbriefs/I997/3mer/2mer/97-6203 .mer.html (accessed on 13 September 2004).
Note 809 above, at 221.
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According to Scharf, the US argues that universal jurisdiction cannot be delegated
to an ICC that is established by international treaty.822 Customary and conventional
international law have established that certain crimes are against the universal interests;
they are offences against universal public policy and are universally condemned.V' After
WWII, the Allies invoked the idea of universal jurisdiction when they established, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. 824
It is submitted that Article 12 of the Rome Statute may not be considered as
violations of customary international law. It is further submitted that Article 12 may be
considered as a development of international criminal law and contributes to the
development of the concept of 'universal jurisdiction' .
4.9.5 States Parties which Fail to Comply with the Rome Statute
Kreb states that the starting point of prosecutions on the international level is the same as
in national proceedings: prosecutions will be undertaken after consideration of the matter
and will be dependent on witness testimony.t" However, he points out that beyond these
initial points there are distinct differences that cannot be ignored. Neither the judges nor
the prosecutor or defence counsel has subpoena powers to compel witnesses to appear.826
These subpoena powers continue to reside in the nation state or states involved.827
Cogan argues that even if the ICC had subpoena powers and could , in theory, find
a powerful state in contempt for non-compliance, it is unlikely that such a finding would
be enforceable without the states' consent. 828 He states that instead, it might be
822 Note 809 above.
823 Denecke, 1. 2002. "The Admissibility of a Case before the International Criminal Court: An Analysis of
Jurisdiction and Complementarity". Masters Dissertation: p47.
824 Note 823 above, at 48.
825 Ibid.
826 Note 4 above, at 447.
827 Ibid.
828 Cogan , 1.K. iooo."The Problem of Obtaining Evidence for International Criminal Court", Human
Rights Quarterly , 22(2) : p425 . .
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disadvantageous to the ICC to issue orders without taking the dynamics of world politics
into consideration because it lacks the mechanism to enforce its order.
The prosecutor can take some kind of initiative by using his or her discretionary
powers to bring a complaint before the ICC, especially in a situation where states or the
UNSC refuse to file a complaint. 829 According to Mounts , Cassel and Bleich, the
institutional integrity of the ICC could be eroded if the UNSC influenced the prosecutor's
discretion to the extent that indictments appeared to be selective, as was the case in the
ICTY and the ICTR. 83o It is submitted that the prosecutor's discretion should be
independent ofUN influence .
4.9.6 The Political Influence of the United Nations Security Council
The Rome Statute uses a comprehensive system of criminal justice, which adds to the
collective security system of the UN.831 According to Article 2 of the Rome Statute, the
ICC is an independent permanent court which nevertheless has a relationship with the
UN system and organs. The UN, the UNSC and the ICC will become key components of
an international legal order devoted to the maintenance of peace.832
In a case where a state has deteriorated to such a point that its judicial system is
no longer functioning, the UN may consider ways to restore peace and order, even if it
means dispatching security forces to the state.833 Under these circumstances, it is not
difficult to imagine that certain organs of the UN could provide judicial assistance to the
ICC. According to Daniel Brown, introducing the notion of UN troops assisting the ICC
would probably not be politically wise.834
829 Ibid .
830 Note 574 above, at 441.
831 .
Note 755 above, at 49.
832 Note 179 above, at 353.
833 Note 784 above.
834 Ibid.
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The Rome Statute specifies two instances in which the UNSC could have a direct
influence on the ICC.835 These are in a case where the UNSC refers a matter to the ICC,
and where the UNSC makes a request to the ICC for the deferral of a case in terms of an
investigation or prosecution. The UNSC may refer a case to the ICC when it would be in
the interests of the maintenance of peace to do SO.836 Under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, this request from the UNSC would trigger the second type of jurisdiction (see
chapter 4.1). In such cases, co-operation with the ICC would be mandatory and would be
backed up by the implicit threat of UNSC sanctions for non-compliance.r'" Inability
could only occur in the case of non-ratifying states, since the prosecutor has independent
initiative in the case of states parties.
It is submitted that it is possible that the ICC might not, at present, be able to
investigate or prosecute some cases because the UNSC, from political motives, fails to
refer them. According to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, deferral or suspension of
jurisdiction is possible for a period of twelve months, and such deferral and suspension
may be renewed annually at the behest of the UNSC. Although the jurisdiction limits can
be used positively to encourage national prosecutions or resolve an ongoing conflict, they
can also be used to frustrate an important international prosecution.838
The ICC has jurisdiction over international crimes committed by perpetrators
irrespective of their station in life. However, with a UNSC endorsement, the ICC has
wide powers to arrest high-ranking offenders in non-ratifying states if their countries
refuse to surrender them.839 The effect of this has been that, contrary to the initial
perceived notion of the ICC's independence, the UNSC still has some measure of
control.840
835 Oosthuizen, G. 1999. "Some Preliminary Remarks on the Relationship between the Envisaged
International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council", Netherlands International Law Review 46(3):
£315 .
36 Note 198 above, at 4.
837 N 6ote 73 above, at 118.




On the other hand, the possibility of referring cases of non-compliance to the
UNSC would probably be a more effective mechanism than referral to the ASP because
the UNSC has the capacity to enforce its decisions while the ASP does not.
841
The chief
reason for the failure of the League of Nations was that it lacked the capacity to enforce
its decisions, especially when they involved its more powerful members. 842
In theory, when national authorities refuse a request, international tribunals can
apply to the UNSC for sanctions against the obdurate state.843 On the other hand, the
UNSC, even though it established the ICTY and the ICTR, does not have a very good
record in terms of prosecuting perpetrators of international crimes or violators of human
rights before such tribunals. 844 However, the ICTY and the ICTR have the formal
authority to command that co-operation be granted to them by the UNSC, acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.845
Political bodies such as the UNSC should not have any control over judicial
bodies such as the ICC because it is more acceptable for states to submit a local matter to
a judicial body than to refer it to a political one.846 If the ICC is perceived to be
influenced politically by the UNSC, states may have concerns about whether hearings are
impartial or not.847
The insistence that the ICC must be a genuine legal instrument motivates the ICC
to focus on the criminal liability of individuals who have committed serious crimes and to
set up an effective judicial system of international criminal justice. 848 However, a
decision to defer the jurisdiction of the ICC at the request of UNSC and to grant the
841 Note 39 above, at 77.
842 Edgar, A 2002. "Peace, Justice and Politics: The International Criminal Court, 'New Diplomacy' and
the UN System". In Cooper, AF.; English, J. and Thakur, R. (eds). Enhancing Global Governments:
Toward a New Diplomacy?: p144.
843 Farer, T. 2000. "Can International Criminal Law Help", Human Rights Quarterlv 22' plO7
844 - ,. .
Note 198 above, at 5.
845 Note 843 above, at 107.
846 Note 415 above, at 423.
847 Note 559 above.
848 Peter, M. 1997. "The Proposed International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Legal and Political
Debates Regarding Jurisdiction that Threaten the Establishment of an Effective Court", Syracuse Journal of
International Law and Commerce, 24 (Fall): p197.
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UNSC a greater say in its jurisdiction may not provide the world with the means it needs
to combat international crime.849 Instead, the ICC will serve as a lasting reminder that
justice can only be achieved when political realities and public support demand it be
hi d 850aC·leve .
The ICC increases global interest in the prevention and/or punishment of
international crimes, regardless of where the crimes take place or the parties involved in
the conflict.85l It should be remembered that, despite the existence of the ICC, the UNSC
still reserves the right to create its own ad hoc tribunals. This remains an option for the
UNSC if it finds that the ICC is not effective or its jurisdiction is too narrow.852
4.9.7 The Role of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court
According to Article 112, paragraph 6 of the Rome Statute, the ASP will meet annually at
the seat of the ICC or at the headquarters of the UN. Representatives of the ICC
president, the prosecutor and the registrar can attend meetings of the bureau, which is
elected by the ASP to assist it in carrying out its duties.853 According to Article 112,
paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute, non-ratifying states may participate as observers in the
ASP.
The role of the ASP is to oversee the administration of the ICe. 854 According to
Article 112, paragraph 2, ASP tasks are to approve the ICC budget, adjust the number of
judges in response to changes in the caseload and perform any other function consistent
with the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It usually considers
recommendations of the PrepCom and takes action in the event of a state party failing to
849 Ibid.
850 Ibid.
851 Note 39 above, at 29.
852 Ibid.
853 Article 112(3)(b), note 15 above.
854 Note 87 above.
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co-operate with the ICC.855 The ASP also has the task of revising and modifying the
provisions of the Rome Statute.856 According to Article 112, paragraph 7.1 of the Rome
Statute, decisions on matters of substance are taken by a two-thirds majority voting of
those present.
It may be appropriate for the ASP to assume limited supervisory powers over the
negotiated relationships between the ICC and states or organisations, though not over its
proceedings as a court.85? Under such a clause, a state may request the help of the ICC to
provide judicial assistance where that state's ability appears to be inferior to that of the
ICe.858
According to Article 87, paragraph 7 of the Rome Statute, if the ICC concludes
that, in the circumstances, the state to whom the request has been put is not acting in
accordance with its obligations under the Rome Statute, it may refer the case to the ASP
unless the UNSC has referred the matter to the ICe. In this case, the ICC can refer the
non-compliance case back to the UNSe. 859
It is submitted that, the ICC would still need the support of the ASP and the
UNSC to enforce any order it might make. It is further submitted that the relationships
between the ICC as a judicial body and other political bodies are sensitive because it is
important that the ICC be seen to have some independence from the ASP and some
means of distancing itself from politics. It is one thing to acknowledge the way the world
works; it is quite another to concede that this is the way it ought to work.860
855 Article 112(2), note 15 above.
856 See generally Anand, R. 1995. "The International Court as a 'Legislator'", Indian Journal of
International Law, 35(1).
857 Note 784 above.
858 Ibid.
859 Note 39 above, at 68.
860 Note 828 above, at 425.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Future of the International Criminal Court, Conclusion and
Recommendations
5.1 The Future of the International Criminal Court
In the words of James Crawford, "the process of developing a satisfactory permanent
International Criminal Court has to be an ongoing process like the process of building
Rome itself'. 861
The jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to the crimes mentioned in Article 5 of the
Rome Statute. This limitation is premised on the fear that states, although prepared to
accept the creation of the ICC in principle, might not be prepared to make the political
concessions necessary to ensure that it is optimally functional. 862 The expectation that lies
behind it is that in the future the states parties, after the successful prosecution of those
responsible for committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, will be
willing to expand the jurisdiction of the ICC to include other crimes.863
However, limiting the competence of the ICC to these crimes would facilitate a
coherent and unified approach to the exercise of jurisdiction.f'" This, therefore, was
believed to be likely to bring about state co-operation.f" It is submitted that, in the future,
the inclusion of other crimes (like drug trafficking or international terrorism) under the
jurisdiction of the ICe will depend on the success rate of ICC prosecutions and the way
in which nations see their roles.
861 Note 39 above, at 81.
862 Note 848 above, at 189.
863 Ibid.
864 Note 87 above, at 25.
865 Ibid .
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Miskowiak concludes that the effectiveness of the ICC will depend on the
political will of states to assist it in the investigation and prosecution of crimes.f" The
many problems relating to co-operation that have been experienced by ad hoc tribunals,
in spite of their power to issue binding orders, suggest that legal obligations are less
relevant than national political will. It is therefore more important that the provisions on
co-operation can be imposed effectively than that they are strong.
867
The problems
encountered in establishing the ICC symbolise the difficulties faced in trying to vindicate
the cause of human rights.868
According to Mounts, Cassel and Bleich, should the need arise to establish
enforcement units, at the Review Conference or before, these might make the
enforcement ofICC judgments easier or enable arguments in favour ofICC prosecutions
in national courtS.869 They state that the international community is not fully committed
to the concept of internat ional justice if it does not permit enforcement measures. They
conclude that the ICC stands, not only as a symbol of the application of international
criminal law, but also as real evidence of the goodwill of the international community.
In order to make ICC judgements effective, it will be necessary to raise public
awareness through dissemination of information and formal educational programmes.870
Better training for ICC staff would improve their skills and qualifications.V' This would
improve the development of ICC policies in combating international crimes and
establishing procedures to enhance the ICC's performance.t" Over and above, it is
submitted that providing training programmes for professionals from different parts of
the world, such as lawyers, statesmen, politicians and human rights activists, would
enhance state's co-operation with the ICe. It is further submitted that this would develop
a clear understanding of the role of 'international criminal justice' as a deterrent to
international crimes.
866 Note 39 above, at 73.
867 Note 39 above, at 81.
868 Note 574 above, at 426.
869 Ibid.




In theory, the ICC will deal with practical problems of investigation, prosecution,
trial and enforcement. However, in practice, it is submitted that although the
implementation of the ICC agenda should lead to impartial enforcement of international
criminal law there are, in particular cases, problems in obtaining the co-operation of
states. It is further submitted that the concept of the rule of law, accountability and
legality, can increasingly be expected to form part of the international community,
especially if each state party accepts its obligations. It is further submitted that it seems
almost inevitable that the code of the ICC, which is accepted as legitimate, will influence
the national laws of states parties. At the present time (October 2004) ninety-seven states
are party to the Rome Statute and have therefore conceded a part of the sovereignty of
their judicial decision-making to the ICC.873
However, an ICC concept of individual accountability would ultimately
necessitate a sustained enforcement of ICC decisions, at least by states parties, and might
eventually lead to the use of some kind of coercion.Y" It is submitted that the ICC
dispenses justice by holding important individuals at the top of chains of command
responsible for serious international crime; that is, crime committed by an organ of state
such as the army or the prison services. It is further submitted that the effect of a state
becoming party to the Rome Statute is that its citizens will enjoy the protection of its
code and will be influenced to accept its provision.
The Rome Statute is poised to contribute positively to the development of
international criminal law. It provides for the prosecution perpetrators of serious
international crimes and allows victims to participate in ICC procedures as well as
providing permanent legal remedies to such crimes where national systems fail.875 The
strength of the Statute ensures that individual accountability for crimes is subject to
873 The International Criminal CourtNowwebsite, Country information. Available at
www.iccnow.org/countrvinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html (accessed on 25 October2004).
874 Lattanzi, F. 2003. "The International Criminal Courtand NationalJurisdictions". In Broomhall, B.
International Justice and the International Criminal Court: between state consent and the rule oflaw:
p189.
875 N bote 564 a ove, at 107.
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national and international decisions and these decisions tend to lead to amendments of
national law where it is contrary to international law.876
According to Crawford, the Rome Statute has clarified much of the confusion
surrounding the vague definition of crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, for
example) tried in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.877 He states that the Statute has
included a new, wider jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, redefining them so as to
eliminate the necessity for a connection to armed conflicts. In the Rome Statute,
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are now listed and further elaborated
in the Elements of Crimes. 878 It is submitted that under the Rome Statute, provision is
made for the development of a comprehensive body of international humanitarian law
enforceable in the ICC, whereas the Geneva Conventions only made recommendations
and there was no standing court .
The Rome Statute itself is not guaranteed to bring about a radical change in
international law or the international judicial system without national co-operation.879
The ICC is the beginning of a new way of thinking about international law as going
beyond obligations of states and regarding individuals as capable of taking responsibility
for crimes.88o Besides prosecuting serious international crimes at the international level,
the ICC will serve a second and vital purpose, namely that of upholding the rule of
law.881
The ICC has repeatedly affirmed that its task is to apply the Rome Statute and
sometimes to interpret its provisions . The ICC is expected to play an important part in
developing international law, just as the criminal courts of the UK and the US have
876 Note 874 above .
877 Crawford, J. 2003 . "The Drafting of the Rome Statute". In Sands, P. (ed). From Nuremberg to The
Hague , the Future ofInt ernational Criminal Justice: p115.
878 Clapham, A. 2003 . "Issues of Complexity, Complicity and Complementarity: from the Nuremberg
Trials to the International Criminal Court". In Sands 2003: p47.
m '
I Note 653 above , at 869.
880 Note 878 above , at 33.
881 Booth, C. 2003. "Prospects and Issues of the International Criminal Court : lessons from Yugoslavia and
Rwanda". In Sands, 2003: p183.
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helped to form common law. 882 The ICC is expected to build a systematic body of
international criminal law from case to case.883 This will have an effect on all countries,
. b if . 884not only states parties ut even non-ran ymg states.
It is submitted that international criminal law developments are flowing into new
channels. Before the establishment of the ICC there were fewer references in treaties to
international criminal tribunals. It is further submitted that now that the ICC is effective,
references are likely to increase. In the past, international treaties mainly focused on
national courts and conferred complementarity of jurisdiction; they did not address the
extent or applicability of international jurisdiction clearly in terms of the gravity or the
systematic character of the crimes covered. 885
These developments may motivate states that have not yet signed the Rome
Statute to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC, either in terms of comity, ad hoc
arrangements, or other non-binding and possibly temporary arrangements with it.886
According to Article 125 of the Rome Statute, at present no more non-signatory states
may become parties to the Statute since the list of signatories closed on 31 December
2000 .
Article 123 of the Rome Statute provides that the Review Conference shall be
convened to consider any amendments to the Statute seven years after the entry into force
of the Statute, and at any time thereafter. The significance of the provision for the Review
Conference should not be underestimated. These will allow a gradual expansion of the
jurisdiction of the Ice at the pace of growing international political will and the
development of international law.887
882 Note 856 above.
883 Ibid.
884 Note 877 above, at 123.
885 Note 877 above, at 122.
886 Note 653 above, at 869.
887 Note 39 above, at 81.
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However, according to Article 122 of the Rome Statute, efforts to amend the
Statute need not wait until the Review Conference takes place , but may be effected at the
annual ASP if a two-thirds majority in favour can be obtained. It is submitted that any
amendments of the Rome Statute can affect the future of the ICC positively or negatively.
Non-ratifying states that are signatories to the final Act of the Rome Conference are
entitled to participate in the PrepCom and suggest amendments to the Rome Statute.
888
State delegations may, inter alia, prepare proposals for practical arrangements, rules of
d d d fi
. . f . 889proce ure an a e rution 0 aggression.
The ICC is at present moving into the implementation phase and should therefore
pursue questions concerning compliance with its legal processes.F" International law, as
represented and interpreted by the ICC, has continuing links with political science and
international relations.89 1 It is submitted that, as a generator of new legal norms, the ICC
must remain a subject of study in both these disciplines, and may affect their nature and
scope.
In this regard the jurisprudence - in particular the case law of the ICTY and ICTR
- may provide interpretative insights.892 The road ahead is difficult and considerable
obstacles continue to prevent the effective protection of potential victims of these crimes
under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 893 If a state offers immunity for 'international crimes'
and condones systematic and widespread violations of international criminal law and
human rights, it is betraying human solidarity, as well as the victims of conflict to whom
it owes a duty of justice.894 As well as building a relationship with each nation, the ICC
888 Note 39 above, at 82 .
889 Ibid.
890 Note 874 above , at 191.
891 Ibid .
892 Doennann, K., Doswald-Beck, K. and Kold , R. 2003 . Elements ofWar Crimes under the Rome Statute
ofthe International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentarv: pll.
893 •
Note 892 above , at 14.
894 Bassiouni, M.C. 2000 . "The Normative Framework ofIntemational Humanitarian Law : Overlaps, Gaps
and Ambiguities". In Schmitt, M. 2000. International Law across the Spectrum ofConflict: p38.
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has to create a culture of individual responsibility.f" This will enable the ICe to
prosecute international crime more effectively.896
5.2 Conclusion
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate the constitution, power and scope of the
ICe in prosecuting individuals and making them take responsibility for 'international'
crimes and then to determine whether the existence of the ICe will have a deterrent,
effect on international crimes. The question of whether the ICe is moving towards the
prevention of breaches of international criminal law, and whether it has yet reached its
maximum effectiveness must be asked.
The establishment of the ICe is the result of years of negotiations between states.
In chapter two, previous efforts to establish an Ice in order to impeach perpetrators of
international crimes and the final of establishment of the Ice were investigated . The ICe
is independent of any nation state and of the UN in its structure though cases can be
referred to it by states and by the UN, which also contributes financially to the budget of
the ICe.
In chapter three, crimes listed in the Rome Statute as being under the jurisdiction
of the ICe were enumerated and discussed. It is submitted that such a list may function as
a deterrent to those who intend to commit such crimes. It was shown that the Statute
defines a variety of acts that were not previously categorised as genocide or crimes
against humanity. A further category, war crimes, is also defined under the Statute, and
though earlier definitions , such as those in the Geneva Conventions, have been applied in
ad hoc tribunals, the clarity and extension of their definition in the Rome Statute is an
improvement in international law. Many innovations have been incorporated into
definitions of crimes in the Rome Statute : for example, ideologically motivated rape, with
895 Meron,T. 2000. "International HumanitarianLaw from Agincourt to Rome". In Schmitt, 2000: p311.
896 Rubin, A.P. 2000. "The International Criminal Court: A Sceptical Analysis". In Schmitt, 2000: p432.
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the purpose of destroying the ethnic fabric of a group, is included both as a crime against
humanity and as a war crime.
In chapter 3.3, it was argued that there is a balance between the rights of victims
and the accused in the proceedings of the lee, though this balance could be improved.
The lee has arrangements in place to protect victims. It is submitted that the accused are
also likely to benefit because the lee emphasises that people who are arrested or brought
to trial should receive fair treatment from the judicial system, irrespective of the final
decision to acquit or convict. It is further submitted that the international jurisdiction of
the lee is a potential safeguard against arbitrary and fallible national criminal procedures
against those who are accused of having committed serious international crimes, such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. Its justice is,
as far as possible, non-partisan and it therefore avoids the charge often levelled at ad hoc
tribunals like the Nuremburg Tribunals that they deal in 'victor's justice'. In this regard it
is likely to be easier for those accused of crimes to submit to the authority of the lee
with its human rights guarantees; such people will at least be assured that they will face a
fair trial, which might not be the case if they were tried by a national court or by an
authority with no commitment to upholding human rights.
The obstacles , real or potential, to the successful functioning of the lee were
dealt with in chapter four and include disputes between the lee and national courts as to
which has the right to institute judicial proceeding . A further problem may be the non-
judicial and potentially partisan influence of political bodies such as the UNSe upon the
lee. Other executive problems facing the lee are the enforcement of its decisions and
the non-compliance of states parties. Bilateral agreements between states parties and non-
ratifying states concerning the extradition of people accused of crimes under the
jurisdiction of the lee may also be problematic.
It has been submitted throughout this dissertation that it is necessary to combat
international crimes. The principle of complementarity (explained in chapter four) gives
national states priority in the institution of judicial proceedings. It is submitted that a
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good national prosecution IS more advantageous than a good ICC trial because it
generates national support for the international justice system. Dealing with grave matters
might also encourage the national judiciary to raise its standards of performance and be
more responsive to the concerns of those whose interests are traditionally ignored by the
courts and excluded from the system. It has been submitted in chapter four that the ICC
encourages states to prosecute international crimes and does not seek to replace the
national judicial authority. States parties always have a choice as to whether or not to
prosecute nationally a person suspected of having committed international crimes, even
though they fall under the jurisdiction of the ICe.
The existence of the ICC may imply a surrender of some part of their sovereignty
for states parties, and even for other states that co-operate to a limited extent with the
ICC, if they hand over individuals accused of serious international crimes to be tried by
the ICC . It is submitted that, despite the reluctance of nations to surrender any part of
their national sovereignty, members of the international community are coming to realise
that the ICC must have an effective system for prosecuting accused persons whose
positions of power might allow them to evade punishment nationally, especially in high
profile cases.
It is submitted that in order to mmrmise the problems facing the ICC the
following solutions may be effective:
1. States parties must fulfil their obligations by providing funding to the ICC, assisting
the ICC with the transfer of accused persons and co-operating with it further by
providing evidence in cases before the ICe.
2. The UNSC must use its influence to persuade states to disclose required information
and to enforce of the judgments of the ICe. It is submitted that the UNSC's role
should be limited to two functions, namely, the referral of matters to the ICC and the
offering of assistance to the ICC (upon its request) in executive measures. Any
resolution which aims to exempt individuals from ICC prosecutions, such as
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Resolution 1422 (2002) (see chapter 4.7.4.2), impedes the legal function of the ICe
and may thwart justice. Relationships between the ICe as a judicial body and political
bodies (UNSe and ASP) are sensitive because it is important that the judicial
chambers of the ICe are seen as independent of any political bodies. The ICe must
also be careful to distance itself from political rivalries .
3. Continued support for the ICe from individuals, organisations and states is necessary
in order to enhance its performance. It is very important that confidence in the ICe be
maintained.
4. Any bilateral agreements that seek to limit the jurisdiction of the ICe and prioritise
the requests of non-ratifying states to extradite individuals accused of serious
international crimes rather than surrender them to the ICe are a threat to international
judicial proceedings. States parties must refrain from signing the above-mentioned
agreements.
5. Anomalies by which non-ratifying states are answerable to the ICe in circumstances
in which states parties are not (see chapter 3.1.4) should be removed, preferably by
the states parties abandoning their present ' opt-out' clause.
5.3 Recommendations
It is submitted that the following proceedings and enactments are likely to improve the
functioning of the lee.
1. In order to arrive at a definition of the crime of aggression in the future, the specific
acts enumerated in the 1974 definition as constituting this crime should be retained as
the basis for defining it under the Rome Statute. This definition will be clearer and
less controversial than an illustrative list of examples of aggression , and therefore
more acceptable for inclusion in the Rome Statute. The ICe must decide priopro
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moto when acts of aggression occur without such a case being referred by the UNSC.
This suggestion addresses the necessity of amending Article 39 of the UN Charter,
which declares that determining situations of aggression is a prerogative of the
UNSC. The ICC only should determine the situation of aggression.
2. Special legislation, which may be prejudicial to human rights, may be introduced
nationally to deal with persons accused of terrorism. To exclude the crime of
terrorism from the jurisdiction of the ICC might deprive those accused of it of their
rights, or put them in a situation where human rights standards are not applied.
Terrorism, in principle, consists of unprovoked, but politically motivated attacks on
civilians. Examples are kidnapping of hostages, attacks on large buildings and
random shootings; these have violence against innocent individuals as their common
element and may come within the category of terrorism.
3. The ICC should, where the alleged crimes are sufficiently grave and large-scale,
accept cases when national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute those accused
of international crimes. The Rome Statute should be amended to include under the
jurisdiction of the ICC cases where national courts are unable to grant the accused
persons the same guarantees and rights which they would receive from the ICe.
Alternatively, the ICC should inform itself concerning the details of procedures and
fair trials within national states, and investigate whether the rights of accused persons
in detention are respected.
4. Successful ICC proceedings are likely to have an effect on national law, at least
amongst the states parties. Even non-ratifying states may frame their laws in the
consciousness of these internationally accepted definitions of human rights standards
because the majority of member-states in the UN are parties to the Rome Statute.
5. The ICC should concern itself only with prosecuting leaders and high-ranking
officials of states. The punishment of minor offenders is not necessary to achieve
respect for the rule of law.
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6. The ICC must grant the defence counsel more prestige. No conceivable formulation
of the relationship between international and national jurisdictions will be absolutely
water-tight, and diverse interpretations are likely to be offered. The prosecutor, who
serves in all the cases before the ICC and is well-known to the international
community, has far greater prestige than the defence counsel, who serves in a single
case. Establishing a strong International Criminal Bar may give defence counsels
more prestige. ICC funding should be used to subsidise the proposed International
Criminal Bar at least in the early stages. Allowing the accused persons the right to
choose counsel may be considered an improvement in human rights standards in
international criminal procedures, and may give defence counsel more prestige. This
would be at variance to the procedure at the Nuremberg Tribunals where the accused
were not entitled to choose their own counsel.
7. The specific grounds on which states may request to co-operate with the ICC should '
be clearly specified . Justice might be better served if states, when they become parties
to the Rome Statute, understand their obligation to give priority to the requests of the
ICC.
8. Because nation states delegated the powers specified in the Statute to the ICC when
their parliaments or equivalent bodies ratified the Rome Statute, the ICC should
exercise these powers, the most vital of which are those that relate to investigations
within states, extradition cases and powers to enforce verdicts .
9. A trial where the accused are in absentia may motivate the accused persons to appear
before the ICC and defend themselves.
10. The ICC will become stronger as more states ratify the Rome Statute . Non-signatory
states can sign ad hoc agreements with the ICe. Alternatively they can co-operate
with the ICC on the basis of comity. The US is an example of an influential non-
ratifying state that possesses strong enforcement measures of its own. It is willing, at
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times, to play a part in the implementation of ICe judgments, for example by
providing information about the whereabouts of accused persons.
Article 12 of the Rome Statute, which extends the jurisdiction of the ICe to
include citizens of non-ratifying states, bolsters the concept of 'universal jurisdiction'. It
is submitted that the 'universal jurisdiction' of the Ice in terms of which international
criminal law is applied to the accused persons is likely to cause international law to
influence national law bodies of law.
The ICe is likely to play a role in the development of international criminal law.
Although it has only been operating since 2001 and it is still too early to say whether it
has had any effect on the incidence of international crimes (defined in chapter three), it is
submitted that because of the powers ceded to it by states parties and the visible
implementation of its code within their territories, it is likely to be a deterrent force.
The ICe works as a deterrent to serious international crimes in two ways: directly
when it investigates and prosecutes these crimes, and indirectly when its existence
motivates states to take judicial action, since they usually prefer not to relocate cases to
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